Iran Focus

US forces are surrounding Iran, says Ahmadinejad

2008-09-24T18:10:00.000-07:00

Daily Times, 24/09/08

NEW YORK - Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad on Monday justified his policy of confronting the West by saying US troops are surrounding Iran. Interviewed by National Public Radio (NPR) about his stance, Ahmadinejad replied: "I’d like to ask you, is it the Iranian (army) that’s around the territories around the country, or is it the US troops that are around? "It is the US troops around our borders. It is not ours around the American borders. So what exactly are they doing over there?" he asked.

Ahmadinejad said the United Nations’ nuclear watchdog agency offers "the best guarantee" that Iran can enrich uranium for peaceful uses, and said the United States "should cease putting pressure" on the agency. He also said diplomatic relations between Iran and the United States should advance, citing a willingness to cooperate on security in Iraq. Asked if Iran has a plan to reassure the world it intends to use its nuclear program for peaceful means only, Ahmadinejad said the United States should "extend at least the equivalent of one-tenth the cooperation we have extended" to the UN’s International Atomic Energy Agency. "We believe that the IAEA itself offers the best guarantee," he added.

During the annual UN General Assembly, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice will meet in New York this week with her counterparts from Britain, Russia, France, China and Germany-the "P5+1" group-to decide how to proceed with Iran. The United States wants to impose new sanctions against Iran, but Russia and China are resisting the move.

Ahmadinejad said it was "the policy approach of the US government that’s been non-responsive and must change. It is not our proposals that are going to fix the problem." On US-Iranian relations, Ahmadinejad said he has "taken lots of leaps forward in this respect," adding: "I even said that I am prepared to talk at the United Nations with them." He also said Iran "responded positively" to Washington’s request "to extend a hand of cooperation in a joint security commission involved in upholding a security force for Iraq. So we did whatever we could."

Ahmadinejad compared his proposal for a Palestinian referendum on the future of Israel, West Bank and Gaza Strip to the end of the Soviet Union. "Let me create an analogy here-where exactly is the Soviet Union today? It did disappear-but exactly how? It was through the vote of its own people. So therefore in Palestine too we must allow the people, the Palestinians, to determine their own future," he said. agencies

President: Pursuing nuclear weapons is politically backwarded

2008-09-24T18:08:00.000-07:00

IRNA, 24/09/08

Iran's President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said on Tuesday that any state pursuing nuclear weapons is politically backwarded.

Addressing a press conference held on the sidelines of the 63rd meeting of the UN General Assembly, he said the real democracy exists in the Islamic Republic.

The Iranian people are their own masters, he said, adding that they elect the country's officials and have full supervision over the governing system.

On the critical situation in Palestine, he underscored the need for holding free referendum there in order to put and end to sufferings of the Palestinians.

He added that the Islamic Republic will propose a democratic plan to resolve the Palestinian problems. The plan will be presented to the United Nations soon, he said.

On combat against terrorism, Ahmadinejad said the Iranian nation is the victim of terrorism.

As to trilateral Iran-Iraq-US talks on Iraqi security, he added that the Islamic Republic is ready to help resolve Iraqi security problems.

On presence of foreign forces, including NATO forces in Afghanistan, the Iranian president said drug production has increased and the Western governments have stepped up extremist policies since arrival of NATO forces in Afghanistan.

He added that Iran enjoys friendly relations with both Pakistan and Afghanistan.

On recent developments in the Caucasus region, Ahmadinejad reiterated that the existing problem in that region should be solved by the regional states.

Referring to Iran's amicable ties with the United Arab Emirates, he emphasized that efforts by certain states to tarnish the existing relations will be vain.

Expressing his satisfaction with the volume of Iran-UAE trade exchanges, President Ahmadinejad said the Persian Gulf littoral states are able to settle their own issues in the best possible manner.

President protests US hurdles in way of Iran nuclear program

2008-09-24T18:07:00.001-07:00

IRNA, 24/09/08

President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad on Tuesday protested to the international community against the US creating obstacles in the way of Iranian nuclear program.

In his address to the United Nations General Assembly, President Ahmadinejad said: "With regard to Iran's peaceful nuclear program, despite the inalienable right of all nations including the Iranian nation, in producing nuclear fuel for peaceful purposes, and despite such facts as the transparency of all Iranian activities and our country's full cooperation with the inspectors of the IAEA and the Agency's repeated confirmation of the fact that Iran's activities are peaceful, a few bullying powers have sought to put hurdles in the way of the peaceful nuclear activities of the Iranian nation by exerting political and economic pressures against Iran, and also through threatening and pressuring the IAEA. These are the same powers that produce new generations of lethal nuclear arms and possess stockpiles of nuclear weapons that no international organization is monitoring; and, the tragedies of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were perpetrated by one of them.

"Indeed, they are not against weapons, but they oppose other nations' progress, and tend to monopolize technologies and to use those monopolies in order to impose their will on other nations.

"But it is very natural that the great Iranian people, with their trust in God, and with determination and steadfastness and with the support of its friends, will resist the bullying and has defended and will continue to defend its rights. The Iranian nation is for dialogue. But it has not accepted and will not accept illegal demands.

"The time has come for the IAEA to present a clear report to the international community on its monitoring of the disarmament of these nuclear powers and their nuclear activities, and for a disarmament committee to be established by independent states to monitor the disarmament of these nuclear powers.

"The theories of development that are in line with the hegemonic system and not in accordance with the true needs of humankind and human societies, have turned into repetitive and bland tools for assimilation of economies, expanding hegemonic domination, destroying the environment and destroying the social solidarity of nations.

"There is no end in sight to this. Poverty, hunger and deprivation are hurting more than one billion of the world's population and have dashed their hopes for a decent life.

"The dignity, integrity and rights of the American and European people are being played with by a small but deceitful number of people called Zionists. Although they are a minuscule minority, they have been dominating an important portion of the financial and monetary centers as well as the political decision-making centers of some European countries and the US in a deceitful, complex and furtive manner.

"It is deeply disastrous to witness that some presidential or premiere nominees in some big countries have to visit these people, take part in their gatherings, swear their allegiance and commitment to their interests in order to attain financial or media support.

"This means that the great people of America and various nations of Europe need to obey the demands and wishes of a small number of acquisitive and invasive people. These nations are spending their dignity and resources on the crimes and occupations and the threats of the Zionist network against their will.

"All these are due to the manner in which the immoral and the powerful view the world, humankind, freedom, obeisance to God, and justice.

"The thoughts and deeds of those who think they are superior to others and consider others as second-class and inferior; who intend to remain out of the divine circle, to be the absolute slaves of their materialistic and selfish desires, who intend to expand their aggressive and domineering natures, constitute the roots of today's problems in human societies.

"They are the great hindrances to the actualization of material and spiritual prosperity and to security, peace and brotherhood among nations. I explicitly state that the Iranian people and the overwhelming majority of peoples and governments are against those deeds and perspectives of the world-domineering powers.

"Establishment of justice requires people who have achieved moderation and justice inside themselves, and have restrained their domineering attitudes and actualized their attributes of self-sacrifice and are at the service of humanity.

"The complete and full-scale manifestation of such characteristics can happen only under the rule of the righteous and perfect human being who is obedient to God and who is promised by the divine Prophets."

Pakistan, Iran to speed up work on IPI project

2008-09-24T18:07:00.000-07:00

Jang Pakistan, 24/09/08

NEW YORK - Pakistan and Iran on Tuesday stressed the importance of deeper and wider bilateral ties in all fields and agreed to speed up the work on multi-billion dollar Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline project. The meeting held here between President Asif Ali Zardari and his Iranian counterpart Mahmoud Ahmadinejad on the sidelines of the 63rd UN General Assembly session covered a wide range of issues between the two countries.

The two leaders stressed the importance of early completion of over 2,700-km-long IPI gas pipeline project that could meet the much needed energy needs for the large industrial sector in Pakistan. The two leaders also discussed the import of additional 1,000 MW of electricity from Iran, to meet the energy shortage in the country, especially in Balochistan, and expressed satisfaction over the pace of talks.

Meanwhile, Pakistan and Turkey on Tuesday vowed to further expand their ties with a particular focus on trade and stronger economic cooperation, as their two leaders met here at the sidelines of the 63rd UN General Assembly. The talks between President Asif Ali Zardari and President Abdullah Gul of Turkey covered all facets of their bilateral ties, besides international matters and the situation in the region, with a particular focus on Iraq and Afghanistan.

Israel's Peres calls Iran's Ahmadinejad a "disgrace"

2008-09-24T18:05:00.000-07:00

By Matt Spetalnick
Reuters, 24/09/08

UNITED NATIONS - Israeli President Shimon Peres called Mahmoud Ahmadinejad a danger and a disgrace Wednesday, rebuking the Iranian president for his vitriolic condemnation of Israel and Zionism at the United Nations.

Taking the podium a day after Ahmadinejad's speech blaming "Zionist murderers" for everything from the Wall Street crisis to Russia's invasion of Georgia, Peres said: "His appearance here is already a shame."

This week's annual General Assembly gathering of world leaders was the latest setting for a long-running war of words between Israel and Iran as Tehran presses ahead with its nuclear program in defiance of U.N. sanctions.

Ahmadinejad, who has said in the past that Israel should be wiped off the map, struck first Tuesday, railing against the Jewish state and its chief ally the United States.

His accusations of Zionist control of world finance were swiftly and widely denounced as anti-Semitic, echoing the classic libel that blamed a world Jewish conspiracy for all the world's troubles.

"The Iranian people are not our enemies," Peres said. "Their leader is a danger to his own people, to the region, to the world ... He's a disgrace to this house."

Peres, who has called Iran's nuclear program an "existential threat" to Israel, urged further U.N. action against Tehran, already under three rounds of sanctions.

"We are able to defend ourselves. We do not intend to change this capacity," he said.

Israel, like the United States, has not ruled out military action if diplomacy fails to resolve the nuclear standoff. The West and Israel accuse Iran of seeking nuclear weapons. Iran insists it only wants civilian nuclear energy.

Israel is widely believed to have assembled the Middle East's only nuclear arsenal.

In his speech, Peres also cast further doubt on chances for a peace deal between Israel and the Palestinians by the end of the year, a goal viewed with skepticism since U.S. President Bush announced it at a peace conference in November.

"We tried to conclude those negotiations in this year," Peres said. "It will take apparently a longer period of time. I believe it can be accomplished in spite of it within the next year."

The latest obstacle is political uncertainty in Israel. Prime Minister Ehud Olmert handed in his resignation and Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni is now trying to pull together a new government.

A Nobel Peace Prize laureate, Peres also used his speech to renew an offer to Arab leaders to travel to Jerusalem to talk peace, a proposal that has never gotten off the ground.

(Editing by Alan Elsner)

Livni: Iran's request to join UNSC is absurd

2008-09-24T18:04:00.000-07:00

By Herb Keinon
Jerusalem Post, 24/09/08

Foreign Minister and Kadima leader Tzipi Livni took the United Nations to task Wednesday for giving a platform to Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, whose speech to the General Assembly the day before dripped with anti-Semitism and hatred of Israel.

"Ahmadinejad's speech at the UN demonstrates the absurd state of affairs of the organization whose founding motto was 'Never Again,'" Livni said, in a statement issued by her office.

Livni said that what was even worse than Ahmadinejad being given a stage at the UN was for Iran to be seeking admission to the Security Council, something Teheran has indicated it was interested in doing.

"Iran is now asking to be included as a member of the UN Security Council," she said. "This is like allowing a criminal to be his own judge and jury.

"This is an unprecedented absurdity-for a state that is threatening the security of its neighbors and calling for the destruction of another state to be a member of the body whose goal is to maintain international peace and security."

Livni said that what was needed now was "international pressure on Iran which would leave no doubt as to the price involved in ignoring the demands of the international community-rather than including Iran in the very body that is spearheading this action."

Livni has instructed Israel's representatives abroad to use Ahmadinejad's speech in efforts to prevent Iran's membership on the Council, an indication that while at first Israel thought Iran's campaign to get on the Security Council was just a joke, it is now taking it seriously.

'Iran's incitement start of a genocide'

2008-09-24T18:03:00.000-07:00

By Hilary Leila Krieger
Jerusalem Post, 24/09/08

"Iran has already started down the road to genocide," said human rights lawyer and Canadian MP Irwin Cotler, at a conference here Tuesday ahead of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's appearance at the UN later in the day.

Pointing to the International Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide's article criminalizing "public incitement to commit genocide," Cotler argued that Ahmadinejad's threats toward Israel and insults about the Jewish people violated the covenant.

"The crime of incitement to genocide has already been committed," Cotler told the conference against state-sponsored genocide, sponsored by The Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs and other organizations.

He cited Ahmadinejad's demonization of Jews by calling them "bloodthirsty barbarians" and worse, together with his calls for the destruction of Israel.

"Iran has paved the way to genocide, and genocide has already begun in [the sense of] incitement," he said.

For those who would dismiss such statements, former US ambassador to the UN Richard Holbrooke, who also spoke at the conference, stressed that "words matter."

Holbrooke noted that his own grandfather decided to move his family out of Germany in the 1930s when he read Adolf Hitler's Mein Kampf and took its message seriously-something that many other German Jewish families who ended up perishing in the Holocaust did not do.

"What you say today can turn into a policy tomorrow," warned Holbrooke, the architect of the Dayton accords, which ended the war in Bosnia in 1995.

Esther Mujawayo learned that lesson first-hand as a victim of the Rwandan Genocide of 1994, an experience she recounted at the conference.

She recalled that the genocide's perpetrators stated their intentions openly, and yet nothing was done because the international community lacked political will, a situation she doesn't want to see repeated.

Referring to Iranian designs, she said, "Let us unite-I think that's not a vain word-to stop them in time."

At the gathering, Cotler unveiled a petition urging states to fulfill their obligations as signatories to the convention and act against Ahmadinejad's incitement to genocide.

Such action should include asking the United Nations to investigate his statements, Cotler said, as the convention allows. And yet, he noted, up until now not one state had filed such a complaint.

"We have a chance now to prevent a genocide," he said. "Now is the time to act."

Venezuela: Iran to finance 25 factories

2008-09-24T18:01:00.000-07:00

Adnkronos International, 24/09/08

Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez has announced that 25 Iranian-built factories will open in the country in the near future.

The factories announced by Chavez in a televised speech will draw on Iranian technology and financial backing.

The factories will include corn flour mills, cement plants, dairies, automobile parts manufacturing units and petrochemical plants.

Economic and political cooperation between both countries has grown tremendously in the past three years.

Iran and Venezuela have also created a joint 2 billion dollar fund to finance investments in friendly third countries and has financed seven projects in Bolivia, Nicaragua and Cuba in the past few months.

EU warns Iran close to nuclear arms capacity

2008-09-24T17:58:00.000-07:00

EU warns Iran nearing nuclear warhead capability despite claims of peaceful atomic program

By George Jahn
AP, 24/09/08

Iran is nearing the ability to arm a nuclear warhead even if it insists its atomic activities are peaceful, the European Union warned Wednesday.

In comments prepared for delivery to the International Atomic Energy Agency's 35 board members, the EU also asserted that Iran appeared to have had a past nuclear arms program despite its denials.

The statement was made available to reporters as the meeting turned its attention on Iran's nuclear defiance on its third day. The main international concerns focus on the country's refusal to freeze uranium enrichment despite three U.N. Security Council sanctions and its blocking of IAEA attempts to follow up on intelligence suggesting it was developing a nuclear arms program until several years ago.

Iran insists its nuclear activities are geared only toward generating power. But Israel says the Islamic Republic could have enough nuclear material to make its first bomb within a year. The U.S. estimates Iran is at least two years away from that stage, and some experts say the country could reach that stage in as little as 6 months through uranium enrichment.

An IAEA report drawn up for Wednesday's meeting says Iran has increased the number of centrifuges used to process uranium to nearly 4,000 from 3,000 just a few months ago.

But David Albright, whose Washington-based Institute for Science and International Security closely tracks suspect secret proliferators, has also been able to extrapolate other information from the report that is less obvious but of at least equal concern.

Iran, he says, has managed to iron out most of the bugs in the intensely complicated process of enrichment that often saw the centrifuges breaking down. The machines, he says "now appear to be running at approximately 85 percent of their stated target capacity, a significant increase over previous rates."

That, he says means, they can produce more enriched uranium faster. And while the IAEA says the machines have spewed out only low-enriched material suitable solely for nuclear fuel, producing enough of that can make it easy to "break out" quickly by reprocessing it to weapons-grade uranium.

To date, Iran has produced nearly 1,000 pounds of low-enriched uranium, said the report-close to what Albright says is the 1,500-pound minimum needed to produce the 45-60 pounds needed for a simple nuclear bomb under optimal conditions.

And with Iran's centrifuges running ever more smoothly, it "is progressing toward this capability and can be expected to reach it in six months to two years," says Albright.

Touching on such fears, the statement by the 27-nation EU said that Iran's defiance of Security Council demands on enrichment is troubling "because it brings us closer to the moment where Iran will have fissile materials for a weapon, if it chose to increase their degree of enrichment."

It also cast serious doubt on Iranian assertions that it never embarked on studies geared toward making nuclear weapons.

While the evidence "remains to be verified, the IAEA's exhaustive and detailed" information, "leads one to think that the Iran has methodically pursued a program aimed at acquiring the nuclear bomb," the statement said.

In a statement, Iran's mission to the IAEA again denied wrongdoing and suggested the pressure was part of a U.S. witchhunt.

The Islamic Republic "has repeatedly declared that there is not and has not been any undeclared nuclear activities and material in Iran," it said, denouncing the "fabricated and baseless allegations ... produced by the United States."

An IAEA report circulated to the board members Monday that faulted Iran for blocking efforts to further investigate the alleged weapons program.

Part of the report touched on what appeared to be drawings and calculations by Iranian engineers on reconfiguring its Shahab-3 missile to be able to carry a nuclear payload. Iranian officials say the missile has a range of 1,250 miles-enabling a strike on Israel and most of the Middle East.

Ahmadinejad talks Holocaust on CNN

2008-09-24T17:54:00.000-07:00

Press TV, 24/09/08

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has shed light on his views about the Holocaust in an interview with CNN's Larry King Live.

In a recorded Tuesday interview with the renowned TV host, President Ahmadinejad said that Zionism blocks research on the Holocaust.

"They (Zionists) don't allow anyone to freely discuss the historical events that happened. They just say this is our account of history, this is what happened and everybody else must just accept it," said Ahmadinejad.

Larry King then asked the president if, from his point of view, the Holocaust did not happen.

"No, what I am saying is let more research be done," Ahmedinejad said.

"There is a claim about the extent of the calamity. There are people who agree with it and people who disagree. Some totally deny and some completely agree with the whole given account. What we are saying is that an impartial group should be formed to conduct an independent study on the extent of the calamity."

On December 2005, Ahmadinejad made several comments about the Holocaust, criticizing European laws against research on the historical event.

Following his remarks, Western politicians and media outlets launched extensive attacks against him, accusing him of anti-Semitism.

However, during his interview with Larry King, Ahmedinejad denied this.

"Iranians have nothing against the Jewish people or their religion," Ahmedinejad said.

Ahmedinejad differentiated between Zionism and Judaism saying that Zionists are not real Jews.

"How can you be religious and kill women and children at the same time?" he argued.

King also asked Ahmadinejad to confirm or deny whether he wanted to "wipe Israel off the map".

Ahmedinejad replied saying that the Israeli regime would disappear in the same way as apartheid South Africa and the Soviet Union.

"The solution that we are proposing is a humanitarian one. What we say is that a free referendum must be held in the Palestinian territories, allowing the Palestinian people to determine their own fate," Ahmadinejad said.

MJ/SF/WY

Iran's Ahmadinejad: US Policies Are Real Threat To World

2008-09-23T18:18:00.000-07:00

AFP, 23/09/08

UNITED NATIONS - Iran's President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad on Tuesday accused the U.S. of encircling his country and said Washington was the real threat to world stability.

Ahead of a speech to the U.N. General Assembly, the Iranian leader defended his confrontational stand against the West and Israel.

"I'd like to ask you, is it the Iranian (army) that's around the territories around the country, or is it the U.S. troops that are around?" he said during an interview on National Public Radio.

"It is the U.S. troops around our borders. It is not ours around the American borders. So what exactly are they doing over there?"

Referring to a global financial crisis sparked by the banking meltdown on Wall Street, Ahmadinejad also told the Los Angeles Times that "the world economy can no longer tolerate the budgetary deficit and the financial pressures."

Despite three rounds of U.N. Security Council sanctions, Iran continues to defy calls by the U.S. and its Western allies to halt uranium enrichment, a process the West and Israel fear is being used to make an atomic bomb.

Iran says its goal is peaceful civilian nuclear energy.

However, with the Security Council-the U.K., China, France, Russia and the U.S.-divided, Ahmadinejad appears to believe he is unlikely to face significantly tougher U.N. action.

"We do not believe that the U.S. policy perspective, looking at the rest of the world as a field of confrontation, will give good results," he told the Los Angeles Times.

Ahmadinejad was in New York for the annual U.N. general meeting.

Iranian-American opponents gathered near U.N. headquarters in Manhattan to protest what they described as the Tehran government's human rights abuses and suppression of democratic opposition.

A separate rally was due nearby by the organization StopWarOnIran.org, which accuses President George W. Bush of pushing for a war on Iran.

Ahmadinejad firmly placed the blame for world tensions on Washington and maintained his controversial stand that Israel has no future, describing the Jewish state as "an airplane that has lost its engine."

"Problems do not arise suddenly," he told the Times.

"The U.S. government has made a series of mistakes in the past few decades. First, the imposition on the U.S. economy of heavy military engagement and involvement around the world ... the war in Iraq ... these are heavy costs."

Ahmadinejad, who has previously called for Israel to be "wiped off the map," also proposed Israel be transformed into a single state including returned Palestinian refugees, who would vastly outnumber the now dominant Jewish population, the Times reported.

U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice was due to meet at the U.N. assembly with her counterparts from the U.K., Russia, France, China and Germany-the " P5-plus-1" group-to decide how to proceed with Iran.

The U.S. wants to impose new sanctions against Iran, but Russia and China are resisting the move.

The U.N. atomic watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency, called on Iran Monday to clear up allegations it had been involved in studies to make a nuclear warhead.

IAEA chief Mohamed El Baradei published a report last week in which he accused Iran of stalling a U.N. investigation into its disputed nuclear program, refusing access to documents, individuals and sites.

Mottaki: Occupiers should leave Iraq

2008-09-23T18:06:00.000-07:00

IRIB, 23/09/08

Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki said Monday that regarding capabilities of the Iraqi government in managing the country, keeping the country under the chapter seven of the UN charter is not necessary.

In a meeting with his Iraqi counterpart Hoshyar Zebari at the sidelines of the 63rd session of UN General Assembly in New York, Mottaki said that based on the new situation in Iraq, setting a timetable for withdrawal of occupying forces from the country was essential because presence of foreign forces in the country would bring more insecurity and instability to Iraq.

Mottaki attached great importance to opening a new chapter in bilateral ties between Tehran and Baghdad and expressed satisfaction over the process of developing mutual relations and positive talks between the two countries' officials in the fields of political, economic, cultural and border cooperation.

The Iraqi Foreign Minister for his part explained the latest developments in his country, and said the security situation in Iraq was promoting.

Zebari called President Ahmadinejad's visit to Iraq as a turning point which attracted the regional and international attentions to Iraq.

He described the recent visit of an Iraqi Foreign Ministry delegation to Tehran as positive and constructive.

mk

Khatami: My candidacy is conditional

2008-09-23T18:05:00.000-07:00

Press TV, 23/09/08

Former president Mohammad Khatami says his presidential candidacy depends on how much it can affect the ongoing developments.

"I need to consider how my presence in the elections can impact the current trend. That is why I have not yet announced my decision (about the candidacy)," Khatami told members of the Coordination Council of Reforms Front.

Khatami's comments followed widespread speculation about his candidacy in the 2009 presidential election.

The former president also asked members of the Reformist Camp not to insist on nominating a particular candidate as a representative of the whole front, Khatami's office said in a report released on Tuesday.

Khatami argued such an approach could block the various options open to them in the course of the election campaign.

Meanwhile, another prominent reformist figure and former parliament speaker Mehdi Karroubi said that he would soon announce his final decision about running in the election.

Karroubi, who ran unsuccessfully for president in the 2005 election, said that the reformist alliance needs to nominate a single candidate.

However, he added, the decision as who must represent them must be made in a general, after various reformist parties or groups have introduced their candidates, started their campaigns and evaluated their chances.

Karroubi said that the reformists will have a much harder task in the election compared to those parties within the Principalist Front that would distance themselves from current President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

However, he added that positive results are achieved when fighting 'hard battles not easy ones'.

Iran's presidential election will be held on June 12, 2009.

MJ/PA

Iran's leader says 'American empire' near collapse

2008-09-23T18:04:00.000-07:00

By Slobodan Lekic
AP, 23/09/08

UNITED NATIONS - Iran's president addressed the U.N. General Assembly Tuesday declaring that "the American empire" is nearing collapse and should end its military involvement in other countries.

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said terrorism is spreading quickly in Afghanistan and that "the occupiers" are still in Iraq nearly six years after Saddam Hussein was ousted from power in Iraq.

"American empire in the world is reaching the end of its road, and its next rulers must limit their interference to their own borders," Ahmadinejad said.

He accused the U.S. of starting wars in Iraq and Afghanistan to win votes in elections and blamed a "few bullying powers" for trying to undermine Iraq's nuclear program.

Ahmadinejad's hardline rhetoric came as no surprise and offered little in the way of compromise at the U.N., where he faces a new round of sanctions if no agreement is reached on limiting Iran's nuclear capabilities.

While he reiterated that the country's nuclear program is purely peaceful, the U.S. and others fear it is aimed at producing enriched uranium to make nuclear weapons.

Iran already is under three sets of sanctions by the U.N. Security Council for refusing to suspend uranium enrichment. Washington and its Western allies are pushing for quick passage of a fourth set of sanctions to underline the international community's resolve, but are likely to face opposition from Russia.

"A few bullying powers have sought to put hurdles in the way of the peaceful nuclear activities of the Iranian nation by exerting political and economic pressures against Iran," he said.

Ahmadinejad also lashed out at Israel on Tuesday, saying "the Zionist regime is on a definite slope to collapse, and there is no way for it to get out of the cesspool created by itself and its supporters."

The Iranian president is feared and reviled in Israel because of his repeated calls to wipe the Jewish state off the map, and his aggressive pursuit of nuclear technology has only fueled Israel's fears.

Ahmadinejad accused "a small but deceitful number of people called Zionists ... (of) dominating an important portion of the financial and monetary centers as well as the political decision-making centers of some European countries and the U.S."

In discussing Afghanistan, he suggested that the presence of U.S. and NATO forces has contributed to a sharp rise in terrorism and a huge increase in the production of narcotics.

He predicted that the war would end in the alliance's defeat.

"Throughout history every force that has entered Afghanistan has left in defeat," Ahmadinejad said.

His speech came just hours after President Bush made his eighth and final appearance before the U.N. General Assembly, urging the international community to stand firm against the nuclear ambitions of Iran and North Korea.

"A few nations, regimes like Syria and Iran, continue to sponsor terror," Bush said. "Yet their numbers are growing fewer, and they're growing more isolated from the world. As the 21st century unfolds, some may be tempted to assume that the threat has receded. This would be comforting. It would be wrong. The terrorists believe time is on their side, so they've made waiting out civilized nations part of their strategy."

At one point during Bush's 22-minute speech, Ahmadinejad turned to Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki and gave a thumb's down.

As in past years, the United States only had a low-level note-taker sitting in a rear seat reserved for the U.S. delegation during the Iranian president's address, said Richard Grenell, spokesman for the U.S. Mission to the United Nations. The U.S. and Iran do not have diplomatic relations.

During interviews ahead of his speech Tuesday, Ahmadinejad blamed U.S. military interventions around the world in part for the collapse of global financial markets. He said the campaign against his country's nuclear program was solely due to the Bush administration "and a couple of their European friends."

"The U.S. government has made a series of mistakes in the past few decades," Ahmadinejad said an interview with the Los Angeles Times. "The imposition on the U.S. economy of the years of heavy military engagement and involvement around the world ... the war in Iraq, for example. These are heavy costs imposed on the U.S. economy.

"The world economy can no longer tolerate the budgetary deficit and the financial pressures occurring from markets here in the United States, and by the U.S. government," he added.

Associated Press Writer Edith M. Lederer contributed to this report.

Iranian Jews refute US claims

2008-09-23T18:02:00.000-07:00

IRIB, 23/09/08

The Association of Tehrani Jews on Sunday refuted claims by certain American State Department officials that Iranian religious minorities face restrictions in performing their religious duties.

In a statement the association said, "We Iranian Jews condemn claims of the US State Department on Iranian religious minorities, announced that we are fully free to perform our religious duties and we feel no restriction on performing our religious rituals."

It said that evidently, the hostile propaganda of enemies of the Iranian nation cannot have the least effect on historical solidarity among the Iranian people and that the global arrogance has not yet understood the cultural and social conditions in Iran .

It added that the global arrogance once again proved that it not only has no understanding of solidarity among Iranians of monotheistic faith but also uses absurd propaganda to divide Iranians and harm their interests.

IAEA calls for transparency from Iran

2008-09-23T17:59:00.001-07:00

UPI, 23/09/08

GENEVA, Switzerland - The head of the United Nation's nuclear watchdog in Geneva, Switzerland, called upon Iran to be completely transparent about its nuclear activities.

International Atomic Energy Agency Director General Mohammed ElBaradei told the agency's board of directors that inspectors don't want to "pry" into Iran's conventional or missile-related activities, but need to review "all relevant information to be able to confirm that no nuclear material is being used for nuclear weapons purposes," the United Nations said in a news release.

"I again urge Iran to show full transparency and to implement all measures required to build confidence in the exclusive peaceful nature of its nuclear program at the earliest possible date," ElBaradei said.

ElBaradei called upon Iran to give IAEA more authority to visit sites and access additional documents to ensure that there are no undeclared nuclear activities.

"Although Iran has so far produced only limited quantities of low enriched uranium, this is still a cause for concern for the international community in the absence of full clarity about Iran's past and present nuclear program," the director general said.

Europe cannot accept a nuclear-armed Iran, calls for Palestinian state

2008-09-23T17:59:00.000-07:00

KUNA, 23/09/08

UNITED NATIONS - French President and current President of the European Union Nicolas Sarkozy on Tuesday said Europe will not allow a nuclear Iran threaten the region.

"Europe is saying to Iran that it respects that country, that Iran has the right to nuclear energy and that we will explore all avenues of dialogue. "But it is saying to Iran with the same sincerity that it cannot accept a nuclear-armed Iran which would endanger the peace and stability of an entire region, nor can it tolerate Iran calling for the destruction of the State of Israel," Sarkozy told the General Assembly on its first day of general debate.
"Europe is telling Israel that it is a friend, that it will let no one threaten its existence, that we will always be at Israel's side to fight terrorism.

"But it is equally telling Israel with the same sincerity that there will be no peace until there is a viable Palestinian state with recognized borders, " he added.

He stressed that Europe will continue to stand by Afghanistan's side and will not permit the Taliban allied with al Qaeda again to take a people hostage and turn an entire country into a terrorist base.

He also pledged that Europe will help Somalia, with the UN help, to combat the scourge of piracy off its coasts.

He said "Europe does not want war. It does not want a war of civilization. It does not want a war of religion. It does not want a cold war. Europe wants peace, and peace is always possible when one truly wants it."

Bush calls for action against Iran

2008-09-23T17:54:00.000-07:00

Press TV, 23/09/08

US President George W. Bush questions Iran's place in 'the modern world', calling for a front to take action against the country.

President Bush, under fire for a major economic crisis at home, in his final address to the UN General Assembly in New York on Tuesday accused Tehran of 'continuing to sponsor terrorism'-without providing any proof.

The Bush administration has long blamed Iran for the violence in Iraq, a country that is under US military occupation. Iran rejects the allegation, saying it only seeks the restoration of security and stability in Iraq.

"A few nations-regimes like Syria and Iran-continue to sponsor terror, yet their numbers are growing fewer and they are growing more isolated from the world," said Bush.

He added that a nation that supports 'terrorism has no place in the modern world', suggesting that the international community should take action against Iran.

Showing no desire for improvement of Tehran-Washington relations, President Bush then raised the issue of the Iranian nuclear program, calling for global support to impose a new round of sanctions against the country.

Amid simmering tensions between the White House and the Kremlin, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev said that he would only accept a follow-up to negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program, adding that Moscow would block further sanctions on Tehran.

Under US pressure the United Nations Security Council has so far imposed three rounds of economic sanctions against Iran, demanding the country halt its uranium enrichment despite the UN nuclear watchdog confirming the 'non-diversion' of Tehran's existing nuclear activities.

Contrary to the findings of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the US accuses Iran of pursuing nuclear weapons. In its latest report, the IAEA announced that it could not find any 'components of a nuclear weapon' or 'related nuclear physics studies' in the country.

The Bush administration has long threatened Tehran with war under the pretext that a nuclear-armed country in the Middle East would pose a threat to Israel-the sole possessor of a nuclear arsenal in the region.

Shortly after Bush's speech, French President Nicolas Sarkozy told the general assembly that Europe supports 'Iran's right to peaceful nuclear activities'.

President Sarkozy, however, warned that the European Union would not tolerate a nuclear-armed Iran since it would pose a threat to Israel-which considers Tehran as its top foe.

Iran has repeatedly said that it has no use for an atomic bomb, stressing that weapons of mass destructions have no place in its defensive doctrine.

Tehran also contends that it has never launched an attack or been involved in any act of aggression against any party, rejecting the allegations that President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad seeks to 'wipe Israel off the map'.

MD/HGH

White House warns Iran about its nuclear inaction

2008-09-22T18:11:00.000-07:00

Reuters, 22/09/08

NEW YORK - The White House on Monday expressed concern about Iran's lack of cooperation with the U.N. nuclear watchdog and said Tehran must provide "substantial information and access" to the agency.

"We would echo what the IAEA said today which is that Iran needs to give the agency substantial information and access if they are going to be proven correct in their claims," White House spokeswoman Dana Perino said of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

"Meanwhile we will continue on our path of negative consequences for their inaction," she told reporters aboard Air Force One as Bush flew to New York to attend the U.N. General Assembly.

Ex-IDF chief: Israel can't avoid a military confrontation with Iran

2008-09-22T18:05:00.000-07:00

Reuters, 22/09/08

Former Israel Defense Forces chief of staff Moshe "Boogie" Ya'alon on Sunday said Israel will not be able to avoid a military confrontation with Iran and called on the international community to stand up to Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad like they did against Adolf Hitler and Nazi Germany.

"Today, we in the West are facing the same situation, the lack of decisiveness towards a threat that is no less severe than that which Hitler posed in 1939."

Ya'alon's statements came hours after Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad vowed Sunday to stop any attacker before he can "pull the trigger."

Ahmadinejad also said sanctions intended to isolate the Islamic Republic have not worked, in a speech before a military parade on Sunday.

The United States and its allies are seeking to step up UN sanctions on Iran over its disputed nuclear plans, which the West says a bid to build nuclear arms. Iran denies this.

There has been persistent speculation Washington or Israel might launch strikes on Iran's nuclear sites, as neither country has ruled out military action if diplomacy fails to end the row.

"If anybody dares to offend the boundaries of the Iranian nation, the Iranian nation's holy land and Iran's legal interests, our armed forces ... will break his hand before he can pull the trigger," Ahmadinejad said.

He was speaking at a parade broadcast live on state television to mark the start of the Iran-Iraq war in September 1980. Hundreds of troops then marched in formation in front of the president's podium.

"Today, Iran is not in a position to show even the smallest flexibility against the bullying of the enemies. History has shown that those who wish ill for Iran will gain nothing but regret," he said.

"The enemies of humanity ... had imagined that by military attack and economic and scientific sanctions they could break down our revolution and our nation," he said, adding that Iran's enemies had "lost hope".

Iran, the world's fourth largest oil producer, says it wants to master nuclear technology to make electricity so it can preserve more of its vast oil and gas reserves for export.

But its failure to convince world powers of its peaceful intentions has prompted three rounds of limited UN sanctions. ashington is pushing for a fourth, but China and Russia-two of the five veto-wielding council members-are reluctant.

Iran has dismissed reports of possible U.S. or Israeli plans to strike Iran, but says it would respond by attacking U.S. interests and Israel if any such assault was made

Iranian president Ahmadinejad vows to outline nuclear activities in UN meeting

2008-09-22T18:03:00.000-07:00

Pakistan Tribune, 22/09/08

President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said that he would outline Iran's nuclear activities in the UN General Assembly meeting during his visit to New York, the official IRNA news agency reported.

Ahmadinejad made the remark prior to his departure for New York on Sunday.

He also told reporters that the UN should be a real representative of all nations and not a servant to certain powers, lobbies or parties.

"All UN bodies should be run based on democratic principles," he said, adding that the international body "should be located in an independent land so that it would be possible for every parties to express their views freely."

According to IRNA, Ahmadinejad is scheduled to address the UN meeting and also meet the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon.

On the sidelines of the UN General Assembly meeting, Ahmadinejad is also to hold separate talks with different heads of state attending the UN meeting and will participate in several regional meetings.

Ahmadinejad left Tehran on Sunday for New York to attend the 63rd meeting of UN General Assembly which is scheduled to open on Sept. 23.

The Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) said last Monday in a report Iran has shown a lack of cooperative sincerity with the international community in solving its nuclear issues, calling on the country to cooperate in this regard.

According to the report, due to Tehran`s blocking, the UN nuclear watchdog had been unable to make much progress in investigating Iran`s suspect nuclear program.

Representatives from the United States, China, Russia, Britain, France and Germany discussed last Friday over possible new sanctions against Iran as Tehran refuses to comply with United Nations resolutions.

The United States and its allies have accused Iran of developing nuclear weapons, but Iran insists that its nuclear program is only for peaceful purposes.

Ahmadinejad shrugged off international sanctions threat last Thursday. "Whatever they do, Iran will continue its activities. Sanctions are not important," he told a news conference. "The era of such threats has ended."

Iran till now has been under three UN sanctions over its disputed nuclear program.

Iran pushed for nuclear answers

2008-09-22T18:00:00.001-07:00

BBC, 22/09/08

Iran has been asked by the UN's nuclear watchdog, the IAEA, for a substantive response to allegations that it is developing a nuclear weapon.

Without more information from Iran, the IAEA cannot provide assurances about the country's nuclear programme, says the agency's head, Mohamed El Baradei.

Iran says its nuclear programme is purely for peaceful purposes.

Allegations about its nuclear programme are unsubstantiated, says the country's IAEA envoy, Ali Asghar Soltanieh.

US allegations

Iran has repeatedly denied allegations that it is building a nuclear weapon.

Mr Soltanieh said that Iran had not been allowed to see any of the documents which allegedly back up US accusations of a military nuclear programme.

"How can we question a country without giving authentic documents?" asked Mr Soltanieh.
IAEA Head, Mohamed El Baradei
The IAEA says Iran must provide clarification

"A member state is accused by another member state but that member state has not been given any documents or evidence," he added.

In a report last week, the IAEA said that it had asked Tehran for detailed clarification about its nuclear programme.

However, the agency said that despite those requests, it had not been able clear up questions about Iran's programme.

Speaking to the IAEA's board, Mr El Baradei said Iran should provide "substantive information to support its statements and access to relevant documentations and individuals".

Iran "should clarify the extent to which the documentation is factually correct and where, as it asserts, such information has been fabricated or where it relates to non-nuclear purposes", he added.

Mr El Baradei also said that, so far, tests had failed to find any sign of nuclear material at a site in Syria which was destroyed in an Israeli bombing raid last year.

The US says Syria was building a secret nuclear facility at the site.

Military intelligence: Iran halfway to first nuclear bomb

2008-09-22T18:00:00.000-07:00

By Herb Keinon
Jerusalem Post, 22/09/08

Iran is halfway to a nuclear bomb, and Hizbullah, Hamas and Syria are using this period of relative calm to significantly rearm, Brig.-Gen. Yossi Baidatz, the Military Intelligence's head of research, told the cabinet Sunday during a particularly gloomy briefing on the threats facing the country.

Baidatz said there was a growing gap between Iran's progress on the nuclear front and the West's determination to stop it. "Iran is concentrating on uranium enrichment, and is making progress," he said, noting that they have improved the function of their 4,000 centrifuges.

According to Baidatz, the Iranian centrifuges have so far produced between one-third to one-half of the enriched material needed to build a bomb.

"The time when they will have crossed the nuclear point-of-no-return is fast approaching," he said, though he stopped short of giving a firm deadline. Last week in the Knesset's Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, however, he put the date at 2011.

Baidatz said that neither the efforts of the International Atomic Energy Agency nor the US and European attempts to get a fourth round of sanctions through the UN Security council were slowing down the Iranian nuclear march.

"The Iranians are pleased that the gap is widening," Baidatz said. "Their confidence is growing with the thought that the international community is not strong enough to stop them," he added.

Baidatz said the Iranians were playing for time, and that time was working in their favor since the longer the process dragged on, the wider the rifts appearing among the countries in the West become. "Iran is in control of the technology and is moving with determination toward a nuclear bomb," he said.

In addition to their nuclear efforts, the Iranians were also deepening their influence in the region through cooperation with Syria and the Palestinian terrorist organizations, as well as being the main arms supplier to Hizbullah and a source of constant attacks on American troops in Iraq. All of this, he said, was part of Iran's efforts to stand at the head of the region's extremist front.

The region's moderates, he said, were limiting their opposition to "just rhetoric."

Baidatz also briefed the ministers on the situation in Gaza and the Palestinian Authority since the beginning of the "calm" in Gaza on June 19, some three months ago.

Baidatz said that while the cease-fire has-for the most part-held, the intelligence agencies were seeing some weakening of Hamas and Islamic Jihad's commitment to it. He said that the cease-fire had led to a significant drop in rocket fire on the western Negev, and that since the cease-fire went into effect, some 15 rockets and 13 mortars had been fired from Gaza into the Western Negev.

Nevertheless, he said that the terrorist organizations were still planning attacks from Gaza, and were recruiting terrorists to go from Gaza into the Sinai, and then back into Israel to carry out attacks or kidnap soldiers.

Regarding kidnapped soldier Gilad Schalit, Baidatz said that Hizbullah had stiffened its demands, believing that Schalit was an "asset," and that the price for his release would only increase. "They are not rushing for a solution, and are preventing a renewal of talks on the matter with Egypt." he said.

Hamas and the other terrorist organizations have taken advantage of the cease-fire to rearm and prepare for the next round of fighting, increasing training and continuing to smuggle in raw materials that allow it to increase its rocket arsenal. As a result of of the cease-fire, he said, the threat to the home front and the IDF had increased.

Baidatz said the smuggling from Egypt was continuing, although the Egyptians-with the help of US technology-were also showing better results in detecting the smuggling tunnels. At the same time, the Egyptians were still not dealing with the root of the problem, which was the need to go after Beduin smugglers in Sinai, he said.

Baidatz added that as time went on, Hamas was consolidating its political hold on Gaza, and that he didn't think the Egyptians had much chance of success in mediating an agreement between Hamas and Fatah.

Regarding Israel's negotiations with the PA, Baidatz said the Palestinian Authority was not willing to compromise on core issues, and was opposed to a partial agreement. He said the PA was holding firm to the position that nothing was agreed until everything was agreed, and were continuing to demand an end to all construction in the West Bank.

Prime Minister Ehud Olmert has recently tried to get the PA to agree to moving negotiations over Jerusalem to another framework, so it did not hold up attempts to come up with some kind of shelf agreement by the end of the year.

Governor Of Iran's Main Bank Dismissed

2008-09-22T17:59:00.000-07:00

By Thomas Erdbrink
Washington Post, 22/09/08

TEHRAN - Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has dismissed Central Bank Governor Tahmasb Mazaheri and his replacement will be announced Wednesday, according to a Central Bank official who spoke on the condition of anonymity.

The Iranian news agency Farsnews reported Saturday that Ahmadinejad had replaced Mazaheri after an unspecified escalation in their differences over monetary policy and inflation.

The news agency said Mazaheri will be succeeded by Mahmoud Bahmani, the Central Bank's general secretary. Analysts say Mazaheri's dismissal removes a final obstacle to Ahmadinejad's plan to stop official subsidies and to distribute money directly to Iran's poor through special bank accounts.

Some analysts fear that the cessation of the government funding that keeps down the prices of gasoline, bread, electricity and other goods will cause inflation to soar. The plan's defenders say it is a long-needed overhaul of Iranian state spending. Inflation in August was 27.2 percent.

The Central Bank official, who is not authorized to speak publicly about the leadership of the institution, confirmed that a senior bank official would be named governor Wednesday.

Mazaheri was widely seen as one of the last remaining technocrats serving under the president, who has surrounded himself with his political backers. As bank governor, Mazaheri often openly disagreed with measures the government took to quell increasing living costs, such as the slashing of interest rates.

"Mazaheri's departure clears the path for Ahmadinejad to change the economy the way he wants," said Mohammad Atrianfar, a journalist, politician and critic of Ahmadinejad. "Mazaheri, who was much more professional than the president, would delay or alter government plans. Now the president has a free hand."

US officer warns Israel not to hit Iran

2008-09-20T17:34:00.000-07:00

By Kim Sengupta
Independent, 20/09/08

An Israeli attack on Iran's nuclear installations would destabilise the region and open a new battlefront which could have a damaging effect on Iraq and Afghanistan, a senior American army commander said yesterday.

In a highly unusual statement on the issue, the officer at the heart of US military policy-making, who requested anonymity, said a diplomatic solution was imperative to solve the crisis.

The commander said that there was "a lot of rhetoric" over Israel's repeated threats of air strikes to stop Iran developing a nuclear arsenal. But he said that an exercise by more than 100 Israeli warplanes above the Mediterranean in June showed the Israelis were practising for a possible offensive.

"But it would not be the right thing to do, it will open up another front and this is not going to help the situation in the region, Iraq or Afghanistan," said the officer. "A diplomatic solution is the only logical answer."

But the commander described Iran as having a "malign presence" in the area in supplying conventional weapons into Iraq. He said that according to intelligence received by the US, "front companies" were being used to pass arms and explosives to insurgents within Iraq.

Sarah Palin blames 'Democrat partisans' for withdrawn invitation to anti-Iran rally

2008-09-20T17:33:00.001-07:00

By Natasha Mozgovaya
Haaretz, 20/09/08

Republican vice presidential candidate Sarah Palin told supporters Friday that Democrat partisans had pressured organizers of an anti-Iran rally in New York next week to withdraw an invitation for her to appear.

"This should be an issue that unites all Americans. Iran should not be allowed to acquire nuclear weapons, period," Palin said. "Unfortunately, some Democrat partisans put politics first and now no elected official can appear. This should not be a matter of partisan politics."

Republican presidential candidate John McCain accused organizers on Thursday of withdrawing Palin's invitation under pressure from her Democratic rivals, a charge that Barack Obama's campaign vehemently denies.

Obama spokesman Tommy Vietor batted away the suggestion, saying they had planned to send Democratic Rep. Robert Wexler to attend the rally on the campaign's behalf and did nothing to discourage Palin's attendance.

"Israel needs real leadership to stop Iran, not phony political controversies," Vietor said.

A group of Jewish organizations had invited both Palin and former Democratic presidential candidate Sen. Hillary Clinton to speak at the protest, to be held near the United Nations on Monday against Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

Ahmadinejad has made countless comments against the state of Israel, including that it should be wiped off the map.

But a senior Clinton adviser said the New York Democrat canceled her appearance after learning Palin was scheduled to address demonstrators as well.

"Gov. Palin was pleased to accept an invitation to address this rally and show her resolve on this grave national security issue, regrettably that invitation has since been withdrawn under pressure from Democratic partisans," McCain said in a statement.

"We stand shoulder to shoulder with Republicans, Democrats and independents alike to oppose Ahmadinejad's goal of a nuclear armed Iran," he said. "Sen. Obama's campaign had the opportunity to join us. Sen. Obama chose politics rather than the national interest."

The suggestion that Democrats urged rally organizers to disinvite Palin "is totally false," said Daniel Shapiro, a spokesman for the Obama campaign. "We never pressured anyone to do anything with Gov. Palin."

Shapiro said the Obama campaign offered to send Democratic Rep. Robert Wexler, a top Jewish surrogate, to the rally.

Clinton decided not to attend because she did not want to take part in a "partisan political event," her aide said. She lost a hard-fought battle for her party's nomination to Obama, but is now supporting the Democratic nominee for the November 4 U.S. presidential election.

Among those scheduled to attend the protest are Nobel laureate Elie Wiesel and Speaker of the Knesset Dalia Itzik, publicist Casey Sanders said on behalf of the organizers.

"In order to keep the focus on Iranian threats and to ensure that this critical message not be obscured, the organizers of the rally have decided not to have any American political personalities appear," Sanders said.

UN officials have also said it was possible McCain and Palin might show up on the sidelines of the opening of the UN General Assembly on Tuesday.

This would give Palin a chance to meet a few world leaders on the day U.S. President George W. Bush and one of his main foes, Iranian President Ahmadinejad, address the 192 UN member states.

Although Palin, 44, has brought new energy to the McCain campaign and helped narrow Obama's lead in opinion polls before the election, Democrats say the mother of five lacks the foreign policy experience a vice president should have.

Iran denies Western allegations that it is seeking atomic weapons, but has refused to suspend sensitive parts of its nuclear program that could be used to make atom bomb fuel.

Russia rejects new measures against Iran

2008-09-20T17:33:00.000-07:00

By Conor Humphries
AFP, 20/09/08

MOSCOW - Russia said Saturday it had rejected US proposals for new UN Security Council measures against Iran over its suspect nuclear programme amid deteriorating ties between Moscow and Washington.

At a meeting Friday with diplomats from the United States, China, Britain, France and Germany, Russia "said it was against the development at this stage of additional measures in the UN Security Council," the foreign ministry said in a statement.

"The Russian side underlined the necessity of continuing efforts to restore constructive dialogue with Tehran with the aim of moving forward the negotiation process," the statement said after the meeting in Washington.

The White House on Monday warned Iran that it faced possible new sanctions over its failure to stop uranium enrichment, which can be a key step towards making nuclear weapons.

But it said poor relations with Russia-a veto-wielding member of the UN Security Council-could complicate matters.

Ties between the two have been severely damaged in recent weeks by Washington's sharp criticism of Russia's incursion into neighbouring Georgia, a close US ally.

Russia's Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has said the West must choose between support of Georgia and Moscow's cooperation on other international issues.

France has echoed the US call for sanctions, but China said such a move would not resolve the stalemate. On Friday, Germany said it still aimed to reach a negotiated settlement with Tehran.

After Friday's meeting, the US State Department had said all six powers were "committed to exploring possible further" sanctions.

The foreign affairs political directors of the five permanent UN Security Council members plus Germany met to help prepare for a meeting next week of their respective foreign ministers.

The six powers are attempting to convince Iran to halt sensitive nuclear work with an incentives package in exchange for full suspension of uranium enrichment.

"All participants of the meeting expressed their support for the actions of the IAEA and underlined the need for Iran's full and transparent cooperation with the agency," the Russian statement said.

The IAEA, the UN's atomic watchdog, on Monday said Iran had failed to freeze uranium enrichment activities as instructed by the United Nations.

In its restricted report, the IAEA complained it was making little headway in investigating allegations that Tehran had, in the past, been involved in studies to make a nuclear warhead.

The agency "regrettably has not been able to make any substantive progress on the alleged studies and other associated key remaining issues which remain of serious concern," said the report.

Three sets of UN sanctions have now been slapped on Iran, for defying Security Council resolutions to stop enrichment

Diplomats in Vienna said Saturday that the IAEA last week showed its members documents and photographs suggesting that Iran secretly tried to modify its long-range Shahab-3 missile to carry a nuclear bomb.

The US envoy to the IAEA, Gregory Schulte, said IAEA officials "told us the information they have is ... 'very credible' and they have asked Iran to provide 'substantive responses'."

Iranian ambassador Ali Asghar Soltanieh said the evidence was forged and complained Tehran was being pressured to disprove the allegations by revealing information vital to its national security.

Meanwhile in Russia's southern resort of Sochi Saturday French Prime Minister Francois Fillon said that Europe and Russia were equally dependent on each other.

There was no alternative to strong relations between Paris and Moscow, he said after talks with his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin.

Russia opposes new UN sanctions on Iran for now

2008-09-20T17:32:00.001-07:00

Haaretz, 20/09/08

Russia made clear Saturday that it opposes a Western push for new sanctions against Iran over its nuclear program.

Russia spoke out against a fourth round of UN sanctions against Tehran at a meeting of the five permanent UN Security Council members and Germany in Washington on Friday, the Foreign Ministry said.

Russia stressed the need to draw Tehran into constructive dialogue, the ministry statement said. In this context we spoke out against the development at this time of new measures along UN Security Council lines.

The U.S. and other nations suspect Iran is seeking nuclear weapons under the guise of an atomic energy program. Russia, which has close ties to Iran and is building its first nuclear power plant, says it is not convinced.

Russia agreed to three previous rounds of U.N. sanctions, but along with China has slowed down their passage and ensured they were less punitive than measures the U.S. was seeking.

The U.S. and its European allies are pushing for quick passage of a fourth sanctions resolution to show the international community's resolve amid a crisis in Moscow's ties with Washington and Brussels over last month's conflict in Georgia.

Major powers end Iran talks

Major powers haggled on Friday over a fourth round of UN sanctions against Iran to curb its nuclear program, but ended with no firm commitments amid Russian and Chinese resistance to more punitive measures.

State Department spokesman Robert Wood said the meeting of senior officials from the permanent five members of the UN Security Council-Britain, France, the United States, Russia and China-and Germany concluded without agreement on either the timing or content of a new UN resolution on Iran.

But he said all six expressed a commitment to the so-called two-track approach-using both carrots and sticks to get Iran to give up its sensitive nuclear work.

"They remain committed to exploring possible further measures on the second track," Wood said, referring to sanctions under consideration by the six.

He said the six countries again urged Iran to accept an offer of trade and other incentives presented in June in exchange for giving up uranium enrichment. Tehran has not accepted the offer and has said it will not give up sensitive nuclear work.

Iran says its nuclear program is intended to generate more power for the Islamic republic and not to build an atomic bomb as charged by the West.

A European diplomat said after the talks that all sides agreed on the principle of more sanctions but there was no consensus on the substance and timing of those measures.

"The Russians are obviously not fully ready to move forward right now and the
Chinese are not far from Russian thinking," said the diplomat, who spoke on condition of anonymity.

Low expectations

Even before the meeting began, State Department spokesman Sean McCormack played down expectations, urging Russia to shelve differences over Georgia, which Russia invaded last month, and work together on Iran.

"We would urge them to put aside, as we have, any issues that exist between the
United States/the rest of the world on Georgia and work on areas where we can work together-Iran," said McCormack.

Highlighting divisions, China and Russia were excluded from a morning meeting at the State Department to discuss both Georgia and Iran, but were brought in for a lunch where the discussion was solely on Iran's nuclear program.

"The Russians have always been very reluctant and usually every resolution of sanctions is an ordeal-three or four months of negotiations, comma by comma. I guess it will be more or less the same," said a senior European official.

"This resolution, if and when we get it, will be very weak," he added.

Earlier this week, the United Nations' International Atomic Energy Agency said in a report that Iranian stonewalling had brought to a standstill its investigation into whether Iran had covertly researched ways to make an atom bomb.

U.S. President George W. Bush's national security adviser, Stephen Hadley, said it was "not reassuring" that Iran was not cooperating with the IAEA, adding that such a move only increased suspicions in the international community about its nuclear activities.

"Since they have not made that strategic choice and seem to be even less cooperative, I think you'll find a call over the weeks ahead for greater pressure on Iran," Hadley said.

Iran has withstood three rounds of UN sanctions imposed so far. Iranian
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad reiterated on Thursday Tehran would not suspend its enrichment program and brushed aside the threat of more sanctions.

With four months left in office, the Bush administration's leverage is slipping on the Iran dossier, experts say, and Tehran, Moscow and Beijing are taking this into account.

McCormack rejected the view that time was running out and that only a weak UN resolution, if any, could emerge.

"We are looking for the most robust Security Council resolution we can get," he said.

While U.S. officials stress their focus on diplomacy to resolve differences with Tehran, the nuclear dispute and hostile rhetoric have fueled speculation in the global financial markets this year of a possible military confrontation between Iran and the United States or Israel.

Foreign ministers from the major power are set to discuss Iran, the world's fourth largest oil producer, on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York next week but McCormack said he did not anticipate any decision would be taken on sanctions then either.

Q&A: McCain, Obama on Iraq, Iran, Putin

2008-09-20T17:32:00.000-07:00

McCain, Obama answers to foreign policy questions from the presidential primary-season debates

AP, 20/09/08

Foreign policy will be the subject when Republican John McCain and Democrat Barack Obama meet for their first presidential debate. Both covered some of the same ground during their primary-season debates. What they've said on Iraq, Iran and then-Russian President Vladimir Putin.

-----

IRAQ

MCCAIN: "We are going to be there for some period of time, but it's American casualties, not American presence. We've got troops right next door in Kuwait. We'll probably have them there for a long time. We have troops in Bosnia. We've had troops in South Korea for some 50 years. By the way, President Eisenhower didn't bail us out of Korea. But the point is that we need to protect America's national security interest. It's not a matter of presence. It's a matter of casualties. We are succeeding. ... We're not going to talk about timetables or anything else; we're going to talk about winning and what's necessary to win. And I'm the only one that said that Rumsfeld had to go and the Petraeus strategy is the one that can succeed. That's because I have the experience, the knowledge, and the judgment. And I believe that Americans will come home with honor." And the fact is-and the fact is that it's not American presence, because America, as the world's superpower, is going to have to be a lot of places in the world. It's how they come home." Jan. 30, 2008.

OBAMA: "At this point, I think we can be as careful getting out as we were careless getting in. But we have to send a clear message to the Iraqi government as well as to the surrounding neighbors that there is no military solution to the problems that we face in Iraq. ... So we have to begin a phased withdrawal; have our combat troops out by March 31 of next year; and initiate the kind of diplomatic surge that is necessary in these surrounding regions to make sure that everybody is carrying their weight. And that is what I will do on day one, as president of the United States, if we have not done it in the intervening months." July 23, 2007.

-----

IRAN

McCAIN: "At the end of the day, we cannot allow Iran to have nuclear weapons. Now, I believe that we can do a lot of things. We can have a league of democracies to impose sanctions and to cut off the-many of the things and benefits that the Iranians are now getting from other democracies. I think it's clear that the United Nations Security Council will not act effectively with Russia and China behaving as they are. But let's see what Iran has been doing ... Iranians are sending lethal IEDs that are killing American soldiers. They're training and equipping terrorists. They have dedicated themselves to the destruction of the state of Israel. They are arming Hezbollah. They are supporting Syria, and there is no doubt they are moving forward with the acquisition of a nuclear weapon. We need to work together with our allies, but at the end of the day, it's the United States of America that will make the final decision." Sept. 5, 2007.

OBAMA: "I think Iran continues to be a threat to some of its neighbors in the region, so they're still funding Hamas, they're still funding Hezbollah, and those are things we have to be concerned about. But it is absolutely clear that this administration and President Bush continues to not let facts get in the way of his ideology. And that's been the problem with their foreign policy generally. They should have stopped the saber-rattling, should have never started it, and they need now to aggressively move on the diplomatic front." Dec. 4, 2007.

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PUTIN

McCAIN: "This is a dangerous person. And he has to understand that there's a cost to some of his actions. And the first thing I would do is make sure that we have a missile defense system in place in Czechoslovakia and Poland, and I don't care what his objections are to it. And he's going to cause us to set up a league of democracies to address issues from Darfur to Burma to Iran and others, because he and the Chinese are blocking meaningful action to keep us in a peaceful world in the United Nations. It's going to be some tough times ahead." Oct. 21, 2007.

OBAMA: "Putin has been very clear that he will continue to have the strongest hand in Russia in terms of running the government. And, you know, it looks-just think back to the beginning of President Bush's administration when he said-you know, he met with Putin, looked into his eyes and saw his soul, and figured he could do business with him. He then proceeded to neglect our relationship with Russia at a time when Putin was strangling any opposition in the country when he was consolidating power, rattling sabers against his European neighbors, as well as satellites of the former Soviet Union. And so we did not send a signal to Mr. Putin that, in fact, we were going to be serious about issues like human rights, issues like international cooperation that were critical to us. That is something that we have to change." Feb. 26, 2008.

Iran Trains Shiite Iraqis To Launch Bombings In Iraq-Police

2008-09-20T17:30:00.000-07:00

AFP, 20/09/08

NASIRIYAH, Iraq - Groups of Shiite extremists trained in Iran are returning to Iraq with plans to bomb high-profile targets, the chief of Dhi Qar province's police said Saturday.

Brigadier General Sabah al-Fatlawi told AFP "Special Groups" (Shiite extremists) of around 10 fighters each are returning by crossing the border from Amara, the capital of Shiite Maysan province in the south.

"The Special Groups are returning from Iran after receiving training in using new tactics. We have seized 20 motorcycle bombs in Nasiriyah. Some groups have arrived in Nasiriyah," Fatlawi said, referring to the capital of Dhi Qar, which neighbors Maysan.

The U.S. military claims that Special Groups are cells of Shiite militants who are trained, funded and armed by Iranian-linked groups.

Tehran denies the charges.

"They are crossing the border through Amara," Fatlawi said.

"They intend to target officials in the country and in Nasiriyah," he said, adding that local authorities had put in place tight security measures, including banning the use of motorcycles.

Shiite Special Groups have been one of the main perpetrators of violence in Iraq, but a series of military crackdowns in Shiite majority regions of Iraq forced many of the leaders of such groups to flee the country.

Iraqi and U.S. officials claim many of them went to Iran.

IAEA shows photos alleging Iran worked on missile

2008-09-20T17:23:00.000-07:00

AFP, 20/09/08

VIENNA - The UN nuclear watchdog has shown its members documents and photographs suggesting that Iran secretly tried to modify a missile cone to carry a nuclear bomb, diplomats said.

Diplomats who attended a special briefing Tuesday said the IAEA's head of inspections in the Middle East, Herman Naeckerts, had shown them new proof indicating that Iran tried to refit the long-distance Shahab-3 missile to carry a nuclear payload.

The US envoy to the IAEA, Gregory Schulte, said Naeckerts showed photos and diagrams of Iranian work on re-designing a Shabab-3 "to carry what would appear to be a nuclear weapon.

"The Secretariat told us the information they have is, in their words, 'very credible', unquote, and they have asked Iran to provide 'substantive responses', unquote", Schulte said.

Iran has refused IAEA requests to interview engineers involved in the work and visit their ostensibly civilian workshops.

For its part, Iran continued to assert that the intelligence was forged.

Iranian ambassador Ali Asghar Soltanieh complained Tehran was being pressured to disprove the allegations by revealing information vital to its national security.

"No country would give information about its conventional military activities," he said.

"I said in this briefing: 'Who in the world would believe there are a series of top secret documents US intelligence found on a laptop regarding a Manhattan Project-type nuclear (bomb programme) in Iran and none of these documents bore seals of 'high confidential' or 'secret'?" he said.

"This matter is over, as far as we are concerned."

Study: Bombing Iran will take years

2008-09-19T17:23:00.000-07:00

Press TV, 19/09/08

A bipartisan group says the US must strike Iran's nuclear sites many times 'over a period of years' to halt the program successfully.

A recent study conducted by the Bipartisan Policy Center and prepared under the guidance of former senators Republican Daniel Coats and Democrat Charles Robb suggests that the next US president would be wise to make contingency plans for a military attack against Iran.

Contrary to the findings of the UN nuclear watchdog, the US accuses Tehran of pursuing nuclear weapons. In its latest report, the International Atomic Energy Agency announced that it could not find any 'components of a nuclear weapon' or 'related nuclear physics studies' in Iran.

The release of the Bipartisan Policy Center report comes ahead of the US presidential elections that will see Republican John McCain and Democrat Barack Obama face off on November 4.

Senator McCain says he would intensify pressure on Iran through sanctions before attacking the country - under the pretext that Tehran, a signatory to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), seeks nuclear weaponry.

Senator Obama, meanwhile, has promised to engage Iran diplomatically to find a solution to the dispute.

Under US pressure, the UN Security Council has intervened in Tehran's nuclear case to slap three rounds of sanctions on Iran in spite of the pertinent international organization, the UN nuclear watchdog, having confirming the 'non-diversion' of Iranian nuclear activities.

After extensively monitoring Iran's nuclear program since 2003, the IAEA announced that Iran has managed to enrich uranium-235 to a level 'less than 5 percent' - a rate consistent with the construction of a nuclear power plant. Nuclear arms production, meanwhile, requires an enrichment level of above 90 percent.

"A military strike is a feasible option and must remain a last resort to retard Iran's nuclear development," reads the bipartisan report.

"However, unless sustained by repeated strikes against rebuilt or newly discovered sites over a period of years, military action alone is likely only to delay Iranian nuclear development while entailing risks of retaliation ... which could quickly escalate to full-scale war."

Iran cites diplomacy as the only means acceptable in clarifying the civilian nature of its nuclear program and has warned that it would not hesitate to take all necessary measures to protect the country should it come under attack.

A realistic retaliation would be for Iran to target US military bases in the oil-rich Middle East, where American forces are in no position, according to Iranian officials, to effectively defend themselves.

In its latest measure to prepare for a potential attack against its soil, Iran appointed the elite Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) forces in charge of securing its interests in the Persian Gulf.

Iran has also announced that it is fully monitoring the strategically vital Strait of Hormuz, through which as much as 40 percent of the world's sea-transited crude oil passes.

Iran says the IRGC could, in times of war, effectively blockade the passage using high-tech weapons systems capable of targeting any vessel within a range of 300 km (185 miles) from Iranian shores.

The Bipartisan Policy Center report comes as Israeli threats against Iran are fueling speculation that either Tel Aviv or Washington may launch airstrikes against Iran before George W. Bush leaves the Oval Office.

MD/AA

Study group questions military action against Iran

2008-09-18T17:33:00.000-07:00

By Barry Schweid
AP, 18/09/08

WASHINGTON — The next president would be wise to make contingency plans for a military attack against Iran, but even a successful strike might not stop Tehran's development of nuclear weapons, a bipartisan study group has concluded.

Intensified diplomacy and tougher economic sanctions aimed at Iran's oil and gas industries are more likely to be productive, said the forthcoming report by the Bipartisan Policy Center, prepared under the guidance of former Sens. Daniel Coats, R-Ind., and Charles Robb, D-Va.

"A military strike is a feasible option and must remain a last resort to retard Iran's nuclear," the report said.

The next president could conclude that the risks of a military strike are outweighed by the dangers of a nuclear-armed Iran dominating the Persian Gulf and Iran possibly acting to eradicate Israel, the report said.

The U.S. military is capable of launching a devastating strike on Iran's nuclear and military infrastructure, probably a more decisive one than the Iranian leadership realizes, the study group said.

And it could set back significantly Iran's nuclear program, the report said.

"However, unless sustained by repeated strikes against rebuilt or newly discovered sites over a period of years, military action alone is likely only to delay Iranian nuclear development while entailing risks of retaliation ... which could quickly escalate to full-scale war."

Any U.S. military strike also would run a number of risks, among them rallying Iranians around their "unstable and ideologically extreme regime" and triggering widescale Hezbollah and Hamas rocket attacks against Israel, the report said.

While a successful bombing campaign would slow Iranian nuclear development, Iran would retain its nuclear knowhow. The United States would have to be prepared to attack previously undiscovered nuclear sites to ensure Iran does not resurrect its military nuclead program, the report said.

Iran's nuclear development may pose the most significant strategic threat to the United States during the next administration, threatening the Persian Gulf region and its vast energy resources, spark nuclear proliferation through the Middle East and destabilize Saudi Arabia and other nations in the region, the report said.

The Bush administration has kept the military option on the table while saying it would talk to Iran under certain conditions.

Republican candidate John McCain's approach is similar. He emphasizes retaining the military option. Democratic candidate Barack Obama would consider unconditional talks with Iran. He has not ruled out a military option.

Solana: IAEA's Iran report worries Russia, China

2008-09-18T17:25:00.000-07:00

AP, 18/09/08

PARIS - The European Union's foreign policy chief says he believes Russia and China are "quite worried" about a new IAEA report that says Iran has blocked efforts to investigate its nuclear program.

Javier Solana says the report presented Monday by the U.N. nuclear watchdog "isn't good for Iran."

He stopped short Thursday of saying that there is support for France's push for more U.N. Security Council sanctions against Tehran.

Solana says the U.N. General Assembly will "analyze" the situation. He was speaking on the sidelines of a Paris meeting of EU foreign ministers with their counterparts from five central Asian nations.

Western nations fear Iran's program masks intentions to build bombs. Iran insists its plan is to generate electricity.

Iran warns IAEA not to expect any favors after tough report

2008-09-17T18:01:00.000-07:00

Agence France Presse, 17/09/08

TEHRAN - Iran warned on Tuesday that it will not respond to every adverse claim about its nuclear drive, after a damning report from the UN atomic watchdog left the global community divided about future action. Amid continuing fears that one response might be a US or Israeli strike on Tehran's nuclear program, a top aide to Iran's supreme leader again raised the specter that his country could bring oil shipments from the Gulf to a halt if attacked.

"We are against offering the agency an open door once more and that they expect Iran to respond to any claim," said Alaeddin Borujerdi, head of Parliament's National Security and Foreign Affairs Committee.

He was commenting on a Monday report by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that accused Iran of stalling over a probe into its nuclear work and said it was continuing uranium enrichment in defiance of UN demands.

"We do not think there should be an open forum so America can bring up a new claim every day and pass it on to the agency, expecting Iran to address any claim," Borujerdi was quoted as saying by the official Islamic Republic News Agency.

Iran's envoy to the IAEA also warned that Tehran would only cooperate within the framework of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and its safeguard agreements. "We continue cooperating with the IAEA but they should not expect us to apply the additional protocol," Ali Asghar Soltanieh told state television.

Iran stopped applying the additional protocol, which gives inspectors broader access to its nuclear sites, after the nuclear case was referred to the UN Security Council in 2006.

The IAEA complained it was making little headway in probing allegations that Tehran has been involved in studies to make a nuclear warhead, as Iran refused to provide access to documentation, individuals or sites that could reveal the true nature of its activities.

Tehran said the allegations were based on fabricated documents and that it had provided the IAEA a 117-page response in May addressing some of the agency's questions.

The United States, which is spearheading moves against Iran's nuclear drive, warned that Tehran could face possible new sanctions. France seconded those suggestions, while China said sanctions would not resolve the stalemate.

Uranium enrichment lies at the core of fears about Iran's nuclear program, as the process can make nuclear fuel as well as-at much higher rates of refinement-the fissile core of an atom bomb.

Iran denies Western claims that it is seeking to build atomic weapons, insisting that it wants nuclear power to generate electricity, its right as a signatory to the NPT.

As diplomatic tensions remained high, a former head of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps reiterated that those forces could halt vital shipping in the Gulf.

The State Department said officials from six world powers would meet in Washington on Friday to discuss ways to persuade Iran to stop its sensitive nuclear work.

The envoys from the United States, China, Russia, Britain, France and Germany will meet to "discuss the way forward," State Department spokesman Sean McCormack told reporters.

U.S. to sell IAF smart bombs for heavily fortified targets

2008-09-14T17:46:00.000-07:00

By Aluf Benn and Amos Harel
Haaretz, 14/09/08

Despite reservations in Washington regarding a possible Israeli strike on Iran, the American administration will supply Israel with sophisticated weapons for heavily fortified targets, the U.S. administration announced.

The U.S. Department of Defense announced it would sell the Israel Air Force 1,000 new smart bombs, rumored to significantly enhance the IAF's military capabilities. The deal was approved amid public and secret messages from Washington, with the Americans expressing their reservations about a possible Israeli strike against the Islamic Republic's suspected nuclear sites.

The Pentagon's announcement, which came on Friday, said the U.S. will provide Israel with 1,000 units of Guided Bomb Unit-39 (GBU-39)-a special weapon developed for penetrating fortified
The $77 million shipment, which includes launchers and appurtenances, will allow the IAF to hit many more bunkers than currently possible. Although each bomb weighs 113 kilograms, its penetration capabilities equal those of a one ton bomb, according to professional literature.

Most U.S. Air Force aircraft are able to carry a pack of four of these bombs in place of a single one-ton bomb. The bomb's small size allows a single-strike aircraft to carry more of the munitions than is possible utilizing currently available bomb units, thus increasing firepower, or, alternatively, allowing the aircraft to fly longer distances to deliver a single bomb.

During demonstrations, the GBU-39-labeled by the manufacturer, Boeing, as a Small Diameter Bomb (SDB)-has successfully penetrated more than 1.8 meters of thick reinforced concrete with a 23-kilogram warhead. The GPS-guided weapon is said to have a 50-percent probability of hitting its intended target within 5-8 meters, which should minimize collateral damage.

The estimated value for the bomb's GPS version, which military experts have called the latest development in the bunker-buster line, is around $70,000 to $90,000 for each individual bomb.

The U.S. has already supplied Israel with earlier versions of bunker busters. In 2005, the Pentagon authorized the sale of GBU-28 to Israel, in a move that commentators construed as a hinted threat aimed at Iran. Haaretz reported earlier this month that the U.S. was hesitant about selling Israel heavier busters.

The Pentagon's announcement also said that the U.S. would help upgrade the Israel Defense Forces' patriot anti-aircraft missiles-which Israel uses as part of its missile-interception array. Israel will also receive 28,000 LAW (Light Anti-Tank Weapon) tube launchers for land forces.

Russia's Medvedev: Attack on Iran will endanger entire world

2008-09-14T17:43:00.000-07:00

By Adar Primor
Haaretz, 14/09/08

MOSCOW AND SOCHI - Russian President Dmitry Medvedev said Friday, "We know that certain players are planning an attack against Iran. But we oppose any unilateral step and military solution to the nuclear crisis," he added.

Speaking at the Valdai Discussion Club, an annual forum of opinion-makers in Moscow, Medvedev also said, "The world does not need to tighten its sanctions on Iran at this time."

The discussions at Valdai dealt with Russia's international role. In response to a question from Haaretz as to whether the Middle East conference Russia is planning to host in the fall shows involvement similar to that once displayed by the Soviet Union, Medvedev said that Russia is not the heir to the Soviet Union.

"Russia has a completely different value system," he said. "When it proposes a mediation service, its sole intention is to assist in bringing about a peace that both Jews and Arabs will enjoy."

A day before the discussion with Medvedev, the forum's members met with Russia's former president and incumbent prime minister, Vladimir Putin.

Putin said he considers Russia's presence in the Middle East important and that his country intended to use Syrian ports "as it did in the past, but not for defined purposes."

The president's adviser, Oleg Tsatsurin, told Haaretz: "Russia would not take any action that would change the balance of power in the Middle East or harm the excellent relations between Russia and Israel."

US stonewalling Ahmadinejad visa process

2008-09-13T17:47:00.000-07:00

Press TV, 13/09/08

The US has failed to issue a visa to allow Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to attend the UN General Assembly in New York.

The Iranian president is scheduled to address the General Assembly on September 23.

Despite a timely application, no visa has yet been issued for the president, Fars news agency reported Saturday.

The US has an agreement with the United Nations, according to which it is obliged to allow foreign leaders to speak before the world body. The agreement requires visas for heads of states visiting the UN headquarters to be granted 'as promptly as possible'.

If President Ahmadinejad attends the summit, it will be his fourth trip to New York since he took office in August 2005.

Ahmadinejad experienced the same reaction from the US State Department last year.

During his last trip in September 2007, Ahmadinejad requested to lay a wreath at the World Trade Center, the site of the September 11 attacks, to pay tribute to the victims of the tragedy. His bid, however, was rejected by city authorities.

He also proposed to meet and hold a live debate with US President George W. Bush. Washington officials rejected the offer, saying that the White House would only engage in direct talks after Tehran halts its nuclear program.
MD/AA

Ahmadinejad: Iran will support Hamas until collapse of Israel

2008-09-13T17:45:00.000-07:00

By Adam Gonn
Haaretz, 13/09/08

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad vowed Friday to keep supporting the Palestinian militant group Hamas until the "collapse of Israel."

The Iranian news agency Khabar quoted Ahmadinejad as telling Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh that Iran views the support of the Palestinian people as part of its religious and national duty and that Iran will stand behind the Palestinian nation "until the big victory feast which is the collapse of the Zionist regime."

In a phone conversation between the two leaders, the Iranian president said that the continued Hamas resistance against Israel and the group's achievements would always be "a source of pride for all Muslims."

Iran does not acknowledge the sovereignty of Israel and vowed to support Hamas until what Ahmadinejad calls "deliverance from Zionists (Israel)."

Haniyeh, the leader of the Islamist Hamas movement in the Gaza Strip, was elected Palestinian prime minister in 2006, but was dismissed in June 2007 by Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, after Hamas violently seized control over the Gaza Strip from Abbas' Palestinian Authority.

US to invade Iran any day now?

2008-09-12T17:48:00.000-07:00

Russia Today, 12/09/08

A few weeks ago the Russian newspaper Izvestia, a well-known and authoritive daily published nationwide and abroad, came forward with something that would have been looked upon as a conspiracy theory if published by a tabloid.

The paper suggested that by attacking South Ossetia, the Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili had badly damaged a planned U.S. military operation against Iran. In the newspaper's opinion Georgia was supposed to play the role of another "unsinkable aircraft carrier" for the U.S., i.e. an operational and tactical base for U.S. aircraft that would be making bombing raids into Iran. Something akin to what Thailand was in the Vietnam war.

Thailand certainly benefited from the arrangement, and Georgia would have too, insists the paper, if its President hadn't put his ambitions above the US national interest and ended up beaten, disarmed, chewing on his neckties and totally incapable of providing whatever the U.S. needs from him.

That's why, according to Izvestia in yet another article on the matter, the U.S. response to the Russian retaliation was harsh in words but very mild in action. The latest on the issue suggests that Mikhail Saakashvili may be replaced any day now by direct order from Washington.

Having read the story in Izvestia I decided to try to figure out the extent of improbability and impossibility of the assumptions. As I was doing that, I remembered that early in August CNN had started showing U.S. generals who cried for more troops and hardware for Afghanistan which, in their opinion, was rapidly becoming a more intensive conflict than Iraq.

Shortly after that, a phone call came from a college friend who had just come back from Kandahar in Afghanistan, where he had seen American battle tanks being unloaded from a Ukrainian-registered Antonov-124 "Ruslan", the heaviest and largest cargo airplane in the world. The friend asked if I had any idea what tanks would be good for in Afghanistan, and I said I didn't. It's an established fact from the Soviet war in Afghanistan that tanks are no good for most of the country's mountainous territory. They are good for flatlands, and the main body of flat land in the region is right across the border in Iran.

Later in August there was another bit of unofficial information from a Russian military source: more than a thousand American tanks and armored vehicles had been shipped to Eastern Afghanistan by Ukrainian "Ruslans" flying in three to five shipments a day, and more flights were expected.

Somehow all this, together with the series of articles in Izvestia, the information that all U.S. troops in Afghanistan are going to be reassigned and regrouped under unified command, the arrival of NATO naval ships in the Black Sea, the appointment of a man used to command troops in a combat environment as the new commander of the US Central Command and other bits and pieces. To my total astonishment, when they all fell together the Izvestia story started looking slightly more credible than before.

Today the U.S. media reported that there had been a leak from the Pentagon about a secret Presidential order in which President Bush authorized his military (most of which is currently on Afghan soil) to conduct operations in Pakistan without the necessity for informing the Pakistani government. The U.S. military in Afghanistan-or shall we say in the whole region neighboring Iran-is getting a freer hand by the day. And it is getting more and more hardware to play with.

Of course it's quite clear now that Georgia has lost its immediate potential as a nearby airfield, but after all, the aircraft carriers in the Gulf are not so far away.

Believe me I'm not saying that the U.S. is going to start an all-out war against Iran tomorrow. But aren't there indications that it may happen the day after tomorrow, a month from now, or on any date before the official handover of Presidency in the U.S.? Or, as some suggest, before the election?

I'm just asking the questions. But there are some people, like those working for Izvestia, for instance, who answer them with a "yes".

Palin backs Israeli right to strike Iran

2008-09-12T17:46:00.000-07:00

Jerusalem Post, 12/09/08

The US must ensure that Teheran does not obtain weapons of mass destruction and should not second guess an Israeli decision to carry out a strike against Iran's nuclear facilities, Alaska Governor Sarah Palin, John McCain's running mate in the US presidential race, said Thursday night in an interview with ABC News that focused almost exclusively on foreign policy issues.

"I believe that under the leadership of [President Mahmoud] Ahmadinejad, nuclear weapons in the hands of his government are extremely dangerous to everyone on this globe," Palin asserted. "We have got to make sure these weapons of mass destruction; that nuclear weapons are not given to the hands of Ahmadinejad, not that he would use them, but that he would allow terrorists to be able to use them. So we have got to put the pressure on Iran."

When asked how the US should respond in the event of an Israeli attack on Iran, Palin said, "Well, first, we are friends of Israel, and I don't think that we should second guess the measures that Israel has to take to defend themselves, and for their security."

The interviewer went on to repeat the question in various forms, but Palin reiterated that "I don't think we can second guess what Israel has to do to secure its nation."

The Alaska governor was then asked to divulge her opinion regarding the roots of Islamic terrorism, which had led, seven years earlier, to the attack on the World Trade Center in New York.

"You know, there is a very small percentage of Islamic believers who are extreme, and they are violent, and they do not believe in American ideals. And they attacked us. And now we are at a point, here, seven years later, on the anniversary, in this post- 9/11 world, where we are able to commit to never again," she replied.

"The only option for them is to become a suicide bomber, to get caught up in this evil, in this terror. They need to be provided the hope that all Americans have, instilled in us, because we're democratic and we are a free, we're a free-thinking society."

During the interview Palin also reiterated opinions voiced by McCain regarding the Russian invasion of Georgia, saying that Tbilisi, as well as the Ukraine, should be allowed to join NATO's ranks. Asked whether such a move could precipitate a military conflict between US and Russian forces should Russia invade Georgia once more, Palin replied, "Perhaps so. That is the agreement. When you are a NATO ally, if another country is attacked, you are going to be expected to be called upon and help."

Iran is a threat, but the West can't afford to have Israel bomb it-yet

2008-09-12T17:45:00.000-07:00

By Con Coughlin
Telegraph, 12/09/08

With almost every day that passes, the crisis over Iran's nuclear programme appears to move a step closer to what looks increasingly like its inevitable conclusion-military action.

Israel may be in the process of choosing a new prime minister, but that has not stopped its military establishment from pressing ahead with preparations to launch unilateral air strikes, should the West fail in its long-running diplomatic mission to bring Tehran to its senses.

As the Israeli media reported yesterday, the plans for an attack against Iran's nuclear facilities have reached the stage where Jerusalem has presented the Bush administration with an inventory of the military equipment it needs to ensure the mission is a success.
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This includes "bunker-buster" bombs and refuelling planes to support the F-16 bombers. Even if Washington proves unwilling to provide this support, the Israelis are confident they can go it alone, especially after the success of the attack last year against a nuclear installation the Syrians were trying to build.

The Israeli air force completely destroyed the complex, and its F-16s were well on their way home before the Syrians realised what was going on.
# Read more from Con Coughlin

Although the Israelis would prefer to have Washington's blessing and military assistance if they were to stage a similar strike against Iran's facilities, the only significant obstacle that remains in their way is getting the US military to grant permission for their planes to use a corridor through Iraqi air space, which the Americans have so far declined.

While the Bush administration is sympathetic to Israel's concern about the existential threat it faces from Iran's nuclear programme, the White House remains reluctant to sanction military action.

This is not because Washington still doubts that Iran is trying to develop an atomic arsenal-last year's controversial National Intelligence Estimate, which claimed Iran had halted work on its nuclear weapons programme, has now been widely discounted as erroneous within the transatlantic intelligence community.

What concerns Washington is that military action against Iran would have disastrous consequences for the US-led coalition's efforts to bring stability to Iraq, where, as President Bush pointed out this week, progress is being made after the success of the military surge strategy by General David Petraeus.

He will soon take control of US Central Command, which, among its many other responsibilities, handles security in the Gulf region, including Iran.

Gen Petraeus's successor in Baghdad, Lt Gen Raymond Odierno, recently confided to US officials that his biggest fear concerning the Iraq mission was a unilateral Israeli air strike against Iran.

The Iranian government has made it clear that it would respond to any such attack by retaliating against coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as launching terror attacks against western capitals, including London.

One important lesson the Bush administration has learnt from its painful involvement in Iraq is the importance of thinking through the likely consequences of military action. The most obvious consequence of any strike against Iran would be renewed sectarian violence in Iraq.

But even though Washington continues to have strong reservations about the wisdom of attacking Iran, Israel's growing restlessness regarding the Iranian threat has not been lost on the mullahs, who, according to the latest western intelligence reports, appear to have intensified their efforts to conceal significant parts of their nuclear development programme.

US spy satellites have detected several installations that intelligence officials believe are being used by Iran for a nuclear project that has not been declared to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the UN-sponsored body responsible for monitoring Iran's nuclear programme.

One facility is located in the Amir Abid residential district of Tehran, where western nuclear experts believe the Iranians are conducting experiments with the sophisticated P2 centrifuge.

Another suspicious site, whose existence British officials recently made public, is at Darhavin in south-west Iran, 200 miles from the Bushehr nuclear power plant. After Foreign Office officials expressed their concerns about it, the Iranians acknowledged they were building another nuclear reactor.

Suspicions that Iran has resumed work on its clandestine nuclear weapons programme have deepened after the discovery by nuclear inspectors that significant quantities of enriched uranium are unaccounted for at Iran's uranium conversion facility at Isfahan, where raw uranium "yellow cake" undergoes the first stage of the enrichment cycle.

Although the Isfahan complex is supposed to be under close IAEA supervision, nuclear inspectors only have access to the final storage area of the process which produces UF6, enriched uranium that can ultimately be used to provide weapons-grade fissile material.

According to research by nuclear inspectors, between 50 and 60 tons of UF6-enough to make six atom bombs-is unaccounted for. They suspect Iranian scientists have diverted the material from the complex before it reaches the storage rooms, where the IAEA relies on a single CCTV camera to monitor production.

So far, the Iranians have failed to come up with an adequate explanation for these discrepancies, and until they do the drumbeats of war are unlikely to subside.

Iran says keen to resume talks on nuclear programme

2008-09-10T17:29:00.000-07:00

Reuters, 10/09/08

LONDON - Iran is keen to resume talks with major powers on its disputed nuclear programme to clear up "ambiguities" in the discussions, Iran's Deputy Foreign Minister Mahdi Safari said on Wednesday.

"We would like just to continue this negotiation and discussion as soon as possible," Safari told a news conference during a visit to London.

Western powers fear Tehran wants to build an atomic bomb. Iran says it is only seeking to master nuclear technology to generate electricity.

Iran's chief atomic negotiator, Saeed Jalili, and European Union foreign policy Javier Solana, representing six world powers last discussed Tehran's nuclear programme by telephone in August. An EU official said there was no change in the dispute.

The United States, Russia, China, France, Germany and Britain have offered to hold off from seeking further sanctions against Iran if Tehran freezes expansion of its nuclear work.

After Iran responded to the offer last month with a non-committal letter, Western countries said they would look at stepping up sanctions on Tehran.

The United States increased pressure on Tehran on Wednesday by slapping sanctions on its shipping sector.

Safari said there were "ambiguities" in the exchanges between Iran and the six powers on the nuclear issue.

"We are ready to just sit together and to clear up these ambiguities... Always we said that we are ready and we are available," said Safari, who held talks with Foreign Secretary David Miliband and other British officials in London

Iran: Tehran Makes A Cautious Move Toward Moscow

2008-09-09T17:34:00.000-07:00

By Kamal Nazer Yasin
Eurasianet, 09/09/08

The Caucasus crisis, precipitated by Russia’s incursion into Georgia, created the possibility of a grand bargain between US and Iranian leaders, under which Tehran could have made a deal on its nuclear program in return for a commitment to develop Iran into a transit state for Caspian Basin energy. The window of opportunity for such a deal now seems to be closed, as Iranian and American experts say the Bush administration never seriously pursued Iranian diplomatic overtures to explore such a trade-off.

Over the past two weeks, Iran has made cautious moves in a pro-Moscow direction after staking out a decidedly neutral stance immediately following the outbreak of Georgian-Russian hostilities. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. The shift toward Russia became evident in late August, when President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad attended the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Tajikistan, and expressed support for the Kremlin’s version of events. "We think Georgia’s leaders should be more in control of the situation and they should stop countries from outside the region from interfering," the Iranian president said, clearly referring to Tbilisi’s close strategic relationship to Washington.

Iran’s neutral stance for most of August, according to policy experts in Tehran, was a signal to the United States that Iranian leaders were interested in probing a diplomatic deal. For a short while, it seemed as though the Bush administration might seize the opportunity, as rumors swirled in Tehran that the United States would soon open an interest section in Iran. But now it appears that the initial optimism surrounding a possible new departure in US-Iranian relations was unfounded.

"Iran was hoping that withholding support to the Russians could tempt the Americans into offering something substantial to us," said an Iranian expert, speaking to EurasiaNet on condition of anonymity. "Nothing of the kind has materialized-if you leave out the fact that [US Vice President Dick] Cheney refrained from lashing out at Iran when he was visiting Azerbaijan and Georgia on September 3-4]."

It would seem that Iran misjudged the Bush administration’s desire to open an interest section in Tehran. US officials floated the idea last July, but on September 7, Iranian Parliament Speaker Ali Larijani told MPs that "there is no movement on that front that we know of."

According to Gary Sick, a New York-based expert on Iran and a former member of US National Security Council under Carter and Reagan Administrations, if the Iranians were indeed waiting for a US reward, their expectations were unrealistic. "On the whole many people in Washington were probably happy that Iran was taking [a neutral] position. But that was in Iran’s own interest," Sick told EurasiaNet. "After all, Russia was using its military might against an independent country that had normal diplomatic and trade relations with Iran."

Iran stands to gain immediate benefits from closer ties with Moscow. As one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, Russia is in position to veto any attempt to expand economic sanctions against Iran made in connection with the ongoing dispute over Tehran’s nuclear program. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Closer relations would also facilitate Iran’s purchase of sophisticated Russian military hardware, such as S-300 surface-to-air missiles.

In the coming weeks, Iran is expected to press Russia to complete the Bushehr Nuclear reactor, a project that has dragged on for years. On August 1, Russia’s ambassador to Tehran, Alexander Sadovnikov, announced that Moscow was committed to finishing the plant "in the shortest possible time." The envoy went on to hint that the reactor could be operational "by the end of 2008."

Russia has long treated Iran as an ally of convenience. But Sick said Moscow is now more interested in retaining Tehran’s support, given the renewal of Cold War-like tension between Russia and the West. "Russia is playing a more active part in world’s politics and that’s where Iran could play a constructive role for them as far as the Middle East is concerned," Sick said.

While there are major incentives for Iran and Russia to promote closer cooperation, the two countries also face some large diplomatic stumbling blocks. Most importantly, the two countries’ energy ambitions sharply diverge: Russia is intent on monopolizing Caspian Basin energy exports, while Iran would like to develop into an alternate route for energy being shipped from the Caspian Basin to Europe. Russia’s incursion into Georgia served to heighten Iran’s ambitions in this regard by casting security doubts upon existing routes connecting Azerbaijan and Turkey. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

Past experience is prompting Iran to proceed cautiously. Russian support for Iranian policy goals has never been firm. A late August commentary posted by the Iranian website Tabnak, which is controlled by former commanders of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, perhaps best summarizes the Iranian stance. It calls on policy makers in Tehran to take "maximum care" and show "diligence" in pursuing closer ties to Russia.

"The possibility of Russia using ’the Iran card’ in its relations with the West exists," the commentary said. "Georgia has no winning cards to offer us, but if Russia is to be supported tacitly, we must first ensure that it (Russia) would not sell us out to the West."

Kamal Nazer Yasin is a pseudonym for a freelance journalist specializing in Iranian affairs.

Vladimir Putin set to bait US with nuclear aid for Tehran

2008-09-07T17:48:00.000-07:00

By Mark Franchetti
Sunday Times, 07/09/08

Russia is considering increasing its assistance to Iran’s nuclear programme in response to America’s calls for Nato expansion eastwards and the presence of US Navy vessels in the Black Sea delivering aid to Georgia.

The Kremlin is discussing sending teams of Russian nuclear experts to Tehran and inviting Iranian nuclear scientists to Moscow for training, according to sources close to the Russian military.

Moscow has been angered by Washington’s promise to give Georgia £564m in aid following the Russian invasion of parts of the country last month after Tbilisi’s military offensive. Kremlin officials suspect the US is planning to rearm the former Soviet republic and is furious at renewed support for attempts by Georgia and Ukraine to join Nato.

Last week a third US Navy ship entered the Black Sea with aid bound for Georgia. Moscow has accused the Americans of using the vessels to deliver weapons but has failed to provide any evidence.

Vladimir Putin, the prime minister of Russia, who has been the driving force during the crisis, has declared he will take unspecified action in response.

"Everything has changed since the war in Georgia," said one source. "What seemed impossible before, is more than possible now when our friends become our enemies and our enemies our friends. What are American ships doing off our coast? Do you see Russian warships off the coast of America?

"Russia will respond. A number of possibilities are being considered, including hitting America there where it hurts most-Iran."

Increasing nuclear assistance to Iran would sharply escalate tensions between Moscow and Washington. Over the past 10 years Russia has helped Iran build its first nuclear power station in Bushehr. Iran claims the plant is for civilian purposes. Officially at least, Moscow accepts that. The West has little doubt the aim is to build a nuclear bomb.

But diplomats say that despite its help with the Bushehr plant, Moscow has so far played a constructive role as a mediator between the regime in Tehran and the West and by backing United Nations sanctions.

Earlier this year, in one of his last actions as president, Putin added Russia’s stamp of approval to a UN security council resolution imposing fresh sanctions against Iran.

The document bans, with the exception of the Bushehr project, dual-technology exports that could be used for civil nuclear purposes and missile production.

"After the war in Georgia it’s difficult to imagine relations between Russia and America getting worse," said a western diplomat. "Russia giving greater nuclear assistance to the Iranians would do the trick – that’s for sure."

Last month Russia agreed to sell missiles to Syria. "The mood among the hawks is very bullish indeed," said one source who did not rule out a resumption of Russian military action in Georgia to take the port of Batumi, where American vessels are delivering aid.

Hardliners were infuriated last week by the visit to Georgia of Dick Cheney, the American vice-president. "Georgia will be in our alliance," Cheney said. He also visited Ukraine, whose Nato aspirations could make it the next flashpoint between Russia and America.

However in Kiev, the Ukrainian capital, events appeared to be moving Moscow’s way. Viktor Yushchenko, the pro-western president, is fighting to stay in power in a crisis that could see him impeached.

"I’m amused by claims in the West that Russia is the loser in this crisis," said a former Putin aide. "What would Washington do if we were arming Cuba the way it armed Georgia? The postSoviet days when we could be pushed around are over."

Peres warns Olmert: Attack on Iran could spark wide-scale war

2008-09-07T17:43:00.000-07:00

Haaretz, 07/09/08

President Shimon Peres has warned Prime Minister Ehud Olmert that a military attack on Iranian nuclear facilities is likely to trigger a wide-scale confrontation, A British newspaper reported Sunday.

Peres is the first senior politician to warn the prime minister against an Israeli attack on Iran, with other politicians threatening an air attack if Tehran does not abandon uranium enrichment in what the West believes is a quest to develop nuclear weapons.

"The military path will not solve the problem," Peres said in an interview with Britain's Sunday Times. "Such an attack can trigger a bigger war."

Peres said he prefers the civilian path, adding that he has voiced this sentiment directly to Olmert. However, he declined to reveal what the prime minister had said in response.

Peres, a firm believer in international cooperation, added that Israel requires the cooperation of more nations in order to stop Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

The danger is not a nuclear Iran, Peres continued, but rather nuclear weapons in the hands of dangerous leaders like the Iranian president.

"If Switzerland announces tomorrow that it has nuclear weapons, would anyone worry?" said Peres.

"I recently told [Russian Prime Minister Vladimir] Putin that the Marxists say that religion is the opium of the masses. I say religion is the opium of leaders like Ahmadinejad," he added.

Peres said a serious attempt to cut the price of oil would help reduce Iran's ambitions to a more realistic level.

"The world has no choice-if nuclear weapons reach the hands of terrorists, it will be impossible to rule the world," he said.

In the interview, Peres also criticized American foreign policy, saying it relied too heavily on military strength in its attempts to bring democracy to the Middle East.

Peres said it would be wiser to use economic strength, saying, "If you suggest elections to the Saudis or to King Abdullah of Jordan they will refuse, as they regard democracy as a new religion and they want to remain Muslims. But if American businessmen offer high-tech companies, they would be most welcome."

Russia's role in the Iran crisis

2008-09-06T17:33:00.000-07:00

By Ray Takeyh and Nikolas Gvosdev
The Boston Globe, 06/09/08

It is one of the rites of passage of the fall-every September, the Bush administration returns to the United Nation for another sanctions resolution against Iran. However, this time there is much consternation in Washington that Russia's invasion of Georgia-and the subsequent chill that has descended on relations between Russia and the West-has ended any possibility of cooperation between the United States and Russia in dealing with Iran's nuclear imbroglio. Such fears are overblown.

Russia's assault on Georgia may produce no measurable change of its Iran policy. Indeed, President Dmitry Medvedev of Russia made it clear that, despite the harsh rhetoric that has been exchanged between Moscow and Washington, Russia continues to support efforts to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons.

The primary reason for the continuity is that both Iran and Russia are essentially satisfied with existing US-European policy of applying incremental and largely symbolic UN sanctions on Tehran. Moscow feels that as long as the diplomatic process remains in play, America is in no position to launch a military strike that could destabilize the Middle East. At the same time, the theocratic regime has increasingly adjusted to a sanctions policy whose impact is negated by increasing oil prices.

Although Tehran would be grateful for a Russian veto of any future sanctions resolutions, it does seem content with a Russian policy that waters down UN mandates while deepening its commercial ties with Iran. On the one hand, Moscow has supported three previous Security Council injunctions against Iran, yet it has also signed lucrative trade deals and expanded its diplomatic representation in Iran. The incongruity of today's situation is that Russia rebukes Iran for its nuclear infractions while providing technical assistance to the Bushehr plant, which is a critical component of Iran's atomic industry.

For its part, Russia is happy with the standoff between Iran and the United States. Not only does it destabilize international oil markets-keeping prices higher than they ought to be-but Iran's large natural gas reserves are effectively off-limits for European use, reinforcing the continent's dependency on Moscow. At the same time, as Iran strengthens its economic links with key Asian powers, it makes it more dependent on Russia and China for its critical trade and investments. Russia can only benefit from Iran's gradual reorientation toward the East.

All this is not to suggest that Iran has not benefited from the Russian-Georgian conflagration, but that those advantages have been subtle. Tehran is using the Georgian crisis as a cautionary lesson to the Persian Gulf states. From its podiums and platforms, the message emanating from the Islamic Republic is that the Georgians mistakenly accepted American pledges of support only to pay a heavy price for their naiveté. The Gulf sheikdoms who similarly put much stock in US security assurances would be wise to come to terms with their populous and powerful Persian neighbor. In a region where America is viewed as unpredictable and unreliable, this message has a powerful resonance.

The contours of Russia's policy became obvious in the recent meeting of the Shanghi Cooperation Organization. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of Iran was unable to persuade Moscow and its partners to extend security guarantees to Tehran, or to gain Russian support for switching oil pricing from dollars to euros. Medvedev and his Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov continued to urge Iran to be flexible and negotiate a restraint on its nuclear activities. Yet, Moscow also declared support for Iran's nuclear activities that were designed for peaceful purposes.

Given the fact that technologies employed for civilian use can be the basis of a military program, it is hard to see the utility of Russia's latest pronouncement.

What this means?

Russia is not interested in playing an active role in resolving the Iran crisis on terms America will find acceptable. If the next president is going to solve the Iranian nuclear conundrum, he must appreciate that the UN process has reached its limits, and that the only manner of moving forward is for Washington to engage in direct negotiations with Tehran.

Ray Takeyh is a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. Nikolas Gvosdev is a member of the faculty of the US Naval War College.

Obama: Nuclear Iran 'unacceptable'

2008-09-05T17:31:00.000-07:00

By By Yitzhak Benhorin
Yedioth Ahronoth, 05/09/08

WASHINGTON - Iran is a "major threat" and it would be "unacceptable" for the rogue nation to develop a nuclear weapon, Barack Obama said Thursday.

During his first-ever interview on FOX News’ "The O’Reilly Factor", the Democratic presidential candidate said, "It is unacceptable for Iran to possess a nuclear weapon; it would be a game changer."
Obama said he would not take military action off the table in dealing with Iran, but added that diplomacy and sanctions cannot be overlooked.
"It’s sufficient to say I would not take military action off the table and that I will never hesitate to use our military force in order to protect the homeland and the United States’ interests," he said.
Obama accused the Bush Administration of bringing radical Islamic groups together, and said Iran "fueled a whole host of terrorist organizations, but we have to have the ability to distinguish between groups. ... They may not all be part and parcel of the same ideology."
Obama also told FOX News he "absolutely" believes the US is fighting a war on terror against "Al Qaeda, the Taliban, a whole host of networks that are bent on attacking America, who have a distorted ideology, who have perverted the faith of Islam."
'Five years of mismanagement'

He repeated his campaign’s foreign policy position that Afghanistan must become the "central front" in the war on terror.
During the interview Obama, who was against the US troop surge in Iraq, admitted that it has "succeeded in ways that nobody anticipated" but refused to retract his initial opposition to the surge. "I’ve already said it’s succeeded beyond our wildest dreams," he said.
However, Obama added that the US has not had enough "political reconciliation" and Iraqis still have not taken responsibility for their country.
"We have gone through five years of mismanagement of this war that I thought was disastrous, and the president wanted to double down and continue an open-ended policy (that did not put pressure on the Iraqi government)," he said.

Obama said he would not take military action off the table in dealing with Iran, but diplomacy and sanctions can’t be overlooked.
According to a new CBS News poll conducted this week, the presidential race between Obama and John McCain is now even at 42 percent. Twelve percent are undecided according to the poll, and one percent said they wouldn't vote.
This is in contrast to a poll conducted last weekend, where the Obama-Biden ticket led McCain-Palin by eight points, 48 percent to 40 percent.

Iran, Russia agree on intelligence sharing

2008-09-05T17:30:00.001-07:00

IRNA, 05/09/08

Iran's Minister of Information, Gholam-Hossein Mohseni Ejeie, on Friday met new head of Russian Federal Security Service, Alexander Bortnikov.

The two sides in the meeting discussed mutual extensive cooperation for information and intelligence sharing, Iran's Embassy to Russia said on Friday.

Ejeie told Bortnikov that the requisite for such cooperation is regular exchange of meetings and views.

No more information on the meeting is available.

Iran's Information Minister also attended the Shanghai Cooperation Organization's (SCO) anti-terrorist exercises Volgograd Anti-Terror 2008, that was held in Russia's Volgograd from August 18-September 4.

On the sidelines of the visit, Ejeie met and conferred with the SCO officials on campaign against extremism and terrorism.

Also the conference of the top brass of security agencies and special services from the SCO member states opened in Volgograd on Wednesday, 3 September, to precede antiterrorist exercises Volgograd Anti-Terror 2008.

The participants in the conference discussed the improvement of international ties in opposing terrorism, including through the organization of joint investigative operations to prevent acts of terrorism in the territories of the SCO members.

The active phase of the SCO anti-terrorist exercises took place on 3-4 September.

The exercises were aimed at practicing teamwork between the units from each SCO member state.

That was the second stage of the SCO joint antiterrorist exercises.

During the first stage, which took place in Volgograd in late August, the participants practiced search and investigative operations to prevent the activity of terrorist groups.

The SCO is comprised of China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.

India, Iran, Mongolia, and Pakistan hold observer status in the organization.

Iran slams French OK for Israeli strike

2008-09-05T17:30:00.000-07:00

Press TV, 05/09/08

Tehran has rejected the French President's suggestion that Israel could strike Iran under the pretext that the country seeks nuclear arms.

In a Friday statement, Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Hassan Qashqavi stressed that nuclear weapons will never be part of 'Iran's defense doctrine'.

Earlier on Thursday in Syria, President Nicolas Sarkozy said, "Iran is taking a major risk by continuing the process of seeking nuclear technology for military ends."

This is while the UN nuclear watchdog, which has extensively monitored Iran's nuclear activities and has been inspecting the country's nuclear installations since 2003, has declared that Tehran enriches uranium-235 to a level of 3.7 percent-a rate consistent with the construction of a nuclear power plant. Nuclear arms production requires an enrichment level of above 90 percent.

"We could find one morning that Israel has struck (Iran)," said the French president, adding that no one would question the legitimacy of such an act of aggression.

Speculation that Israel plans to launch air strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities has run high since Pentagon officials revealed in June that Tel Aviv had held an extensive 'dress rehearsal' for an attack against Iran.

Israel and the US have long threatened Iran with war, accusing Tehran, a signatory to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), of developing nuclear weapons.

"Iran has always, along with other nations, demanded nuclear disarmament in all countries and the destruction of nuclear arsenals," the Iranian spokesman continued.

Suffering from electricity shortage, Iran has been forced to adopt a rationing program by scheduling power outages-of up to two hours a day-across both urban and rural areas in the country.

Iran open to talks with U.S. over Iraq

2008-09-05T17:29:00.000-07:00

UPI, 05/09/08

TEHRAN - The Iranian ambassador to Iraq said on state-run television Friday that Tehran would hold talks on Iraq with Washington if requested to do so by Baghdad.

Hassan Qummi said Tehran would hold its fifth round of talks to discuss the political and security situation in Iraq if Baghdad requested its involvement based on mechanisms outlined in earlier talks, the Kuwait News Agency reported.

U.S. and Iraqi officials said there was no current interest in including Tehran in discussions on the reconstruction of Iraq.

U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker said the Iranians in earlier rounds of negotiations made a verbal pledge to stop meddling in the internal affairs of Iraq, but the United States had no evidence that promise was carried through.

Qummi noted that the Iraqi government has not issued a request to hold another round of trilateral talks, but added Iran was willing to do its part to assure Iraq is secure and stable.

Top U.S. and Iranian officials met previously at the request of Baghdad several times in 2007.

Iran nuclear program needs political, not military response: Peres

2008-09-05T17:27:00.001-07:00

AFP, 05/09/08

ROME - Iran's nuclear program demands a political rather than a military response, Israeli President Shimon Peres said Friday, a day after his French counterpart warned Tehran risked a possible Israeli strike.

"I think the problem can be resolved not militarily but politically and economically," Peres told reporters, on the sidelines of a meeting in the northern Italian town of Cernobbio that also included Palestinian president Mahmud Abbas.

In remarks carried by ANSA news agency, he described a military option in dealing with Iran as "an error."

"So long as there is a possibility of acting politically and economically, it is much better," Peres said.

On Thursday, French President Nicolas Sarkozy warned Tehran that its determination to press on with its controversial nuclear drive risked an Israeli strike that would be a "catastrophe."

Peres and Abbas shook hands and embraced at the meeting largely dealing with the economy that gathers pundits and a variety of international leaders.

US Vice President Dick Cheney was expected later in the day, after wrapping up visits to Azerbaijan, Georgia and Ukraine.

Iran calls Sarkozy nuclear claims 'baseless'

2008-09-05T17:27:00.000-07:00

AFP, 05/09/08

TEHRAN - Iran on Friday dismissed as baseless remarks by French President Nicolas Sarkozy that Tehran was pursuing its controversial nuclear programme for military purposes.

Sarkozy's comments, made on Thursday during a visit to Iran's regional staunch ally Syria, are "baseless," foreign ministry spokesman Hassan Ghashghavi said in a statement received by AFP.

"Nuclear weapons are not part of Iran's defence doctrine," he added.

Sarkozy warned Iran that its determination to press ahead with its programme of uranium enrichment risked provoking an Israeli military strike.

"Iran is taking a major risk by continuing the process of seeking nuclear technology for military ends," the French president said at a four-way summit in Damascus with the leaders of Syria, Qatar and Turkey.

Iran has consistently denied that its nuclear programme is aimed at making an atomic weapon, and says it wants only to generate energy for its growing population.

"The Islamic Republic of Iran has always, along with other nations, wanted nuclear disarmament in all countries and the destruction of their arsenals," Ghashghavi said.

The United States and its staunch ally Israel-the Middle East's sole if undeclared nuclear armed nation-have never ruled out taking military action against Iran, which they accuse of seeking to make a nuclear bomb.

Iran has repeatedly vowed that any attack will be met by a crushing response.

Tehran risks a fourth round of UN sanctions over its failure to abide by international calls to freeze uranium enrichment, a process which makes nuclear fuel but can also be used to build the core of a nuclear weapon.

Iran's Nuclear Program: Status

2008-09-04T17:33:00.000-07:00

Paul K. Kerr, Analyst in Nonproliferation
Congressional Research Service, 23/06/08

Summary

Although Iran claims that its nuclear programs are exclusively for peaceful purposes, they have generated considerable concern that Tehran is pursuing a nuclear weapons program. Indeed, the UN Security Council has responded to Iran's refusal to suspend work on its uranium enrichment and heavy-water nuclear reactor programs by adopting several resolutions, most recently in March 2008, which imposed sanctions on Tehran.

Despite this pressure, Iran continues at its Natanz centrifuge facility to enrich uranium, expand the number of operating centrifuges, and conduct research on new types of centrifuges. Tehran has also continued to produce centrifuge feedstock, as well as work on its heavy-water reactor and associated facilities.

Whether Iran is pursuing a nuclear weapons program is, however, unknown. A National Intelligence Estimate made public in December 2007 assessed that Tehran "halted its nuclear weapons program," defined as "Iran's nuclear weapon design and weaponization work and covert uranium conversion-related and uranium enrichment-related work," in 2003. The estimate, however, also assessed that Tehran is "keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons" and that any decision to end a nuclear weapons program is "inherently reversible."

Although Iran has cooperated with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to an extent, the agency says that Tehran has not gone far enough to alleviate all of the agency's concerns about Iran's enrichment and heavy-water reactor programs. The IAEA continues to investigate the program, particularly evidence that Tehran may have conducted procurement activities and research directly applicable to nuclear weapons development.

This report will be updated as necessary.
Contents

Background

Recent Nuclear Controversy
Iran's Cooperation with the IAEA

Status of Iran's Nuclear Programs
Uranium Enrichment
Arak Reactor
Bushehr Reactor

Does Iran Have a Nuclear Weapons Program?
The 2007 National Intelligence Estimate
Living with Risk
Other Constraints on Nuclear Weapons Ambitions

Background

Iran has had a nuclear program for close to 50 years, beginning with a research reactor purchased from the United States in 1959. U.S. concerns that Iran could pursue a nuclear weapons program date back to at least the mid-1970s, as evidenced by U.S. intelligence reports from that decade.(1) During the 1970s, Tehran planned to build nuclear power reactors and actually began constructing a light-water moderated nuclear po wer reactor near the city of Bushehr. Iran also considered obtaining uranium enrichment and reprocessing technology.(2)

Iranian leaders halted the nuclear program after the 1979 Islamic revolution. But a 1985 National Intelligence Council report, which cited Iran as a "potential proliferation threat," stated that Tehran was "interested in developing facilities that ... could eventually produce fissile material that could be used in a [nuclear] weapon." The report, however, added that it "would take at least a decade" for Iran to do so.(3)

The Iranian government says that it plans to expand its reliance on nuclear power in order to generate electricity. This program will, Tehran says, substitute for oil and gas consumption and allow Ir an to export its fossil fuels. Currently, a Russian contractor is completing the Bushehr reactor, and Iran says it intends to build additional reactors.(4) Iranian officials say that Tehran began design work on its first indigenously produced reactor, which is to be constructed at Darkhovein.(5)

Iranian officials have repeatedly asserted that the country's nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful purposes. For example, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamene'i, declared during a June 3, 2008, speech that Iran is opposed to nuclear weapons "based on religious and Islamic beliefs as well as based on logic and wisdom." He added, "Nuclear weapons have no benefit but high costs to manufacture and keep them. Nuclear weapons do not bring power to a nation because they are not applicable. Nuclear weapons cannot be used."

However, the United States and other governments have argued that Iran may be pursuing, at a minimum, the capability to produce nuclear weapons. Discerning a peaceful nuclear program from a nuclear weapons program can be difficult because of the dual-use nature of much of the technology. In addition, military nuclear programs may co-exist with civilian programs without a clear decision to produce nuclear weapons. Jose Goldemberg, Brazil's former secretary of state for science and technology, observed that a country developing the capability to produce nuclear fuel

does not have to make an explicit early [political] decision to acquire nuclear
weapons. In some countries, such a path is supported equally by those who genuinely want to explore an energy alternative and by government officials who either want nuclear weapons or just want to keep the option open.(6)

The main source of proliferation concern is Tehran's construction of a gas-centrifuge-based uranium enrichment facility. Tehran claims that it wants to produce low-enriched uranium (LEU) for its current and future reactors. Although Iranian officials have expressed interest in purchasing nuclear fuel from other countries, they assert that Tehran should have an indigenous enrichment capability as a hedge against possible fuel supply disruptions.(7)

Gas centrifuges enrich uranium by spinning uranium hexafluoride gas at high speeds to increase the concentration of the uranium-235 isotope. Such centrifuges can produce both LEU, which can be used in n uclear power reactors, and highly enriched uranium (HEU), which is one of the two types of fissile material used in nuclear weapons. HEU can also be used as fuel in certain types of nuclear reactors.(8) Iran also has a uranium-conversion facility, which converts uranium oxide into several compounds, including uranium hexafluoride.

A heavy-water reactor, which Iran is constructing at Arak, has also been a source of concern. Although Tehran says that the reactor is intended for the production of medical isotopes, it is a proliferation concern because its spent fuel will contain plutonium well-suited for use in nuclear weapons.

Spent nuclear fuel from nuclear reactors contains plutonium, the other type of fissile material used in nuclear weapons. In order to be used in nuclear weapons, however, plutonium must be separated from the spent fuel-a procedure called "reprocessing." Iran has said that it will not engage in reprocessing.

In addition to the dual-use nature of the nuclear programs described above, Tehran's interactions with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have contributed to suspicion s that Tehran has a nuclear weapons program. In the past, Iran has taken several actions that interfered with the agency's investigation of its nuclear program, including concealing nuclear activities and providing misleading statements. Although the IAEA has gotten a more complete picture of Iran's nuclear program since its investigation began in 2002, the agency still wants Tehran to provide more information. IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei explained
in a recent interview that

they [the Iranians] have concealed things from us in the past, but that doesn't prove that they are building a bomb today. They continue to insist that they are interested solely in using nuclear power for civilian purposes. We have yet to find a smoking gun that would prove them wrong. But there are suspicious circumstances and unsettling questions. The Iranians' willingness to cooperate leaves a lot to be desired. Iran must do more to provide us with access to certain individuals and documents. It must make a stronger contribution to clarifying the last unanswered set of questions-those relating to a possible military dimension of the Iranian nuclear program.(9)

Recent Nuclear Controversy

The recent public controversy over Iran's nuclear program began in August 2002, when the National Council of Resistance on Iran (NCRI), an Iranian exile group, revealed information during a press conference (some of which later proved to be accurate) that Iran had built nuclear-related facilities at Natanz and Arak that it had not revealed to the IAEA. The United States had been aware of at least some of these activities, according to knowledgeable former officials.(10)

States-parties to the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) are obligated to conclude a safeguards agreement with the IAEA. In the case of non-nuclear-weapon states-parties to the treaty (of which Iran is one), such agreements allow the agency to monitor nuclear facilities and materials to ensure that they are not diverted for military purposes. However, the agency's inspections and monitoring authority is limited to facilities that have been declared by the government.(11) Additional protocols to IAEA safeguards agreements augment the agency's authority to investigate clandestine nuclear facilities and activities by increasing the agency's authority to inspect certain facilities and demand additional information from states-
parties.(12) The IAEA's statute requires its Board of Governors to refer cases of non-ccompliance with safeguards agreements to the UN Security Council. Prior to the NCRI's revelations, the IAEA had expressed concerns that Iran had not been providing the agency with all relevant information about its nuclear programs, but had never found Iran in violation of its safeguards agreement.

In fall 2002, the IAEA began to investigate Iran's nuclear activities at Natanz and Arak, and inspectors visited the sites the following February. The IAEA board adopted its first resolution, which called on Tehran to increase its cooperation with the agency's investigation and to suspend its uranium enrichment activities, in September 2003. The next month, Iran concluded an agreement with France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, collectively known as the "E3," to suspend its enrichment activities, sign and implement an additional protocol to its 1974 IAEA safeguards agreement, and comply fully with the IAEA's investigation.(13) As a result, the IAEA board decided to refrain from referring the matter to the UN Security Council.

Ultimately, the IAEA's investigation, as well as information Tehran provided fter the October 2003 agreement, revealed that Iran had engaged in a variety of clandestine nuclear-related activities, some of which violated Iran's safeguards agreement. These included plutonium separation experiments, uranium enrichment and conversion experiments, and importing various uranium compounds.

After October 2003, Iran continued some of its enrichment-related activities, but Tehran and the E3 agreed in November 2004 to a more detailed suspension agreement. However, Iran resumed uranium conversion in August 2005 under the leadership of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who had been elected two months earlier. Iran announced in January 2006 that it would resume research and development on its centrifuges at Natanz. In response, the IAEA board adopted a
resolution February 4, 2006, that referred the matter to the Security Council. Two days later, Tehran announced that it would stop implementing its additional protocol.

In June 2006, China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, collectively known as the "P5+1," presented a proposal to Iran that offered a variety of incentives in return for Tehran taking several steps to assuage international concerns about its enrichment and heavy-water programs.(14) The proposal called on the government to "address the [IAEA's] outstanding concerns ...through full cooperation" with the agency's ongoing investigation of Tehran's nuclear programs, "suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities," and resume implementing its additional protocol. These requirements have also been included in several UN Security Council resolutions, the most recent of which, Resolution 1803, was adopted March 3, 2008.(15) That resolution called on ElBaradei to report within 90 d ays on whether Iran had complied with the Security Council requirements, adding that the council would respond to Iranian noncompliance with additional sanctions. ElBaradei's May 26, 2008, report to the Security Council and the IAEA board indicated that Tehran has continued to defy the council's demands by continuing work on its uranium enrichment program and heavy-water reactor program.(16) And Iranian officials have repeatedly stated that Iran will not suspend its enrichment program.

European Union High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana traveled to Tehran June 13 to present a revised version of the June 2006 offer,(17) on which the P5+1 had reached agreement in early May. Tehran has told the IAEA that it would implement its additional protocol "if the nuclear file is returned from the Security Council" to the agency.(18) It is, however, unclear how the council could meet this condition.

Iran's Cooperation with the IAEA

Iran and the IAEA agreed in August 2007 on a work program that would clarify the outstanding questions regarding Tehran's nuclear program.(19) Most of the outstanding issues,(20) which had created suspicions that Iran had been pursuing a nuclear weapons program, have essentially been resolved, but ElBaradei told the IAEA board June 2, 2008, that there is "one remaining major [unresolved] issue," which concerns questions regarding "possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme." Iran maintains that it has not done any work on nuclear weapons. But Iranian Ambassador Ali-Asghar Soltanieh said that Iran would continue to answer the IAEA's outstanding questions, stating that the "trend of resolving the ambiguities will continue," Reuters reported June 5.

The IAEA has provided Iran with documents or (in some cases) descriptions of documents, provided to the agency by several governments, which indicate that Iranian entities may have conducted studies related to nuclear weapons development. The subjects of these studies included missile re-entry vehicles for delivering nuclear warheads, uranium conversion, and conventional explosives used in nuclear weapons.(21) Iranian officials have told the IAEA that the documents are not authentic. Although these officials acknowledged that some of the information in them is accurate, the activities described were, the Iranians said, exclusively for peaceful purposes. Tehran has provided some relevant information about these matters to the IAEA, but ElBaradei reported that the government still should provide all of the "information, access to documents and access to individuals necessary to support Iran's statements." Indeed, the agency believes that "Iran may have additional information ... which could shed more light on the nature of these alleged studies and which Iran should share with the Agency."(22)

The IAEA has asked Tehran about other information suggesting that the country may have pursued nuclear weapons, such as:

- "information about a high level meeting in 1984 on reviving Iran's pre-revolution nuclear programme";

- "the scope of a visit by officials" associated with Iran's Atomic Energy Organization "to a nuclear installation in Pakistan in 1987";

- information on 1993 meetings between Iranian officials and members of a clandestine procurement network run by former Pakistani nuclear official Abdul Qadeer Khan; and

- information about work done in 2000 which apparently related to reprocessing.(23)

The agency also wants Iran to provide mo re information on nuclear-related procurement, production, and research activity by entities linked to Iran's military and defense establishments. These included attempts to obtain items, such as spark gaps, shock wave software, and neutron sources, which could be useful for developing nuclear weapons.(24) In addition, ElBaradei's May report notes that "that substantial parts" of Iran's centrifuge components "were manufactured in the workshops of the Defence Industries Organization."

Furthermore, the IAEA has asked Tehran to provide additional information about the manner in which it acquired a document "describing the procedures" for reducing uranium hexafluoride to uranium metal, as well as "machining ... enriched uranium metal into hemispheres," which are "components of nuclear weapons."(25) Tehran has previously told the agency that it was offered equipment for casting uranium but never actually received it. According to Iran, its nuclear suppliers, many of whom were affiliated with the Khan network, provided the document in 1987 at
their own initiative, rather than at Tehran's request. Islamabad has confirmed to the
IAEA that "an identical document exists" in Pakistan.(26)

ElBaradei's May report points out that the IAEA, with the exception of the document related to uranium metal, has "no information ... on the actual design or manufacture by Iran" of components (nuclear or otherwise) for nuclear weapons. Despite the IAEA's remaining questions, Tehran has been cooperating with the agency in other respects, albeit with varying degrees of consistency. The IAEA has been able to verify that Iran's declared nuclear facilities and materials have not been diverted for military purposes. And Tehran has provided the agency with "information similar to that which Iran had previously provided pursuant to the Additional Protocol," ElBaradei reported in February, adding that this information clarified the agency's "knowledge about Ir an's current declared nuclear programme." Iran, however, provided this information "on an ad hoc basis and not in a consistent and complete manner," the report said.(27)

Indeed, the IAEA requested in April 2008 that Iran provide "as a transparency measure, access to additional locations related ... to the manufacturing of centrifuges, R&D on uranium enrichment, and uranium mining." But Tehran has not yet agreed to do so.

ElBaradei's February 2008 report underscored the impo rtance of full Iranian cooperation with the agency's investigation, as well as Tehran's implementation of its additional protocol:

Confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme requires that the Agency be able to provide assurances not only regarding declared nuclear material, but, equally importantly, regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran... Although Iran has provided some additional detailed information about its current activities on an ad hoc basis, the Agency will not be in a position to make progress towards providing credible assurances about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran before reaching some clarity about the nature of the alleged studies, and without implementation of the Additional Protocol.

The IAEA has also asked Iran to "reconsider" its March 2007 decision to stop complying with a portion of the subsidiary arrangements for its IAEA safeguards agreement. That provision, to which Iran agreed in 2003, requires Tehran to provide design information for new nuclear facilities "as soon as the decision to construct, or to authorize construction, of such a facility has been taken, whichever is earlier." Previously, Iran was required to provide design information for a new facility only 180 days before introducing nuclear material into it. If Tehran does not alter this decision, the agency will receive considerably later notice about the construction of future Iranian nuclear facilities.

Status of Iran's Nuclear Programs

Some non-governmental ex perts and U.S. officials have argued that, rather than producing fissile material indigenously, Iran could obtain such material from foreign sources.(28) A National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) made public December 3, 2007, states that the intelligence community "cannot rule out that Iran has acquired fr om abroad-or will acquire in the future-a nuclear weapon or enough fissile material for a weapon." Similarly, during a press briefing that same day, a senior intelligence official characterized such acquisition as "an inherent option" for Iran. However, Tehran's potential ability to produce its own HEU or plutonium is a greater cause of concern; the official explained that "getting bits and pieces of fissile material from overseas is not going to be sufficient" to produce a nuclear arsenal.

Uranium Enrichment

Iran has a pilot centrifuge facility and a larger commercial facility, both located at Natanz. The latter is eventually to hold over 47,000 centrifuges.(29) Vice President Gholamreza Aghazadeh, who also heads Iran's Atomic Energy Organization, said in April 2007 that it will take up to four years to install all of them.(30) Iran began enriching uranium in the facility after mid-April 2007, producing LEU containing a maximum of 4% uranium-235.(31)

Individual centrifuges are linked together in cascades; each cascade in the commercial facility contains 164 centrifuges. Currently, Iran has 18 cascades (2,952 centrifuges) of first generation (IR-1) centrifuges installed in the facility. Iran is feeding uranium hexafluoride into two additional 164-centrifuge cascades. Another 164-centrifuge cascade is spinning, but no feedstock is being fed into it.(32)

A senior U.S. intelligence official said December 3, 2007, that a country needs to be able to "operate large numbers of centrifuges for long periods of time with very small failure rates" in order to be able to "make industrial quantities of enriched uranium." The NIE stated that Iran still "faces significant technical problems operating" its centrifuges.(33)

Iran's ability to operate its centrifuges appears to have impr oved in recent months, however. ElBaradei's February report indicated that the Natanz commercial facility had been operating "well below its declared design capacity"-language that does not appear in the May report. In addition, a May 29 report from the Institute for Science and International Security says that Tehran's centrifuges "are running at about 50 percent of their capacity, a significant increase over previous rates."(34)

Iran is also working on several other centrifuge designs. Tehran has given the IAEA information on four different centrifuge designs and has been testing small numbers of more advanced centrifuges, known as the IR-2 and IR-3, which could increase Iran's enrichment capacity.(35) Iran may also be conducting work on another advanced centrifuge in its pilot enrichment facility.(36)

In addition to its centrifuge work, Tehran is continuing to produce uranium hexafluoride-a total of 320 metric tons since March 2004. Iran appears to have improved its ability to produce centrifuge feedstock since it began doing so.(37) Stating that "centrifuge enrichment is how Iran probably could first produce enough fissile material for a weapon," the 2007 NIE adds that "the earliest possible date Iran would be technically capable of producing enough HEU for a weapon is late 2009."(38) This date, however, "is very unlikely," the estimate says, adding that "Iran probably would be technically capable of producing enough HEU for a weapon sometime during the 2010-2015 time frame." But the State Department Bureau for Intelligence and Research, the estimate says, judges that Tehran "is unlikely to achieve this capability before 2013" and all intelligence agencies "recognize the possibility that this capability may not be attained until after 2015."(39) A senior intelligence o fficial explained during the December press briefing that the "acquisition of fissile material ... remains the governing element in any timelines in which they'd have a nuclear device."

The above time frame assesses Tehran's capability to produce HEU from its Natanz facility. However, the 2007 NIE states that Iran would "probably would use covert facilities-rather than its declared nuclear sites-for the production of highly enriched uranium for a weapon." Indeed, it is very difficult to divert significant amounts of nuclear material without detection from centrifuge facilities under IAEA safeguards. A CIA report concluded that "inspections and safeguards will most likely prevent Tehran from using facilities declared to the IAEA directly for its weapons program as long as Iran remains a party to the NPT."(40) Although Tehran could end its cooperation with the IAEA and use its declared centrifuge facilities to develop nuclear weapons, such an action would be virtually unprecedented.(41)

A senior intelligence official explained that Iran could use knowledge gained from its Natanz facilities at covert enrichment facilities. However, there is no public official evidence that Iran has covert centrifuge or conversion facilities. And according to the NIE, a "growing amount of intelligence indicates Iran was engaged in covert uranium conversion and uranium enrichment activity," but Tehran "probably stopped those efforts in 2003 and had not, as of mid-2007," restarted them.

Plutonium

Iran acknowledged to the IAEA in 2003 that it had conducted plutonium-separation experiments-an admission which aroused suspicions that Iran could have a program to produce plutonium for nuclear weapons. The IAEA, however, continued to investigate the matter, and ElBaradei reported in August 2007 that the agency has resolved its questions about Iran's plutonium activities.(42)

The 2007 NIE stated that "Iran will not be technically capable of producing and reprocessing enough plutonium for a weapon before about 2015." But, as noted above, Iran says that it does not plan to engage in reprocessing, and ElBaradei's May 2008 report stated that "[t]here have been no indications of ongoing reprocessing related activities" at Iran's declared nuclear facilities.

Arak Reactor. Iran says that its heavy-water reactor, which is being constructed at Arak, is intended for the production of medical isotopes. According to a May 5, 2008, presentation by Ambassador Soltanieh, it is to substitute for an "outdated" HEU-fueled research reactor in Tehran that has been in operation since 1967.(43) However, the reactor is a proliferation concern because its spent fuel will contain plutonium better suited for nuclear weapons than the plutonium produced by light-water moderated reactors, such as the Bushehr reactor. In addition, Iran will be able to operate the reactor with natural uranium, which means that it will not be dependent on supplies of enriched uranium.

Iran also has a plant for producing heavy water. According to ElBaradei's February report, "satellite imagery appears to indicate" that the plant is operating. Moreover, Tehran is continuing work on a fuel manufacturing plant which, when complete, will first produce fuel for the Arak reactor.(44)

Bushehr Reactor. Iran is also constructing near the city of Bushehr a 1,000 megawatt nuclear power reactor moderated by light water. The original German contractor, which began constructing the reactor in 1975, abandoned the project following Iran's 1979 revolution. Russia agreed in 1995 to complete the reactor, but the project has since encountered repeated delays. In February 2005, Moscow and Tehran concluded an agreement stating that Russia would supply fuel for the reactor for 10 years. At the time, the director of the Russian Federal Agency for Atomic Energy said the reactor would begin operating in late 2006. More recently, an official from Atomstroyexport, the Russian contractor, stated that the reactor would not begin operating before the end of 2008. Russia has blamed financial and technical issues for delaying the project's completion. However, it had been widely believed that Moscow may have been delaying fuel shipments in order to increase political pressure on Iran to comply with the Security Council resolutions.

In any case, Atomstroyexport sent the first shipment of LEU fuel to Iran on December 16, 2007, and the reactor received the last shipment near the end of January. The fuel, which is under IAEA seal, will contain no more than 3.62% uranium-235, according to an Atomstroyexport spokesperson.(45)

The United States had previously urged Moscow to end work on the project, citing concerns that it could aid an Iranian nuclear weapons program by providing the country with access to nuclear technology and expertise.(46) However, U.S. officials

said in 2002 that Washington would drop these public objections if Russia took steps to mitigate the project's proliferation risks; the 2005 deal requires Iran to return the spent nuclear fuel to Russia.(47) This measure is designed to ensure that Iran will not separate plutonium from the spent fuel. Moscow also argues that the reactor will not pose a proliferation risk because it will operate under IAEA safeguards. It is worth noting that light-water reactors are generally regarded as more proliferation-resistant than other types of reactors.

Although the UN Security Council resolutions restrict the supply of nuclear-related goods to Iran, they do permit the exporting of nuclear equipment related to light water reactors.

Does Iran Have a Nuclear Weapons Program?

In addition to the possible nuclear-weapons related activities discussed above, Iran has continued to develop of ballistic missiles, which could potentially be used to deliver nuclear weapons. But Tehran's nuclear program has raised concerns for various other reasons.

First, Iran has been secretive about its nuclear programs. For example, Tehran hindered the IAEA investigation by failing to disclose numerous nuclear activities, destroying evidence, and making false statements to the agency.(48) Moreover, although Iran's cooperation with the agency has improved, the IAEA has repeatedly criticized Tehran for failing to provide the agency with timely access to documents and personnel.

Second, many observers have questioned Iran's need for nuclear power, given the country's extensive oil and gas reserves. Tehran's resumption of its nuclear program during the Iran-Iraq war has also cast doubt on the energy rationale.

Furthermore, many countries with nuclear power reactors purchase nuclear fuel from foreign suppliers-a fact that calls into question Iran's need for an indigenous enrichment capability, especially since Russia has agreed to provide fuel for the Bushehr reactor. Moreover, although Tehran plans to develop a large nuclear power program, the country lacks sufficient uranium deposits.(49)

Iran's stated rationale for its Arak reactor has also been met with some skepticism. Tehran says it needs the reactor to produce medical isotopes, but the Tehran research reactor is capable of producing such isotopes and has unused capacity. In addition, non-proliferation experts have argued that the reactor is unnecessary for producing such isotopes.(50)

However, Iran maintains that its enrichment program has always been exclusively fo r peaceful purposes. Tehran argues that it cannot depend on foreign suppliers for reactor fuel because such suppliers have been unreliable in the past.(51) Iran also says that it has been forced to conceal its nuclear procurement efforts in order to counter Western efforts to deny it nuclear technology, a claim that appears to be supported by a 1997 CIA report.(52) Furthermore, as noted above, Iran has stated that it needs the Arak reactor to replace the Tehran research reactor.

Althou gh few experts argue that there is no evidence that Iran has pursued a nuclear weapons program, some have documented Tehran's projected difficulty in expor ting oil and natural gas without additional foreign investment in its energy infrastructure.(53) And at least one expert has described Iran's inability to obtain nuclear fuel from an international enrichment consortium called Eurodif. During the1970s, Iran had reached an agreement with Eurodif that entitled Iran to enriched uranium from the consortium in exchange for a loan.(54)

The 2007 National Intelligence Estimate

According to the 2007 NIE, "Iranian military entities were working under government direction to develop nuclear weapons" until fall 2003, but then "halted its nuclear weapons program ... primarily in response to international pressure." The NIE defines "nuclear weapons program" as "Iran's nuclear weapon design and weaponization work and covert uranium conversion-related and uranium enrichment-related work."(55)

The estimate, however, added that the intelligence community also assesses "with moderate-to-high confidence that Tehran at a minimum is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons."(56) The estimate adds that, because of "intelligence gaps," the Department of Energy and the National Intelligence Council "assess with only moderate confidence that the halt to those activities represents a halt to Iran's entire nuclear weapons program."

The NIE also stated that "Tehran's decision to halt its nuclear weapons program suggests it is less determined to develop nuclear weapons than we have been judging since 2005."(57) The change in assessments, a senior intelligence official said December 3, 2007, was the result of "new information which caused us to challenge our assessments in their own right, and illuminated previous information for us to be able to see it perhaps differently than we saw before, or to make sense of other data points that didn't seem to self-connect previously."

According to press accounts, this information included various written and oral communications among Iranian officials which indicated that the program had been halted.(58) The United States may also have obtained information from Iranian officials who defected as part of a CIA program to induce them to do.(59) The NIE also incorporated open-source information, such as photographs of the Natanz facility that became available after Iran allowed members of the press to tour the facility.

According to the 2007 NIE, the intelligence community continues to assess "with moderate-to-high confidence that Iran does not have a nuclear weapon." Although the commun ity assesses "with low confidence that Iran probably has imported at least some weapons-usable fissile material," it still judges "with moderate-to-high confidence" that Tehran still lacks sufficient fissile material for a nuclear weapon.

In addition to the new intelligence, other factors suggest that Iran may not have an active nuclear weapons program. First, the IAEA has resolved several of the outstanding issues described in the August 2007 Iran-IAEA work plan and has apparently not found additional evidence of a nuclear weapons program. Indeed, the agency has not discovered significant undeclared Iranian nuclear activities for several years (although, as noted above, the IAEA's ability to monitor Iran's nuclear facilities has decreased). Furthermore, Tehran, beginning in 2003, has been willing to disclose previously undeclared nuclear activities to the IAEA (though, as previously discussed, Iran has not been fully cooperating with the agency). In addition, Iran made significant changes to the administration of its nuclear program in fall 2003-changes that produced greater openness with the IAEA and may have indicated a decision to stop a nuclear weapons program.(60) Finally, as noted above, Iranian officials have stated numerous times that Tehran is not seeking nuclear weapons, partly for religious regions. A change in this stance could arguably damage religious leaders' credibility.

Living with Risk. Other findings of the NIE indicate that the international community may, for the foreseeable future, have to accept some risk that Iran will develop nuclear weapons. According to the 2007 NIE, "only an Iranian political decision to abandon a nuclear weapons objective would plausibly keep Iran from eventually producing nuclear weapons-and such a decision is inherently reversible." The estimate added that "Iran has the scientific, technical and industrial capacity eventually to produce nuclear weapons if it decides to do so," adding that, "since fall 2003, Iran has been conducting research and development projects with commercial and conventional military applications-some of which would also be of limited use for nuclear weapons."

This is not to say that an Iranian nuclear weapons capability is inevitable; as noted above, Iran does not yet have such a capability. But Tehran would have to accept some constraints on its nuclear program in order to provide the international community with confidence that Iran is not pursuing a nuclear weapon.

Other Constraints on Nuclear Weapons Ambitions

Although the production of fissile material is widely considered to be the most difficult step in nuclear weapons development, Iran would, even with the ability to produce HEU, still face challenges in producing nuclear weapons, such as developing a workable physics package and effective delivery vehicles.(61)

Although developing and producing HEU-based nuclear weapons covertly would probably be Tehran's preferred option, such a path would present additional challenges. A 2005 report from the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) concluded that "an Iranian planner would have little basis for confidence that significant nuclear facilities could be kept hidden."(62) Tehran would need to hide a number of activities, including uranium conversion, the movement of uranium from mines, and the movement of centrifuge feedstock.(63) Alternatively, Tehran could
import uranium ore or centrifuge feedstock, but would also need to do so covertly. Furthermore, Iran could produce only fairly simple nuclear weapons, which are not deliverable b y longer-range missiles, without conducting ex plosive nuclear tests. However, many analysts argue that such tests would likely be detected.(64)

Note

1. Prospects for Further Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Special National Intelligence
Estimate, August 23, 1974.

2. For example, the United States was willing to supply Iran with reprocessing technology,
according to 1975 and 1976 National Security Council documents. Tehran also had a 1976
contract for a pilot uranium enrichment facility using lasers (see Iran, Report by the Director
General, GOV/2007/58, November 15, 2007).

3. The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation: Balance of Power and Constraints, National
Intelligence Council, September 1985.

4. See statement by Iran's former Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi, at [http://www.pbs.org/
newshour/bb/middle_east/july-dec04/iran_9-27.html].

5. Iran has stated that the 360 MW reactor will be completed in 2016. See "Bushehr Plant To
Be Inaugurated By Mid October 2008-Iranian Official," Islamic Republic of Iran News
Network, January 30, 2008.

6. Jose Goldemberg, "Looking Back: Lessons From the Denuclearization of Brazil and
Argentina," Arms Control Today, April 2006.

7. Paul Kerr, "U.S. Offers Iran Direct Talks," Arms Control Today, June 2006.

8. Highly enriched uranium typically contains over 90% uranium-235, whereas low-enriched
uranium used in nuclear reactors typically contains less than 5% uranium-235.

9. "Interview With IAEA Boss Mohamed Elbaradei," Der Spiegel, June 11, 2008.

10. Gary Samore, Former Senior Director for Nonproliferation and Export Controls on the
National Security Council, personal communication June 5, 2008; Director of Central Intelligence George J. Tenet, "DCI Remarks on Iraq's WMD Programs," February 5, 2004, available at [https://www.cia.gov/news-information/speeches-testimony/2004/tenet_georgetownspeech_02052004.html].

11. The IAEA does have other investigative tools, such as monitoring scientific publications
from member-states.

12. NPT states are not required to conclude additional protocols. However, applicable UN
Security Council resolutions require Iran to conclude such a protocol.
13. The text of the agreement is available at [http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/ Focus/IaeaIran/
statement_iran21102003.shtml]. Iran signed its additional protocol in December 2003, but
has not ratified it.
14. The proposal text is available at [http://armscontrol.org/pdf/20060606_Iran_P5+1_
Proposal.pdf]. Prior to late May 2006, the United States refused to participate in direct talks
with Iran about its nuclear program. In March 2005, Washington had offered some limited
incentives for Iran to cooperate with the E3. (See Kerr, Arms Control Today, June 2006).
For more information about the state of international diplomacy with Iran, see CRS Report
RL32048, Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses, by Kenneth Katzman.

15. The resolution text is available at [http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2008/sc9268.
doc.htm]. The resolutions also require Iran to suspend work on its heavy water-related
projects.

16. Iran, Report by the Director General, GOV/2008/15, May 26, 2008.

17. "EU's Solana Head to Iran with New Nuclear Cooperation Offer," Agence France Presse,
June 13, 2008.

18. Iran, Report by the Director General, GOV/2008/4, February 22, 2008.

19. The text of the work plan is available at [http://www.iaea.org/Publications/
Documents/Infcircs/2007/infcirc711.pdf].

20. These issues included plutonium experiments, research and procurement efforts associated
with two types of centrifuges, operations of a uranium mine, and experiments with
polonium-210, which (in conjunction with beryllium) is used as a neutron initiator in certain
types of nuclear weapons.

21. For more information about Iran's ballistic missile program, see CRS Report RL22758,
Iran's Ballistic Missile Programs: An Overview, by Steven A. Hildreth.

22. GOV/2008/15.

23. For a detailed discussion of this information, as well as the documents concerning Iran's
nuclear weapons related studies, see GOV/2008/15.

24. GOV/2008/4.

25. GOV/2008/15.

26. GOV/2008/15.

27. GOV/2008/4.

28. See, for example, then-Undersecretary of State for U.S. Arms Control And International
Security Robert Joseph's testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,
February 9, 2006; and then-Director of Research Institute for National Strategic Studies
National Defense University Stephen Cambone's testimony before the Senate Committee
on Governmental Affairs, September 21, 2000.

29. GOV/2008/15.

30. Installation of Centrifuges Continues in Natanz-Iran Nuclear Official," Iranian Students
News Agency, April 17, 2007.

31. GOV/2008/15.

32. GOV/2008/15.

33. Available at [http://odni.gov/press_releases/20071203_release.pdf].

34. David Albright, Jacqueline Shire, and Paul Brannan, May 26, 2008 IAEA Safeguards
Report on Iran: Centrifuge Operation Improving and Cooperation Lacking on Weaponization Issues, May 29, 2008, available at [http://www.isis-online.org/publications/iran/ISIS_Iran_IAEA_Report_29May2008.pdf]. The report compares data from the two most recent IAEA reports about the amount of uranium hexafluoride fed into Iran's centrifuges during two time periods (February-December 2007 and December 2007-May 2008).

35. GOV/2008/15;GOV/2008/4.

36. Institute for Science and International Security, May 29, 2008. That report's argument
is based on an analysis of recent photographs taken at Iran's pilot centrifuge facility.
37 IISS Strategic Comments, "Nuclear Iran: How Close Is It?," September 2007, available
at [http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-comments/past-issues/volume-13-2007/volume-13-issue-7/nuclear-iran]. Paul Kerr, "Iran Continues Security Council Defiance," Arms Control Today, June 2007.

38. This time frame describes the point at which Iran could have enough HEU for a weapon, rather than when Iran could start producing HEU.

39. The time frame described in the 2007 NIE is the same as one described in a 2005 NIE.

40. Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons
of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, January 1-December 31, 2004,
available at [http://www.odni.gov/reports/2004_unclass_report_to_NIC_DO_16Nov04.pdf].

41. No state in good standing with the IAEA has ever used this tactic. North Korea restarted
its nuclear weapons program after announcing its withdrawal from the NPT in 2003. But the IAEA has never completed an assessment of that country's nuclear activities.

42. Iran, Report by the Director General, GOV/2007/48, August 30, 2007.

43. "Iran's Exclusively Peaceful Nuclear Programs and Activities," Briefing for NGOs, May 5, 2008, available at [http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/prepcom08/WP/iran_
briefing.pdf]

44. "Aqazadeh: Iran Hera lds Peaceful Nuclear Program," Islamic Republic News Agency, April 8, 2008.

45. "Atomstroyexport Completes Latest Shipment of Fuel to Bushehr Nuclear Plant," Interfax, December 28, 2007.

46. For example, then-Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Marshall Billingslea testified
before the Senate July 29, 2002, that the United States was "concerned that the Bushehr
nuclear power project is, in reality, a pretext for the creation of an infrastructure designed
to help Tehran acquire atomic weapons." Then-Undersecretary of State for International Security and Arms Control John Bolton told the House International Relations Committee in June 2003 that Iran could build "over 80 nuclear weapons" if it had access to sufficient fuel, operated the reactor for five to six years, and chose to withdraw from the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). This estimate assumes that Iran possesses a reprocessing facility.

47. Estimates for the length of time the spent fuel will have to stay in Iran to cool range from two-five years. See Paul Kerr, "Iran, Russia Reach Nuclear Agreement," Arms Control
Today, April 2005.

48. For example, Iran sanitized a facility where Iranian scientists had enriched uranium,
falsely told the IAEA that it had not enriched uranium, and claimed that it had not procured
any foreign components for one of its centrifuge programs.

49. Iranian Students News Agency, April 17, 2007.

50. Robert J. Einhorn, "Iran's Heavy-Water Reactor: A Plutonium Bomb Factory," November 9, 2006, available at [http://www.armscontrol.org/pressroom/2006/20061109_Einhorn.asp?
print].

51. Paul Kerr, "News Analysis: Behind Iran's Diplomatic Behavior,"Arms Control Today, June 2006.

52. The report says that Iran had responded to "Western counterproliferation efforts by
relying more on legitimate commercial firms as procurement fronts and by developing more
convoluted procurement networks."

53. See, for example, Roger Stern, "The Iranian Petroleum Crisis and United States National
Security," Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of America, January 2007, and
George Perkovich and Silvia Manzanero, "Plan B: Using Sanctions to End Iran's Nuclear
Program," Arms Control Today, May 2004.

54. Oliver Meier, "Iran and Foreign Enrichment: A Troubled Model," Arms Control Today,
January/February 2006.

55. The NIE does not incorporate intelligence reporting after October 31, 2007-a time frame that includes the last three reports to the IAEA Board of Governors. Some documents described in ElBaradei's May 2008 report contain 2004 dates, but whether that fact would change the NIE's conclusion regarding the date when Iran ended its nuclear weapons program is unclear.

56. Prior to the NIE, some non-governmental experts had argued that Iran had stopped its
nuclear weapons program. See, for example, Paul Kerr, "Divided From Within," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November/December 2006; Jeffrey Lewis, "Iran Roundup: Negotiations and Wonkporn," July 27, 2005, available at [http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/703/iran-roundup-negotiations-and-wonkporn]; and George Perkovich, Changing Iran's Nuclear Interests, Policy Outlook, Carnegie Endowment for international Peace, May 2005, available at [http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/PO16.perkovich.FINAL2.pdf].

57. Although the 2005 NIE stated that "Iran currently is determined to develop nuclear weapons despite its international obligations and international pressure," that assessment was somewhat qualified. Titled "Iran's Nuclear Program: At A Crossroads," the estimate stated that Iran was not "immovable"on the question of pursuing a nuclear weapons program and also addressed the possibility that Tehran may not have had such a program. Moreover, the word "determined" was used in lieu of "pursuing" a nuclear weapon because the authors believed that the latter to be a stronger term.

58. Dafna Linzer and Joby Warrick ,U.S. Finds that Iran Halted Nuclear Arms Bid in 2003, Washington Post December 4, 2007; Greg Miller, "Iran's Nuclear Ambitions on Hold, U.S. Agencies Conclude," Los Angeles Times, December 4, 2007; David E. Sanger and Steven Lee Myers, "Details in Military Notes Led to Shift on Iran, U.S. Says," New York Times, December 6, 2007; Peter Baker and Dafna Linzer, "Diving Deep, Unearthing a Surprise; How a Search for Iran's Nuclear Arms Program Turned Up an Unexpected Conclusion," Washington Post, December 8, 2007.

59. Greg Miller "CIA Has Recruited Iranians to Defect; The Secret Effort Aims to Undermine
Tehran's Nuclear Program," Los Angeles Times, December 9, 2007.

60. This argument is explained in more detail in Kerr, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 2006.
For an in-depth discussion of Iran's nuclear decision-making process, see Abbas William Samii, "The Iranian Nuclear Issue and Informal Networks," Naval War College Review, Winter 2006.

61. For a more detailed discussion, see Office of Technology Assessment, Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction (OTA-BP-ISC-115), December 1993.

62. International Institute for Strategic Studies, Iran's Strategic Weapons Programmes: A Net
Assessment, (UK: Routledge, 2005), p. 57.

63. The 2005 IISS report also explains that concealing a plutonium-based nuclear weapons
program would be even more difficult (pp. 62-63).

64. For a detailed discussion of this issue, see Steven A. Hildreth, statement before the House
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, March 5, 2008, available at [http://nationalsecurity.oversight.house.gov/
documents/20080305141600.pdf].

Iran's Influence in Iraq

2008-09-03T17:32:00.000-07:00

By Kenneth Katzman, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Congressional Research Service, 13/06/06

Summary

Iran’s influence over the post-Saddam government in Iraq is substantial because the
predominant parties in that government have long enjoyed Tehran’s sponsorship. An emerging concern is that Iran’s influence has extended to support for militant groups in Iraq. U.S. officials say that sophisticated explosive devices are entering Iraq from Iran, suggesting that Iran, or factions within Iran, are backing Iraqi factions that use violence to oppose the U.S. presence in Iraq. This report will be updated as warranted.

Background

Iran's influence over the post-Saddam government in Iraq is substantial because the predominant parties in that government have long enjoyed Tehran's sponsorship. An emerging concern is that Iran's influence has extended to support for militant groups in Iraq. U.S. officials say that sophisticated explosive devices are entering Iraq from Iran, suggesting that Iran, or factions within Iran, are backing Iraqi factions that use violence to oppose the U.S. presence in Iraq. This report will be updated as warranted.

The significance of the issue of Iranian influence in Iraq derives from tensions between the United States and Iran over Iran's nuclear ambitions. Ex perts anticipate that any U.S. military action would likely cause Iran to retaliate, in part, by directing its allies in Iraq to attack U.S. forces there, further complicating the U.S. effort to stabilize Iraq. Now that the conventional military and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) threat from Saddam Hussein has been removed, the thrust of Iran's strategy in Iraq has been to perpetuate domination of Iraq's government by pro-Iranian Shiite Islamist leaders. Iran's leaders and diplomats have sought to persuade all Iraqi Shiite Islamist factions in Iraq to work together through the U.S.-orchestrated political process, because the sheer number of Shiites in Iraq (about 60% of the population) virtually ensures Shiite predominance of government. To this extent, Iran's orientation in Iraq differs little from the main emphasis of U.S. policy in Iraq, which has been to set up a democratic process that reflects majority preferences. Iran's strategy bore fruit with victory by a Shiite Islamist bloc ("United Iraqi Alliance") in the two National Assembly elections in 2005. The UIA bloc, which won 128 of the 275 Assembly seats in the December election, includes all of Iran's Shiite Islamist protégés in Iraq, including the Sup reme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), the most pro-Iranian of the groups, the Da'wa (Islamic Call) party, and Moqtada Al Sadr's faction. Like his predecessor as Prime Minister, Ibrahim al-Jafari, Nuri al-Maliki is from the Da'wa Party, although Maliki spent most of his exile in Syria, not Iran. Most SCIRI leaders spent their years of exile in Iran. Moqtada Al Sadr and his supporters remained in Iraq during Saddam's rule.

SCIRI controls a militia called the "Badr Brigades" (now renamed the "Badr Organization") which number about 20,000. Badr fighters are playing unofficial policing roles in Basra and other Shiite cities. Those Badr members that have joined the national Iraqi police and military forces are widely said to retain their loyalties to Badr and SCIRI. The Badr Brigades were formed, trained, and equipped by Iran's Revolutionary Guard, politically aligned with Iran's hardliners, during the Iran-Iraq war. During that war, Badr guerrillas conducted forays from Iran into southern Iraq to attack Baath Party officials, but the Badr forays did not spark broad popular unrest against Saddam Hussein's regime. Some Sunnis have accused Badr fighters of conducting retaliatory attacks on Sunnis suspected of links to the insurgency. A related militia called the "Wolf Brigade," recently renamed the Freedom Brigade, is a Badr offshoot that is formally under the Ministry of Interior's control.

Iranian leaders have also cultivated ties to Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the 75-year-old Iranian-born Shiite cleric who is de-facto leader of mainstream Shiite Islamists. However, Sistani has differed with Iran's doctrine of direct clerical involvement, although he has exerted his considerable influence on major political decisions since the fall of Saddam Hussein. As a revered Shiite cleric with a large following in Iran itself, particularly the theological center of Qom, Sistani has resisted political direction from Iran.

Iran's relations with Moqtada Al Sadr, another Shiite Islamist cleric, are more complicated. The 31-year-old is a scion of the revered Sadr clan and he has strongly criticized the U.S. presence in Iraq. His great uncle, Mohammad Baqr Al Sadr, was a contemporary and ally of Iran's Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, and was hung by Saddam Hussein in 1980. Unlike SCIRI and Da'wa leaders, Sadr and his clan remained in Iraq during Saddam's rule, and Sadr has generally been seen as a rival to those parties for preeminence among Iraq's Shiites. This might explain why Iran's relations with Sadr are somewhat more tenuous and uneven than Iran's relations with Da'wa and SCIRI. However, Iran appears to see him, with h is large and dedicated following particularly among lower-class Shiite Muslims in Iraq, as a growing force in Iraqi politics and a potential long-term asset to Iran. Iran's strategy thus far apparently has been to build ties to Sadr and coax him into the political process, while tolerating-or possibly even
materially assisting-his challenges to the United States and Britain, as discussed further
below.

Like SCIRI, Sadr believes that it is useful to maintain his own militia in post-Saddam southern Iraq. However, in contrast to the Bad r forces, Sadr's "Mahdi Army" militia does not have long-standing ties to Iran. The militia was formed in mid-2003 when Sadr, whose base is more anti-U.S. than are the supporters of SCIRI, Da'wa, and Sistani, sought to forcibly oppose U.S. forces in Iraq. U.S. military operations put down Mahdi Army uprisings in April 2004 and August 2004 in Sadr City (a Shiite-inhabited slum area of Baghdad), Najaf, and other Shiite cities. In each case, fighting was ended with compromises under which Mahdi forces stopped fighting in ex change for amnesty for Sadr himself. Since August 2004, the Mahdi Army has largely ended active anti-U.S. activity, but Mahdi fighters continue to patrol Sadr City and parts of other Shiite cities, particularly in Basra, where they have sought to ensure that personal behavior conforms to Islam and tradition. Mahdi (and Badr Brigade) assertiveness in Basra has partly accounted for a sharp deterioration of relations since July 2005 between Iraqi officials in Basra and the British forces that conduct peacekeeping in the city.

A variety of press reports say that other Shiite militias are performing informal police functions in southern Iraq. One such militia is derived from the fighters who challenged Saddam Hussein's forces in the southern marsh areas, around the town of Amara, north of Basra. It goes by the name Hizbollah-Iraq and it is headed by guerrilla leader Abdul Karim Muhammadawi, who was on the Iraq Governing Council during the U.S. occupation period (May 2003-June 2004). Hizbollah-Iraq apparently plays a major role in policing Amara and environs. (Muhammadawi has agreed to run on the slate of Deputy Prime Minister Ahmad Chalabi in the December 15, 2005 elections. Chalabi has been politically close to Iran and reportedly has been under U.S. investigation for passing U.S. military secrets to Iran.)

Iranian support to Sunni Muslim insurgents in Iraq, such as foreign volunteers commanded by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, would not appear to fit Iran's political strategy in Iraq. These factions are attempting to bring down Iraq's government in which pro-Iranian factions are predominant, an objective clearly not shared by Iran. On the other hand, some believe that Iran might want to support Sunni insurgents for no other purpose than to cause harm to the U.S. military position in Iraq. Another interpretation is that some of Iran's assistance to Sh iite factions such as Sadr's group is being re-transferred to Sunni guerrillas without Iran's knowledge or support. Sadr has held talks with some major Sunni militant groups in an effort to forge a Shiite-Sunni anti-U.S. alliance.
Indicators of Iranian Influence in Iraq

Since the fall of Saddam Hussein, Iran has established that it has substantial politicaland economic influence over and mentorship of the Iraqi government. During exchanges of high-level visits in the summer of 2005, including a large Iraqi delegation led by interim Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jafari in July 2005, Iraqi officials essentially took responsibility for starting the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war, indirectly blamed Saddam Hussein for ordering the use of chemical weapons against Iranian forces during that conflict, and condemned Israel. During a defense ministerial exchange, the two countries signed military cooperation agreements, as well as agreements to open diplomatic facilities in Basra and Karbala (two major cities in Iraq's mostly Shiite south) and agreements on new transportation and energy links, including oil swaps and possibly future oil pipeline connections. Iran offered Iraq a $1 billion credit line as well. Iraq denies that the military agreements signed include commitments by Iran to train Iraqi forces, saying the cooperation is limited to border security, landmine removal, remaining POW/MIA issues from the Iran-Iraq war, and information sharing.

Some observers say that Iran is moving to exert influence over the new, permanent government, even though the government now incorporates major Sunni figures who have traditionally been suspicious of Iran. Shortly after the government of Nuri Kamal al-Maliki took office on May 20, Iran's Foreign Minister Manuchehr Mottaki led a high-pro file visit to Iraq. During that visit, Iraq supported Iran's right to pursue nuclear technology "for peaceful purposes," while also stating that Iraq does not want "any of [its] neighbors to have weapons of mass destruction."(1) The two countries also reaffirmed the agreement to mutually secure their common border.

At the same time, some believe Iran's influence will fade over the long term. Iraq's post-Saddam constitution does not establish an Iranian-style theocratic government. Some experts maintain that rivalry between Iraq's Shiite clerics and those of Iran might increase if Najaf re-emerges as a key center of Shiite Islamic scholarship to rival Qom in Iran. Other experts note that most Iraqi Shiites generally stayed loyal to the Iraqi regime during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war, which took nearly one million Iranian lives and about half that many Iraqi battlefield deaths. Although exchanges of prisoners and remains from the Iran-Iraq war are mostly completed, Iran has not returned the 125 military and civilian aircraft flown to Iran at the start of the 1991 Gulf war. On the other hand, territorial issues are mostly resolved as a result of an October 2000 agreement to abide by the waterway-sharing and other provisions of their 1975 Algiers Accords. (Iraq abrogated that agreement prior to its September 1980 invasion of Iran.) During the 1990s, Iran's naval forces did sometimes cooperate with Saddam Hussein's illicit export of oil through the Gulf, in exchange for substantial "protection fees."

U.S. Assertions of Iranian Support to Armed Groups

Some U.S. and allied officials appear to believe that Iran's agenda in Iraq might be broader and more threatening than providing political support to pro-Iranian factions. According to experts who share this view, Iran might be seeking to develop a broad range of options in Iraq that include sponsoring insurgent violence to pressure U.S. and British forces to leave Iraq or to deter the United States from action against Iran to curb its purported nuclear ambitions. On several occasions over the past year, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and other senior U.S. officials have asserted that U.S. forces have found Iranian-supplied explosives (reportedly including highly lethal shaped ex plosives) in Iraq.(2) On October 6, 2005, British Prime Minister Blair made similar allegations about Iran, backing up press comments the previous day from an unnamed British government official who alleged that Iran had supplied explosive devices to Sadr's Mahdi Army.(3) Blair, in his public comments, attributed the shipments to "Iranian elements" or Iran's ally, Lebanese Hizballah, acting on Iran's behalf, and he asserted that the explosives had been used to kill eight British soldiers in and around Basra since July 2005. In March 2006, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Peter Pace, and Commander of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) Gen. John Abizaid asserted that Iran's Revolutionary Guard-particularly its "Qods (Jerusalem) Forces" that conduct activities outside Iran in support of Shiite movements-is assisting armed factions in Iraq with explosives and weapons. None of these assertions of Iranian shipments has specified whether the weapons shipments had formal Iranian government approval or for which Iraqi faction(s) the bombs were intended.

Although echoing the British assertions, U.S. officials, eager to try to stabilize Iraq, appear to have chosen to try to engage Iran on the issue. In the December 5, 2005, issue of Newsweek magazine, U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Zalmay Khalilzad confirmed that he had received President Bush's approval to undertake negotiations with Iranian counterparts in an effort to enlist Iranian cooperation in Iraq. The United States and Iran confirmed in March 2006 that they would conduct direct talks on the issue of stabilizing Iraq. However, differences began to appear when Iranian officials intimated that they would want to expand such discussions to bilateral U.S.-Iran issues, including Iran's nuclear ambitions. The Administration opposed doing so, insisting the talks would take place in Baghdad and would be limited to Iraq issues. In addition, some Sunni groups criticized the United States for seeking the talks, maintaining that the United States and Iran might reach an arrangement to stabilize Iraq that neglects the views of Iraq's Sunnis. In May 2006, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said the talks were no longer needed because an Iraqi unity government had been formed, and no U.S.-Iran talks have
been held, to date.

Recent Press Allegations

The statements of U.S. and British officials, cited above, characterize Iran's aid to militant groups in Iraq in very general terms. Some press reports have offered more specific information. There is no firm information on how many representatives of the Iranian government or its institutions might be in Iraq. Two major articles, one in U.S. News and World Report and one in Time magazine, as well as other press reports, discuss allegations of Iranian material support to militant groups in Iraq as follows:(4)

- According to the Time report, which it says is based on U.S. military intelligence documents, Iran's Revolutionary Guard has set up a network in Iraq, headed by Abu Mustafa al-Sheibani, with the expressed purpose of committing violence against U.S. and coalition forces in Iraq. The report adds that it is this network that has brought into Iraq new types of "shaped" explosive charges that can pierce U.S. armor. According to the Time report, Sheibani's group "consists of 280 members, divided into 17 bomb-making teams and death squads.

- According to the Time report, Iranian-supported militant groups, including one called Thar Allah (Vengeance of God), are responsible for assassinations in southern Iraq against former members of Saddam's intelligence service and even some (presumably Sunni Muslim) members of Iraq's newly reconstituted National Intelligence Service. Thar Allah is reportedly headed by Yusif al-Musawi. According to other reports, Iraqi security officials have raided its headquarters and seized documents showing that it gets financial and logistical support from Iran.(5)

- The U.S. News report appears to support the Blair assertions discussed above by citing U.S. military reports that Lebanese Hizballah had established a "team of 30 to 40 operatives" in Najaf to support Moqtada Al Sadr's Mahdi militia forces, and that Hizballah had bought rocket-propelled grenades and anti-tank missiles for the Mahdi forces.

- In late October 2005, the London Sunday Telegraph quoted an Iranian opposition group (National Council of Resistance) as saying that Iran's Revolutionary Guard had set up a network of smuggling routes to ferry men and equipment for attacks on U.S. and allied troops in Iraq.(6) According to the report, the three principal smuggling routes were near the southern cities of Basra and Amarah, and in central Iraq, directly east of Baghdad. Some Iraqi security units in Diyala Province (which covers areas east of Baghdad) appeared to corroborate these assertions by announcing arrests of Iranian infiltrators.(7)

- On June 13, 2006, the New York Times ("Oil, Politics and Bloodshed Corrupt an Iraqi City") reported that in February 2006, border police in Basra, which is near the border with Iran, arrested a man they identified as a colonel in the Revolutionary Guard as he attempted to cross into Iraq.

Conclusions

Iran appears to be pursuing multiple options in Iraq. Iran is supporting the U.S.-engineered political process in Iraq because doing so favors pro-Iranian movements in Iraq, which have numeric stren gth and a degree of popularity. However, Iran is preserving the option of sponsoring militant activity in Iraq either to drive U.S. and allied forces out of Iraq or to raise the costs of U.S. military intervention close to Iran's borders. Iran's influence in Iraq positions Iran to retaliate against the United States should the United States succeed in persuading the United Nations to impose economic sanctions on Iran because of its nuclear program. Iran might also retaliate through Iraqi proxies if the United States were to undertake direct military action against Iran's nuclear facilities or other installations. An alternate explanation is that Iran might be indulging the Sadr faction with weaponry and other support as a way of building ties to a future political power in Iraq, Moqtada al-Sadr. Sadr's faction is now the largest bloc in the new Council of Representatives, holding about 32 seats in the 275-seat body.

It is unlikely that Iran's influence will fade unless the Shiite Islamist factions in Iraq were to somehow suffer diminished political power. At current levels of Iranian influence, it is likely that the Iraqi government will continue to offer general support to Iranian foreign policy, including its attempts to continue to advance its nuclear program.

Notes

1. "Clarification Statement" issued by Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari. May 29, 2006.

2. Scarborough, Rowan. "Rumsfeld Says Iran 'Allowing' Weapons Into Iraq." Washington Times,
August 10, 2005.

3. "Blair Warns Iran Over Iraq Bombs." BBC News, October 6, 2005.

4. See Ware, Michael. "Inside Iran's Secret War for Iraq." Time, August 22, 2005; and "The Iran Connection." U.S. News and World Report, November 22, 2204.

5 "Iraqi Security Forces Pursue Basra Militias, Arrest Iranian Infiltrators." BBC News, October 31, 2005.

6 Coughlin, Con. "Smuggling Route Opened to Supply Iraqi Insurgents." London Sunday
Telegraph, October 30, 2005.

7 "Iraqi Police Arrest Nine Iranian 'Infiltrators' Near Border." BBC News, October 29, 2005.

Russia will complete Iran nuclear plant

2008-09-02T18:09:00.000-07:00

AFP, 02/09/08

TEHRAN — The Russian company building Iran's first nuclear power plant has renewed a commitment to complete the project, the official IRNA news agency reported on Tuesday.

Russia, one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, is building the plant at Bushehr on the Gulf coast of Iran despite a long-running standoff over Tehran's controversial nuclear drive.

A visiting delegation from Russia's state-run Atomstroiexport pledged to "abide by the working agenda by providing the necessary experts... and sending the necessary equipment for the power plant in time," according to a joint statement with Iran's Atomic Energy Organisation carried by IRNA.

The Russian contractor said in December that Bushehr would not come on line before the end of 2008, amid repeated delays in construction, contractual disputes and international tensions over Iran's nuclear programme.

It took over construction of the plant from the German company Siemens in 1994.

Western governments believe oil-rich Iran is trying to develop nuclear weapons, but Tehran insists its programme is peaceful and aimed at generating energy for a growing population.

The UN Security Council has imposed three sets of sanctions on Iran over its failure to heed resolutions requiring the suspension of uranium enrichment, a process which makes fuel for a nuclear power plant but also the core of an atomic bomb.

Responding to a Nuclear Iran

2008-09-02T17:31:00.000-07:00

By Christopher Hemmer
Parameters, Autumn 2007, pp. 42-53.

What should American foreign policy be if current efforts to discourage Iran from developing nuclear weapons fail? Despite the recent resumption of high-level contacts between Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency, and the potential for stronger action by the United Nations Security Council, an Iranian nuclear weapon remains a distinct possibility. The current debate regarding US policy toward Iran revolves around the relative merits of a preventive military strike, including the possibility of seeking regime change in Tehran, versus a policy that focuses on diplomacy and economic sanctions to dissuade Iran from pursuing a nuclear bomb. This debate, however, risks prematurely foreclosing discussions regarding a wide-range of foreign policy options should diplomacy and sanctions fail to persuade Tehran to limit its nuclear ambitions.

The choices America would face if Iran developed nuclear weapons are not simply between preventive military action and doing nothing. The calculations America would face are not between the costs of action versus the costs of inaction. A nuclear-armed Iran will certainly pose a number of challenges for the United States. Those challenges, however, can be met through an active policy of deterrence, containment, engagement, and the reassurance of America’s allies in the region.

American Interests

The United States has three strategic interests in the Persian Gulf: maintaining the flow of oil onto world markets, preventing any hostile state from dominating the region, and minimizing any terrorist threat. Given these interests, the challenges posed by a nuclear-armed Iran need to be addressed by a policy that minimizes the threat to key oil production and transportation infrastructure and negates any Iranian bid for regional hegemony. Additionally, any action taken toward Iran has to be weighed against the potential impact it may have with regard to the global war on terrorism and ongoing US initiatives related to nation-building in Iraq and Afghanistan. Moreover, such a policy needs to be executed in a manner that avoids any nuclear threat to the United States or its allies.

The end-state the United States should be working toward, as a result of these strategic interests, is an Iran that is an integral part of the global economy, at peace with its neighbors, and not supportive of terrorist organizations. While America’s strategic interests do not include the proliferation of democracy, any acceptable end-state will likely require some measure of democratic reform. Given the fact that anti-Americanism and anti-Zionism are an integral part of the Islamic Republic’s identity, some measure of regime evolution will be required in an effort to advance America’s long-term interests.(1)

The Perils of a Preventive Strike

Any attempt to disarm Iran through the use of military options would in all likelihood damage America’s interests in the region. While a military option might inflict significant damage on Iran’s infrastructure by damaging or destroying its nuclear weapons program, disrupting its regional ambitions, and possibly serving as a deterrent to future proliferators, the likely costs would far outweigh the benefits.

First, any military action against Iran would send seismic shocks through global energy markets at a time when the price of oil is already at record highs. Since Iran relies heavily on the income derived from oil exports, it is unlikely that it would withhold petroleum from global markets. Iran may, however, threaten to disrupt the flow of traffic through the Strait of Hormuz or sponsor attacks on key oil infrastructure on the territory of America’s Gulf allies. Such actions could hurt the US economy and potentially bolster Iranian revenue by raising the price of oil. While it is true that the world market would eventually adjust to such actions, as James Fallows has noted, that is a bit like saying eventually the US stock market adjusted to the Great Depression.(2)

Any direct military action against Iran could also have a significant impact on America’s war on terrorism. Such action would only serve to confirm many of Osama bin Laden’s statements that the United States is at war with the world of Islam. This charge would be difficult to counter, given the fact that the United States has looked the other way for years with regard to Israel’s nuclear program, accepted India as a legitimate nuclear-state, and is negotiating with North Korea regarding its nuclear ambitions.

Any military action against Iran would also undermine America’s nation-building efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, due to possible Iranian retaliation in both countries. While Iranian efforts toward stabilizing these two states have been sporadic at best, and purposively obstructive at worst, there is little reason to doubt that Iran could make achieving US objectives in Iraq and Afghanistan far more difficult. Although mostly bluster, there is some truth to former Iranian President Ali Rafsanjani’s argument that as long as American troops maintain a formidable presence on Iran’s borders, "it is the United States that is besieged by Iran."(3) The same holds true regarding Iran’s ties to Hezbollah and its presence in Lebanon. By targeting Iran’s nuclear program the United States would unwisely encourage Iranian escalation in a number of these arenas.

Military strikes against Tehran would also undermine Washington’s long-term goal of seeing reform movements succeed in Iran. If the history of military incursions and the Iranian nation teach us anything it is the fact that intervention is likely to solidify support for the current regime. The idea that the Iranian people would react to a military strike by advocating the overthrow of the existing regime is delusional.(4) Instead the likely outcome of any direct military incursion would be the bolstering of the current regime.

Moreover, any preventive attack, no matter how effective, is only a temporary fix. First, such a campaign will eliminate only that portion of Iran’s nuclear program known to intelligence agencies. Even after the extensive bombing campaign of the 1990-1991 Gulf War, subsequent inspections discovered large parts of Iraq’s unconventional weapons programs that were previously unknown. More importantly, even if such an attack succeeded in eliminating significant facets of Iran’s nuclear program, it would do little toward discouraging Iran from rebuilding those assets. Thus, even after a fully successful denial campaign, the United States, in a number of years, would likely face the prospect of having to do it all over again.

The Problem with Regime Change

Given the limits of any preventive strike, perhaps the United States should not restrict its goal in Iran to simply nuclear disarmament, but opt instead for the broader objective of regime change. If successful, regime change in Iran could provide for a number of benefits. It may eliminate the Iranian threat of interrupting the flow of oil from the region; it would also send a strong message to potential proliferators about the costs of similar actions; it might diminish Iran’s support for terrorism; even possibly eliminate the threat of official Iranian meddling in Iraq and Afghanistan; and could potentially curtail Iran’s nuclear ambitions.

The reason a policy advocating regime change is a bad idea, given its potential benefits, is the fact that such a policy is beyond America’s means. While the United States certainly possesses the capability to eliminate the regime in Tehran, as the invasion of Iraq has shown, eliminating the present leadership is the easy part of regime change. The more difficult and costly challenge is installing a new government. With America’s resources already overly committed in Afghanistan and Iraq, taking on a new nation-building mission in a country far larger and in some ways far more nationalistic than Iraq would be the epitome of strategic overreach.

Additionally, one of the few scenarios where Iran might use its nuclear capability would be if Tehran believed that the United States intended to exercise forcible regime change. A nuclear strike against any American presence in the region might be seen by the leadership in Tehran as its last hope for survival. It goes without saying that once any government has crossed the nuclear threshold, forcible regime change by an external actor is no longer a viable option. The threat of nuclear retaliation would simply be too great. Indeed, this is probably the most important reason why states such as Iran and North Korea desire nuclear weapons. Does this mean that the United States should therefore seek regime change before Iran develops its nuclear capability? No; even without nuclear weapons, forcible regime change in Iran and the ensuing occupation would entail too great a commitment of resources on the part of the United States. Pursuing regime change in Iran as a response to its nuclear program would be akin to treating a brain tumor with a guillotine. The proposed cure is worse than the disease.

A Better Policy: Deter, Contain, and Engage

Fortunately, US policy options for dealing with a nuclear Iran are not limited to preventive military strikes, regime change, or doing nothing. A more promising option would have four key components. First, deter Iran from ever using its nuclear weapons. Second, prevent Iran from using its nuclear status to increase its influence in the region. Third, engage Iran in a meaningful way that encourages the creation of a government friendly to the United States and its regional allies, one that does not sponsor terrorism. Finally, such a policy should reassure US allies in the region that America’s commitment to their security is steadfast. This four-pronged strategy would do a better job of protecting American interests in the region than any military strike or forcible regime change.

Deter

America’s overriding concern regarding Iran’s nuclear weapons program is that these weapons are never used against the United States or its allies. Fortunately, the strategy of nuclear deterrence can go a long way in resolving this problem. The threat of annihilation as the result of an American retaliatory strike can be a powerful deterrent. As the United States and the Soviet Union discovered during the Cold War and as India and Pakistan have recently learned, the threat of nuclear retaliation makes the use of such weapons problematic.

The central question in any debate over America’s policies toward a nuclear Iran is whether or not the regime in Tehran is deterrable. If in fact it is, then deterrence is a less costly and risky strategy than prevention. Proponents of the preventive use of military force argue, as did the alarmists in the late 1940s with regard to the Soviet Union and in the early 1960s about China, that Iran is a revolutionary state seeking to export its destabilizing ideology. For these analysts Iran is often depicted as a regime of religious zealots that cannot be deterred because they are willing to accept an apocalyptic end to any conflict.(5)

While Iran’s track record with regard to its foreign policy does indicate a regime that is hostile to America, nothing would indicate that Iran is beyond the realm of nuclear deterrence. The bulk of the revolutionary fervor demonstrated by the Islamic Republic during its infancy died during the long war with Iraq. Moreover, the power of nuclear deterrence lies in the fact that precise calculations and cost and benefit analyses are not needed given the overwhelming costs associated with any nuclear exchange. Iranian leaders are rational enough to understand that any use of nuclear weapons against the United States or its allies would result in an overwhelming and unacceptable response.

What about President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad talking of wiping Israel off the map or the former President Rafsanjani declaring that while Israel could not survive a nuclear war, the Islamic world could survive a nuclear exchange? Fears related to such rhetoric need to be viewed in a historical context. Similar arguments were made about the Soviets and Chinese as they developed their nuclear arsenals. The fear of many Cold War hawks was that the Kremlin was run by ideologues. Wasn’t it a fact that they did not shirk while watching 25 million of their own killed in World War II; nor did they flinch while millions more were murdered in internal purges? This demonstrated, many argued, that the Soviet leadership would be impervious to the logic of mutually assured destruction. Indeed, at times Mao Tse-Tung offered strikingly similar rhetoric to that coming out of Tehran today. He also boasted about how China could afford to lose millions in a nuclear exchange and still emerge victorious.(6) Such worries turned out to be baseless with regard to the Soviets and the Chinese, and such rhetoric proved to be just that, rhetoric. While the bizarre views and hostile statements coming from Iran’s current President are cause for concern, one must also be cognizant of the fact that the President of Iran is not the commander-in-chief of the armed forces and, in reality, has little influence over the nuclear program. The Supreme Leader does, however, and Ayatollah Ali Khameni has distanced himself from the most bellicose of Ahmadinejad’s rhetoric.

To counter these ominous tirades one could look to more reassuring statements, such as Supreme Leader Khameni’s argument that nuclear weapons are un-Islamic.(7) More enlightening, however, than comparing dueling quotes, is an examination of what Iran has done in terms of its foreign policy. Iran has shown itself to be pragmatic in its actions to protect national interests, foregoing the activities one associates with a religiously driven revolutionary state.

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, contrary to expectations, Iran did not seek to export its revolution to parts of the former Soviet Union, understanding that their national interest lay in forging a solid and profitable relationship with Russia. Iran even went so far as to dismiss the war in Chechnya as an internal Russian matter. Similar calculations of national interests led Iran to support Christian Armenia over Muslim Azerbaijan. Following the 1991 Gulf War, Iran did not push for a Shia revolution in Iraq, fearing that the outcome would probably be too dangerous and destabilizing. Following its isolation during the Iran-Iraq War Iran worked vigorously to improve relations with its Gulf neighbors.(8)

But does Tehran’s antipathy toward the United States and Israel outweigh its long-term national interests? No; indeed, during the Iran-Iraq War Tehran was willing to engage in arms shipments with the United States and Israel in an effort to further its war against Iraq. Given the difficulties the Iranians had with the Taliban, Tehran has also been fairly supportive of the American intervention in Afghanistan, to include offering the United States the use of its airfields and ports.(9) While Tehran was less supportive of America’s subsequent intervention in Iraq, the leadership was astute enough to recognize the benefits associated with the destruction of Saddam Hussein’s regime. The point of these examples is not to discount any policy differences that Washington has with Tehran, but to stress that Iran is not run by ideologues, rather by a group of pragmatists devoted to protecting Iranian interests. Leaders who are rational enough to understand that the use of nuclear weapons against America would not be in their national interests.

There has also been a good deal of international media reports related to the fear that Iran might provide nuclear weapons to terrorist organizations. Ironically, the very use by Iran of surrogate terrorist organizations, rather than more overt attacks, is evidence that Tehran is sensitive to the calculations associated with the strategy of deterrence. It is also an affirmation that the Iranian leadership is attempting to minimize the risks to its foreign policy objectives. Such acts argue strongly against any possibility that Iran might provide terrorist organizations with nuclear weapons. Any move of this nature carries with it a great amount of risk; Iranians would lose control over the employment of the weapons while still having to worry that they might be blamed and targeted for response.(10)

Contain

The second pillar of US strategy toward a nuclear Iran should be a policy of containment, to be certain that Iran does not succeed in exercising its nuclear capability as a tool of coercive diplomacy against US or allied interests in the region. Given Iran’s perception of itself as the historically preeminent power in the region, Tehran can be expected to continue its policy attempting to increase its regional influence at the expense of the United States.

How would the possession of a deliverable nuclear weapon impact Tehran’s foreign policy agenda? One possibility is that a nuclear Iran might be more, rather than less, restrained in its regional agenda. If any of Iran’s actions are driven by a sense of insecurity with regard to America’s intentions (or the threat created by a nuclear Pakistan or Israel, even the possibility of a resurgent Iraq), the security that Tehran would gain from having its own nuclear deterrent could make the nation’s leadership less worried about the regional balance of power. Moreover, possession of a nuclear weapon would certainly increase the attention other world-powers paid Iran. The leadership in Tehran would have to continually worry that if any crisis developed involving another nuclear power the potential foe might opt for a preemptive attack on Iranian nuclear facilities. The fear that even a limited conflict might escalate into a nuclear exchange could make Tehran more cautious across the entire spectrum of conflict.

While such pressures may play a limited role in Iran’s decisionmaking, it would be unwise for the United States to put too much faith in such possibilities. First, Iran’s regional behavior is only partially driven by security fears. Even if Iran believed there was no threat from the United States, its status as a potential regional hegemon gives it incentive to increase its role in regional affairs. Second, while a limited amount of learning related to nuclear crisis management did take place during the Cold War, it took the United States and the Soviets a number of crises to fully appreciate these lessons.(11) Although the existence of this Cold War record might enable Iran to learn such lessons more quickly, the limits of vicarious learning offer ample reasons to doubt that Iran will internalize these dictums without experiencing similar crises.

The result is that Iran can probably be expected to continue furthering its regional agenda in an attempt to increase its stature and diminish that of the United States. At least initially, any increased nuclear capability will likely embolden rather than induce caution on the part of Iran’s leadership. Having gone to great lengths and paid significant costs to develop its nuclear capabilities, Iran is likely to continue testing the regional and international waters. Such efforts are bound to create challenges for the United States and its allies. The good news is that nuclear weapons have proven to be poor tools for coercive diplomacy, especially against states that already possess nuclear weapons or who may be allied with a nuclear power. Nuclear weapons have proven to be extraordinarily effective at two tasks: deterring the use of such weapons against other nuclear powers or their allies, and deterring states from directly challenging the vital interests of a nuclear power. Beyond these two critical tasks, however, nuclear weapons have not proven particularly useful as diplomatic tools of intimidation. For the United States and its allies, a policy of containment against Iranian attempts to expand its influence in the region is the correct foreign policy strategy. Certainly, such a strategy far outweighs any policy based on preventive war.

Engage

To advance America’s long-range goal of an Iran that is part of the global economy, at peace with its neighbors, and not supporting terrorism, Washington would be better served by engaging Iran rather than attempting to isolate it. A policy of engagement could take two forms: the establishment of direct diplomatic relations and the encouragement of Iran’s involvement in the global economy.

The United States broke diplomatic ties with Iran in April 1980, during the hostage crisis. The establishment of direct diplomatic ties between the United States and Iran, however, should not be seen as any form of a reward to Iran or as approval of Iranian policies. Nor should the reestablishment of formal relations be seen as the final stage in some sort of grand bargain. Instead, diplomatic relations should be viewed as part of the normal business of conducting America’s foreign policy. There is little reason to doubt that Iran would portray any US initiative to reestablish diplomatic relations as a victory, as Tehran did with the recent moves by the Bush Administration to engage in direct talks related to the situation in Iraq. America should not let fear of such a reaction stand in the way of any initiative that would advance America’s long-term security interests.

Over the years the United States has found that it needs diplomatic relations with hostile states as well as with allies. Such relationships were maintained throughout the Cold War with the Soviet Union, despite numerous crises and conflicts. In the case of Iran the absence of direct governmental links makes it more difficult to deter and contain Iran. Obviously, Iran would have to concur in the reestablishment of any form of diplomatic relations.

Given the number of domestic challenges the Islamic Republic is facing, most notably a tremendous growth in its youthful population, combined with the incompetence and corruption that has marked its stewardship of the Iranian economy, it is hard to imagine that this regime can continue to avoid collapse without significant reform.(12) At the same time, there is little reason to expect that a democratic revolution is imminent. The reform movements that seemed so promising in the late 1990s have largely been defeated. The best strategy for revitalizing these movements is to encourage Tehran’s involvement in the world economy, as opposed to further attempts at isolation. Increasing the Iranian people’s exposure to the world economy is much more likely to increase motivation and expand the resources available to any future reform movement. Iran’s eventual inclusion in the World Trade Organization is one of the carrots currently being held out to Iran as part of ongoing negotiations regarding its nuclear program. Such incentives may advance America’s long-term foreign policy goals in the region even if those efforts fail to negate Iran’s development of a nuclear weapon.

Potential economic sanctions against Iran related to its nuclear program need to be carefully addressed. Iran’s stagnant economy, as well as its reliance on the international energy market, make it acutely vulnerable to economic sanctions.(13) While the threat of sanctions may be useful in dissuading the development of nuclear weapons, it is less clear that the actual imposition of sanctions would advance US foreign policy interests. While economic sanctions might extract a high toll on the Iranian economy, the reality is that the political effect that accompanies such sanctions often strengthens, rather than undermines, a regime. Sanctions tend to increase a government’s control over the country’s economic activity, thereby starving potential opponents of resources. Sanctions can also create a "rally round the flag" effect that permits a regime to blame international hostility for the state’s internal weaknesses.(14)

In the case of a nuclear Iran, sanctions are only likely to be useful under a fairly stringent set of circumstances. To significantly impact Iran’s economy, any sanctions regime would have to be multilateral and include at a minimum the United States, European Union, Russia, and China. Sanctions would also have to be properly targeted against the leadership of the current regime and not structured in such a manner as to inflict indiscriminate damage to Iran’s economy. Finally, penalties inflicted by the sanctions need be directly attributable to the regime’s development of nuclear weapons.

Creating sanctions that meet these requirements would not be easy. The importance of Iran as a market for Russia and an energy supplier to China makes any sanctions regime a tough sell in Moscow and Beijing. The complicated and often opaque nature of Iranian domestic politics also presents a challenge to the development of "smart sanctions." Finally, given the distrust that exists in Iran regarding the history of external interventions, it is doubtful that any sanctions regime would be interpreted as anything except another attempt to interfere in internal politics. In all likelihood, the United States would be better off by not making sanctions the focal point for its policies regarding a nuclear Iran. Engagement has often proven to be a surer path to regime evolution than economic isolation.(15)

Reassure Iran’s Neighbors

The final portion of a US strategy toward a nuclear-armed Iran should focus on convincing Iran’s neighbors that the American commitment to their security remains strong. If the United States wants regional powers to resist Iranian attempts at expanding its influence, then Washington needs to bolster security ties in the region. Improving security cooperation with Iran’s neighbors could advance a number of American interests beyond simple containment. Such efforts could also help increase the security of the oil infrastructure in the region, as well as expand intelligence cooperation related to international terrorism.

A more definite US security commitment to Iran’s neighbors may also decrease the chance that the development of a nuclear weapon would increase the threat of nuclear proliferation in the region. Egypt, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia have been cited as states likely to respond to any Iranian nuclear capability with increased nuclear programs. Egypt, however, has been able to tolerate a nuclear Israel for more than 30 years, as well as accommodate Libya’s weapons programs. Given that historical precedent, it is unlikely that an Iranian bomb would dramatically change Cairo’s calculations. Similarly, Turkey’s membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and its desire to join the European Union are likely to dissuade Ankara from attempting to join the nuclear fraternity. Saudi Arabia and the other members of the Gulf Cooperation Council, however, would more than likely attempt to strengthen security ties with the United States in an effort to bolster their position against a nuclear Iran.

Part of America’s strategy regarding regional allies needs to focus on assuring individual states that as long as Iran is contained, the United States will not take any preventive military action. While the Gulf States certainly would prefer that Iran not develop nuclear weapons, it is also important to recognize that they fear any US-Iranian conflict more than they fear the prospect of a nuclear Iran.(16) America’s most promising strategy toward a nuclear-armed Iran should be the development of a security architecture based on deterrence and containment.

Conclusion

The United States should be under no illusions regarding the problems that a nuclear-armed Iran would present. The challenges that development would pose for American interests in the region would be monumental and lasting. The strategy of deterrence, containment, engagement, and reassurance provides the framework for achieving America’s long-term regional objectives. Such a strategy would minimize disruptions to the international flow of oil, blunt Iran’s attempts at regional hegemony, stabilize US efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq, and aid in countering the global war on terrorism. Ultimately, it will provide the time that reformers in Iran need to recast the Iranian government from within. It is this reformation of Iran’s government that will offer the best guarantee for preserving America’s interests in the region.

When US diplomat George Kennan proposed the doctrine of containment against the Soviet Union at the outset of the Cold War, he argued that Soviet diplomacy was:

At once easier and more difficult to deal with than the diplomacy of aggressive leaders like Napoleon and Hitler. On the one hand it is more sensitive to contrary force, more ready to yield on individual sectors of the diplomatic front when that force was felt to be too strong, and thus more rational in the logic and rhetoric of power. On the other hand it cannot be easily defeated or discouraged by a single victory on the part of its opponents.... [I]t can be effectively countered not by sporadic acts which represent the momentary whims of democratic opinion, but only by intelligent long-range policies.(17)

Admittedly, the Iran of today is quite different than the Soviet Union of the 1940s. It represents what is at best a regional rather than a global challenge, and its distinctive Persian and Shia ideologies are likely to have limited appeal abroad. These differences aside, Kennan’s insight still applies. Iranian nuclear ambitions can best be deterred by means of an intelligent long-range foreign policy, not the threat of military intervention.

NOTES

1. On regime evolution versus regime change, see Richard N. Haass, "Regime Change and Its Limits," Foreign Affairs, 84 (July/August 2005), 68.

2. James Fallows, "The Nuclear Power Beside Iraq," The Atlantic Monthly, May 2006, 32.

3. Quoted in Kamram Taremi, "Iranian Foreign Policy Towards Occupied Iraq, 2003-2005," Middle East Policy, 12 (Winter 2005), 42.

4. For examples of those who argue that decisive military action against Iran could cause a favorable regime change, see Arthur Herman, "Getting Serious About Iran: A Military Option," Commentary, 122 (November 2006), 28-32 and Norman Podhoretz, "The Case for Bombing Iran," Commentary, 123 (June 2007), 17-23.

5. For example, see Bernard Lewis, "August 22," Wall Street Journal, 8 August 2006, A10; William Kristol, "It’s Our War," The Weekly Standard, 24 July 2006; Charles Krauthammer, "The Tehran Calculus," The Washington Post, 15 September 2006, A19; and Efraim Inbar, "The Need to Block a Nuclear Iran," Middle East Review of International Affairs, 10 (March 2006), 85-105.

6. On the comparison between Iran’s rhetoric on nuclear weapons and earlier statements from Mao, see Ray Takeyh, "Confronting Iran: Take Ahmadinejad with a Grain of Salt," The Los Angeles Times, 19 November 2006, M1.

7. Kenneth M. Pollack, The Persian Puzzle: The Conflict Between Iran and America (New York: Random House, 2004), 237; and Michael Eisenstadt, "Deter and Contain: Dealing with a Nuclear Iran" in Henry Sokolski and Patrick Clawson, eds., Getting Ready for a Nuclear-Ready Iran (Carlisle, Pa.: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, October 2005), 227-29.

8. See Ray Takeyh, Hidden Iran: Paradox and Power in the Islamic Republic (New York: Times Books, 2006), 59-82; Robert O. Freedman, "Putin, Iran, and the Nuclear Weapons Issue," Problems of Post-Communism, 53 (March/April 2006), 41; and Mohsen M. Milani, "Iran: The Status Quo Power," Current History, 104 (January 2005), 30-36.

9. Pollack, 346-47.

10. For a discussion of the issues involved in deterring states from supplying nuclear weapons to terrorists, see Caitlin Talmadge, "Deterring a Nuclear 9/11," Washington Quarterly, 30 (Spring 2007), 21-34.

11. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Nuclear Learning and U.S.-Soviet Security Regimes," International Organization, 41 (Summer 1987), 389-90.

12. Ray Takeyh and Nikolas K. Gvosdev, "Pragmatism in the Midst of Iranian Turmoil," Washington Quarterly, 27 (Autumn 2004), 33-56; Ali Gheissari and Vali Nasr, "The Conservative Consolidation in Iran," Survival, 47 (Summer 2005), 175-90; and Jahangir Amuzegar, "Iran’s Theocracy under Siege," Middle East Policy, 10 (Spring 2003), 135-52.

13. Kenneth Pollack and Ray Takeyh, "Taking on Tehran," Foreign Affairs, 84 (March/April 2005), 20-34; and Abbas Milani, "U.S. Foreign Policy and the Future of Democracy in Iran," Washington Quarterly, 28 (Summer 2005), 41-56.

14. See, for example, Meghan L. O’Sullivan, Shrewd Sanctions: Statecraft and State Sponsors of Terrorism (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2003), especially 284-320.

15. Haass, 71.

16. Judith S. Yaphe and Charles D. Lutes, Reassessing the Implications of a Nuclear-Armed Iran (Washington: National Defense Univ., Institute for National Strategic Studies, McNair Paper #69, August 2005), 19.

17. X [George Kennan], "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," Foreign Affairs, 25 (July 1947), 575.

Dr. Christopher Hemmer received his doctorate from Cornell University. He currently serves as an Associate Professor of International Security Studies at the Air War College. He is the author of Which Lessons Matter? American Foreign Policy Decision Making in the Middle East, 1979-1987.

US gearing up to attack Iran - report

2008-09-01T17:47:00.000-07:00

By Stan Goodenough
Jerusalem Newswire, 01/09/08

The United States is preparing to launch an attack on the Iranian nuclear program with something expected to happen "in the coming weeks."

This is according to a report on the Ynetnews website Monday, which in turn was based on a story that appeared in De Telegraaf in Holland.

As that report has it, the Dutch authorities have just suspended a clandestine operation they were pursuing aimed at sabotaging Iran's nukes.

While it was thought to be potentially successful, the operation was recently halted due to preparations for an American airstrike in Iran.

"The Dutch believe that the bombed targets will include the locations of their espionage operation," stated De Telegraaf.

Iran has for months been belligerently bulldozing its way towards the production of nuclear weapons even as it frequently fires fusillades of threats in Israel's direction, promising the soon-to-be-realized destruction of the Jewish state.

In a classic power play, the regime in Tehran has escalated its rhetoric amid increasing reports that either Israel or the United States plans to strike.

A top Iranian official, Brigadier General Masoud Jazayeri, warned at the weekend that an attack on the rogue state's nuclear facilities would trigger another world war.

Israel has meanwhile reiterated that it will never allow the Iranians to acquire an atomic bomb.

As the war talk spirals, Israeli officials voiced the belief Iran has purchased advanced anti-aircraft defenses from Russia that would severely hamper efforts to hit the Iranian facilities.

Tehran is expected to take delivery of the S-300 missile systems by year's end-narrowing the window of opportunity for a strike.

Iran denies it has bought the system.

Obama camp denies report Biden said Israel will have to reconcile to nuclear Iran

2008-09-01T17:45:00.000-07:00

Haaretz, 01/09/08

U.S. vice presidential candidate Senator Joe Biden's press secretary vehemently denied on Monday a report that the Democratic candidate had said that Israel would have to reconcile itself to a nuclear Iran.

According to an unsourced report by Army Radio, the senator made the remarks to senior Israeli officials behind closed doors, adding that he opposed "opening an additional military and diplomatic front."

Biden, chairman of the powerful Senate Foreign Relations Committee, has long been considered strongly pro-Israel. His nomination as U.S. presidential candidate Barack Obama's running mate had been expected to shore up the Democrats' strength with U.S. Jewish voters.

"It's doubtful if the economic sanctions will be effective, and I am against opening an additional military and diplomatic front," Army Radio quoted him as saying.

In response, Senator Biden's press secretary David Wade released a statement saying "This is a lie peddled by partisan opponents of Senators Obama and Biden and we will not tolerate anyone questioning Senator Biden?s 35-year record of standing up for the security of Israel."

"Joe Biden's first trip as a Senator was to Israel, he has worked with every Israeli leader from Golda Meir to Prime Minister Olmert, and he takes a back seat to no one when it comes to protecting the relationship between Israel and the U.S. Senator Biden has consistently stated-publicly and privately-that a nuclear Iran would pose a grave threat to Israel and the United States and that we must prevent a nuclear Iran," the statement continued.

As recently as July 2008, in a Foreign Relations hearing, Senator Biden reiterated his long-held view on this subject and stated that "Iran's acquisition of a nuclear weapon would dramatically destabilize an already unstable region and probably fuel a nuclear arms race in the region. It is profoundly in our interest to prevent that from happening,? the statement said.

Last year, in a widely quoted interview with year the Jewish American Shalom TV, Biden said, "I am a Zionist. You don't have to be a Jew to be a Zionist," adding that "Israel is the single greatest strength that America has in the Middle East," and that its presence as a strategic ally meant that America need station far fewer troops and warships in the region.

Iran Corroborates U.N. Nuclear Monitor's Estimate of Centrifuges in Operation

2008-09-01T17:34:00.000-07:00

By Thomas Erdbrink
Washington Post, 30/08/08

TEHRAN - Iran is using 4,000 centrifuges to enrich uranium and plans to install an additional 3,000 of the devices, Deputy Foreign Minister Ali Reza Sheikh Attar said Thursday in an interview on Iranian state television.

Sheikh Attar did not say when the new machines would begin operating, but his statement corroborates the International Atomic Energy Agency's estimate of the number of centrifuges that Iran is currently using. The country says it plans to build a total of 54,000 centrifuges to enrich uranium, which can be used to fuel nuclear power plants or to build nuclear weapons.

President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said in July that the country already had 5,000 centrifuges. The IAEA, the United Nations' nuclear monitoring agency, which routinely inspects Iran's main enrichment facility at Natanz in central Iran through visits and permanent video surveillance, said that Ahmadinejad had overstated the amount of centrifuges by a thousand. A report by the IAEA in May said Iran may have 6,000 of the machines ready by September.

Iran says the Non-Proliferation Treaty, of which it is a signatory, gives it the right to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes. The country says it needs nuclear energy to provide for a growing energy demand.

The United States and other countries suspect Iran of trying to make a nuclear weapon. The U.N. Security Council has imposed three sets of sanctions against Iran, mainly aimed at its defense and financial industries, intended to dissuade the country from pursuing nuclear weapons.

Negotiations between Iran and world powers over the nuclear program have stalled over the summer, with Iran ignoring an ultimatum to answer a proposal from the United States, Russia, China, France, Britain and Germany, which demand that Iran suspend enrichment activities as a precondition for talks.

Iran argues that it suspended enrichment from 2003 until 2005 at the request of European countries, which it says then failed to reach an agreement with Iran. Iranian officials have often stated their willingness to negotiate but only if there are no preconditions.

No new economic sanctions against Iran have come into effect since the issuance of the ultimatum on Aug. 5, mainly because of differences between Russia and China, on one hand, and the Western powers on the other. Russia, China and the European Union are Iran's most important trade partners. Russia is building Iran's first nuclear power plant in the town of Bushehr on the Persian Gulf.

Western nations will have to resolve the standoff over Iran's nuclear ambitions without Russia's help if they refuse to cooperate with Moscow, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin said in an interview with CNN on Thursday.

Asked if the conflict with Georgia could hurt U.S.-Russian cooperation on Iran, Putin said: "If nobody wants to talk with us on these issues and cooperation with Russia is not needed, then for God's sake, do it yourself."

U.S. Foreign Policy and the Future of Democracy in Iran

2008-09-01T17:31:00.000-07:00

Abbas Milani
Washington Quarterly 28, no. 3 Summer 2005, 28:3 pp. 41-56

(Abbas Milani is director of Iranian studies at Stanford University and codirector of the
Hoover Institution's Iran Democracy Project)

U.S. policy toward Iran has reached a crucial crossroads. Since the early 1970s, Washington has developed policies that lasated only until the next crisis, forcing the United States into a reactive mode, at the mercy of events and their subsequent tactical responses. A series of harried reactions, however, do not add up to an effective strategy toward this crucial country in a region of incomparable geostrategic significance. Harvesting the promise of a new Iran policy and avoiding its perils require a diplomacy wise in its historic insights, patient and prudent about its goals, honest and clear about its true foes and friends, and credibly resolute in its use of the requisite tools to bring about the desired ends.

Today, many suggest that ensuring that the Islamic Republic does not acquire a nuclear weapon should be the centerpiece of U.S. policy toward Iran. A failure in this effort, they warn, will not only alter the balance of forces in the region, but more ominously still, it will sound the death knell of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Yet, real as these dangers are, the
failures of the European Union and the United States to develop a coherent policy on the nuclear issue; the failure of the Iranian opposition to engage the regime seriously about the safety as well as the real strategic and economic costs and benefits of the nuclear program; and, finally, the adventurism of China, Russia, North Korea, and Pakistan have resulted in an Islamic Republic which today finds itself in a win-win-win situation on the nuclear question. None of the three current policies on the table-going along with the EU's proposed negotiated agreement, a surgical strike on Iran's nuclear facilities, or a "grand bargain" between the United States and Iran-will bring about an end to the regime's nuclear adventurism.

Ironically, although democracy has always been the Islamic Republic's Achilles' heel, these enumerated failures have turned the nuclear question into the clerics' Herculean club. It has been the only issue in the last 15 years around which the regime has been able to garner public support. To solve Iran's nuclear problem, the West has to stop playing to the regime's strength and instead concentrate on its weakness. In other words, in spite of the many dire and serious warnings about the nuclear threat, the key to solving Iran's nuclear problem is the fate of the
country's democratic movement. Democracy is in fact the focal point where Iranians' interests converge with those of the United States. If the past is any indication, democracies are far more likely than dictatorships to engage in a serious and honest "roll back" of their nuclear programs. Furthermore, only in a democracy can there be a serious national dialogue about the real costs and benefits of "going nuclear."(1) Finally, democracies are far less likely to allow terrorists access to their arsenals.

Fortunately, in contrast to most Muslim countries in the Middle East, Iran has a viable, indigenous democratic movement. Also setting it apart, the United States is, for the most part, admired politically and culturally by many elements of Iran's democratic movement and by the Iranian population in general. The movement sees the United States as its potential ally, but it is also wary of being used, in appearance or in reality, as a bargaining chip in a realpolitik between Tehran and Washington. The United States must treat Iran's democracy movement as an independent ally, not a ward. It must respect its autonomy and its political exigencies at home, and most importantly, it must not interfere in the movement by anointing any person, group, or faction. Patronizing the democratic movement by throwing money it it will only serve to strengthen the regime's claims that democrats in Iran are tools of the United States.

Some in Tehran and Washington today, for a variety of often self-serving purposes, offer facile solutions to the complex problem of U.S.-Iranian relations. On one hand, pessimists have already declared the democratic movement in Iran not just dead but deracinated. The regime, they say, is here to stay. It has weathered its crisis and is well ensconced; the opposition is scattered, and the populace is depoliticized; and the once active and vibrant youth are either fighting the demon of drug addiction or have morphed into what Francis Fukuyama calls the "Last Man,"(2) an amorphous mass of lonely and atomized individuals bereft of ideals and goals, obsessed with frivolous consumerism or a destructive nihilism that values and hopes for nothing.

On the other hand, optimists see an utterly isolated, incompetent regime on the verge of immediate collapse. They have pinned their hopes on false messiahs popping up at a rapidly rising rate in the plethora of Iranian diaspora media outlets. A simple flick of a finger by the United States; a few million dollars thrown at the diaspora media or disbursed among those who claim to wear the mantle of the democratic movement in Iran; or if money fails, a surgical strike on Iran's suspected nuclear sites is allegedly all that is needed to topple the renegade rogue regime. No sooner had whispers of U.S. dollars hit the rumor mills than a sudden surge of newly minted "democratic activists" and media personalities emerged, short on bona fide experience in fighting for democracy but gargantuan in their appetite for financial assistance. Neither the quixotic optimism of the second group nor the incorrigible nihilism of the first, however, can help navigate the way to a real solution of the Iran problem.

Avoiding these two extreme positions is not enough to develop a successful strategy toward Iran. Success will require a genuine understanding of the enemy's weaknesses and strengths as well as a sober assessment of one's own powers and limitations. Ultimately, an effective strategy must free itself both of the ideologues who sees the world as their ideology dictates and of the speculative scholar who offers endless complexities, paradoxes, and relativisms
but seems to abjure action. The situation in Iran is complex enough to require the resolution and decisiveness of the military commander, the patience and prudence of the diplomat, and finally the appreciation of the scholar for the intricacies and paradoxes that define Iran as a nation. This combination, although daunting, is surely not impossible for the United States, as well as the Iranian opposition, to achieve.

Democracy's Indigenous Roots

Iran's democratic movement is seemingly dormant, but it has endured for a century. Contrary to the claims of foes of modernity in Iran, particularly among the clerics who suggest that democracy is by nature Western in origin and foreign to Iran's Islamic cultural climes, Iran has a long history of thinking independently about some of democracy's seminal ideas.(3) Over the last century, the threads of this movement were woven into the very fabric of Iranian society; the failure of President Muhammad Khatami or any other leader to deliver on reform promises indicates only tactical defeat and not the movement's end. During its origins from 1905 to 1907, a strange, cognitively and historically discordant coalition of forces composed of clerics-some modernist and others uncompromisingly traditionalist-merchants of the bazaar, intellectuals, and segments of the urban poor and middle classes launched the Constitutional Revolution in hopes of creating a secular democratic polity. By 1979, that same coalition came together to overthrow the shah.

In 1905, secular intellectuals had outmaneuvered the clerics. The 1905 democratic victory was quickly followed by the realization that simply deposing a despot does not beget democracy. Successful democracy requires a society with a complicated web of institutions, social habits of tolerance, and civic responsibility. More than anything else, democracy requires a civil society and a middle class prudent in politics, free from the leveling tendencies of the poor or the oligarchic proclivities of the rich. Although the desire for democracy in Iran was present at the beginning of the twentieth century, the requisite social institutions and habits were sadly wanting. The Pahlavi era, beginning with Reza Shah Pahlavi in 1925, heralded an age that saw rapid establishment of the social institutions and forces necessary for democracy.
Unfortunately, this development occurred under deeply undemocratic circumstances. The new Iranian constitution of 1905 was adapted-indeed translated with some modification-from Belgium, where the king reigns but does not rule. The constitution stipulated an independent bicameral
parliament, an independent judiciary, free elections, and freedom of thought and assembly. With the exception of a few limitations placed on women and non-Muslims, both written into law as a concession to Shiite clerics, the laws were democratic. In reality, however, both Reza Shah and his son, Muhammad Reza Shah, ruled with an iron fist. For nearly the duration of the Pahlavi era, the parliament was simply a dour, drab debating society merely rubber-stamping all royal commands. Freedom of the press and assembly were almost never respected. Political parties, with the exception of the democratic experiment in 1941-1953, were never allowed to thrive and
participate in the political process. The shah's sudden declaration in 1975 that Iran was henceforth to have only one party marked the zenith of these undemocratic practices.

Despite Soviet Cold War propaganda suggesting that the United States wanted to maintain despotism in Iran, there is evidence that for much of the shah's rule, from 1941 to 1979, the United States often tried to convince him that his survival depended on opening up the political system to more democratic participation. The 1953 decision by the Eisenhower administration to participate in a British and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) coup to topple the democratically elected government of Prime Minister Muhammad Mossadeq, as well as the realpolitik years of Richard M. Nixon's presidency, were the only, albeit egregious, systematic exceptions to U.S. whispers of democracy.(4) Ironically, a sudden surge of oil revenues made the shah more independent of the West and of the United States and thus made him more oblivious and at times indignant to these democratic pressures. The Islamic Revolution of 1979 was more than anything else an attempt by the Iranian people, transformed by the shah's far-reaching economic reforms, to demand their political rights.

The current situation in Iran and the regime's alleged strategic stability is comparable to that of the mid-1970s, when British and U.S. embassies and intelligence agencies were resolute in their declarations that the shah's rule was stable and the opposition had been destroyed. The CIA went so far as to claim in 1977 that Iran was not even in a prerevolutionary phase.
Less than two years later, of course, the shah was deposed by the Islamic Revolution.

The regime in Tehran today is tactically stable but has deep strategic vulnerabilities. Its relative stability derives from the failure of the Khatami experiment. When Khatami was chosen as the president in 1997, despite all-out opposition by the conservative clerical hierarchy, there was euphoria in Iran and throughout much of the world. In some of the Western press, he was anointed as the Iranian Gorbachev. It was hoped that he would use his popular mandate to radically change Iran. When a majority of his allies found their way to the Iranian parliament, the Majlis, hope for change was even greater.

Khatami promised a government based on the rule of law in which the private lives of citizens would be immune from the intrusive gaze of the state and where paralegal institutions, from "special courts" to the menacing, chain-wielding, and acid-throwing zealots in the street enforcing "morality codes," would be dismantled. To the youth, he offered the promise of jobs,
and to women, he held out the hope of greater legal parity. To the private sector, he offered the possibility of more governmental support, and finally, to the radical wing of his coalition, who had during the days of Ayatollah Khomeini advocated the elimination of the private sector from "key industries," he offered a more vigorous support of their statist agenda. He hinted at curtailing the power of the "Spiritual Leader" and granting more power to
Iran's elected offices. He also promised, yet failed to deliver, fair and free elections.

Khatami's platform was inherently contradictory and impossible to fulfill. More importantly, he underestimated the guile and ruthless cunning of his clerical opponents. The conservatives used a combination of tactics to transform Khatami from a beacon of hope into an object of ridicule and the epitome of political impotence. They used the judiciary as a tool to imprison or kill opponents, and they used the Guardian Council, a body of clerics and jurists entrusted by the constitution to ensure that all laws abide by Islam's tenets, to derail the reformists' legislative agenda. Furthermore, the Iranian opposition's inability to organize itself effectively into a viable alternative, U.S. problems in Iraq, and $50 per barrel of oil have all allowed the regime to reconsolidate its hold on power and extend its labyrinthine system of patronage and subsidies.

Despite its apparent stability, the Islamic regime is structurally fragile and strategically vulnerable. Millions of Iran's 75 million people rely on direct governmental patronage. Of the
nearly 1,500 companies confiscated by the regime and its newly formed "revolutionary foundations" (bonyads) on the eve of the revolution, almost every one has been losing money and
receiving annual government subsidies. Many have already been sold to "the private sector"-the regime's cronies-in sweetheart deals reminiscent of the Soviet "privatization" fiasco. Furthermore, the regime subsidizes the price of such staples of the daily Iranian diet as bread, sugar, and tea. The exact figure for all of these subsidies remains unknown, but it is certainly to the tune of billions of dollars. The companies that have been losing money had all been highly profitable before the revolution, but in the last two decades, as the result of mismanagement and corruption and the use of company payrolls as a way to "employ" hundreds of thousands of the regime's supporters and musclemen and women, they have become a financial liability for the regime. The new oil bonanza has allowed the regime to underwrite these costly
bribes, but a drop in oil prices will underscore the regime's vulnerability and shake it to its core.

Making the present situation far more volatile, however, is the existence of a seasoned democratic movement that only appears dormant to the untrained eye. Beneath the veneer of calm are millions of unemployed youth. According to a recent report prepared for the government by its own National Youth Organization, 30 percent of young Iranians are now unemployed. With the young demographic structure of the population, the number of the unemployed, according to the same organization, is likely to increase.(5) Furthermore, systemic corruption and economic incompetence; ideological bankruptcy; and, most importantly, the women's movement have
been feeding into a sea of popular discontent. The misogyny of some Islamic laws-allowing girls to be legally married at the "age of puberty," denying women custody of any children over the age of seven, and allowing men to have multiple wives while forcing women to remain in unhappy marriages-makes it impossible for women to achieve parity with men under the current Islamic regime. Can the current regime successfully combat these forces in the long run?

Separating Fact from Fad

In Tehran today, talking about the "China model" as the regime's sole path of salvation is something of a fad. According to this model, the regime will liberalize the economy and improve people's livelihood but keep a tight, monopolist hold on political power. Just as Shakespeare suggested that despots "busy giddy minds with foreign wars," the China model aims to keep giddy
minds busy with business and hopes that this preoccupation keeps people politically inactive, if not altogether uninterested. Of course, the looming threat of a U.S. invasion allows the Iranian regime the luxury of trying to use both war and promised economic welfare to preoccupy its citizens.

Yet, in reality the China model is sure to fail in Iran for a variety of reasons. In the economic realm, China's robust industrial base has allowed it to maintain its prosperity through an impressive export sector. The Iranian economy, meanwhile, has shown a stark inability to export much other than oil and some copper, as well as the traditional staples of caviar, carpets, pistachios, and in recent years a small number of delicacies that are the diaspora's romantic connection to the smells and tastes of home. Furthermore, China has established an equally impressive record of attracting foreign investment, an area in which the Islamic Republic has had a dismal record.

Finally, the China model has in fact already been attempted under Reza Shah (1925-1941) and his son Muhammad Reza Shah (1941-1979) as well as during Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani's presidency (1989-1997), and it failed on each occasion. It failed because people do not live by bread alone. Now, even more than during the Pahlavi era, democracy has become an essential staple of our age. Regardless of how affluent oppressed people become, they will eventually demand their democratic and human rights. Aside from this "natural" tendency to want freedom and democracy, historical evidence suggests that economic affluence in societies often not only leads to greater political demands, but also affords the new affluent classes the political savvy
as well as the social and economic power and leverage to see their demands met. Today, Iran's vibrant civil society, which includes more than 8,000 non-governmental organizations(6) and a staggering 75,000 bloggers, as well as the Iranian diaspora, is licking its Khatami wounds, but it is far from dead or even dying. Sooner or later, that unpredictable moment of political epiphany will come, and the dissatisfied but intimidated populace will realize that the regime has lost its ability to oppress its people violently, as examples inplaces as disparate as Ukraine, Lebanon, Georgia, and Romania have shown in recent years.

At the same time, the recognition that this moment of transition might be near and, more importantly, the hope that sooner or later the promise of U.S. dollars to support the Iranian democratic movement will materialize has led to the recent emergence of opportunist elements claiming to represent the Iranian people. Fanciful stories about alleged support at home for these sometimes fictive groups, stories about their individual (such as those about Ahmed Chalabi) or group influence and networks in Iran, and exaggerated claims about the influence in Iran of newly created diaspora media outlets, have made it more difficult to distinguish true
democrats from political parasites. A simple rule of thumb, however, can distinguish the
two groups. In Iran's current reality, accepting money from the United States or in fact from any foreign government with vested interests in Iran is a kiss of death. Anyone who solicits such funds or claims to be a safe conduit for such funds to "genuine democrats" in Iran is, by definition, not a true democrat.

Another fad, this one in Washington, has been to think about Iran in terms of two ticking alarm clocks: one nuclear and the other democratic. If democracy is not going to ring first, some argue, military action is required to stop the nuclear clock from going off. In reality, the regime has already de facto won the nuclear game, and democracy remains the only hope of solving the Iran nuclear problem. The regime has sought the bomb for the same reason that it does everything: its monomaniacal commitment to self-preservation. If this assessment is correct, then the regime today faces a win-win-win situation. If the West does nothing, the Iranians will almost certainly acquire a nuclear weapon sooner rather than later. If the EU or the United States reaches a negotiated agreement with Iran, experience from the past as well as
the regime's many breaches of its promises and of law shows that they will cheat and build the bomb anyway. If the United States or Israel make surgical attacks, then the regime, due to the clearly predictable surge of nationalism among the people, as well as the inevitable collateral damage and its political consequences, will enhance its political support, entrench its power, and acquire more justification to openly and defiantly develop a bomb in the future.

Ironically, the West collectively and the United States independently have over time strengthened, not weakened, Tehran's clerical regime. Its Achilles' heel has been the internal challenge to its survival posed by the democratic movement. Iran's vast potential for economic growth, squandered by the clerics' corruption, despotism, and adventurism in international relations, has increasingly undermined the regime's legitimacy and added urgency and power to the democratic movement. Philosophically, in the age of democracy and popular sovereignty, the regime's weakness is rooted in its outdated claim to divine legitimacy and its dismissal of popular sovereignty and secular nationalism as Western concoctions.

Although the regime is deeply isolated and is distrusted and despised by the majority, it still enjoys the support of the small portion of the population that has been the chief recipient of its patronage. The regime's greatest strength has been its claim to be the only country in the Middle East standing up to the United States. The nuclear question, particularly the way it
has been spun in Tehran, has permitted the regime to emerge as the champion of Iran's sovereign rights, even in the eyes of many Iranians who despise their leaders. No one-not the Iranian opposition, U.S. government officials or academics, and certainly not the Europeans-has made any effort to establish a dialogue with the Iranian people about its nuclear program. There has been no discussion concerning the potential costs and benefits of a nuclear bomb, nor has it been pointed out that a nuclear Iran means the prolongation of the mullahs' hold on power. It is not at all clear how many Iranians would still support the regime's nuclear quest if it is
made clear to them that such a program would prolong the life of the Islamic regime.(7) As a result of this vacuum, the regime has filled the air with its patently vacuous and inherently contradictory claims of its divine destiny and divine right on one hand and nationalist duty to defend Iran's rights on the other.

Beyond Today 's Bumper-Sticker Policies

The Iranian case demands a nuanced sense of realism bereft of the extremist ideologies that advocate panaceas such as conducting military strikes, tightening the embargo, or accepting the current regime as enduring and stable and engaging with it as the sole solution. To use the embargo as an example, dogmatic advocates of a continued or hardened embargo pay little heed to empirical evidence revealing the heavy costs that the embargo has inflicted both on U.S. companies and the Iranian people, amounting to billions of dollars on each side.(8) They seem to care little that the embargo has benefited European companies, as well as the most corrupt and ruthless elements of the Islamic Republic. The embargo strengthens the regime specifically by enabling it to richly reward its domestic allies, such as right-wing vigilantes, with "import licenses" for embargoed, hard-to-find commodities. The embargo also empowers the bonyads with illicit gains from the same import licenses. The Revolutionary Guards, clearly the regime's most important tool of suppression, have made millions of dollars from importing banned and expensive commodities into their own private ports.

"End the embargo, and you consolidate the regime," Manichean champions of the status quo claim. In reality, end the embargo, and it will reduce the power and privilege of these vigilantes, bonyads, and the Revolutionary Guards. As the regime is dependent on patronage for its survival, limiting their potential avenues would be one more nail in the coffin of an increasingly despised regime. It will also help hundreds of U.S. companies hoping to pursue ventures and sales in Iran, such as Cisco, ready to sell routers to Iran and thus pave the highways and byways of information, and Boeing, which stands to make huge profits from refurbishing Iran's dangerously aging and ailing airline industry.

Ending the embargo will also help further integrate Iran into the global economy, and ample evidence indicates that the more a regime such as Iran is allowed into the global network, the more the legal and economic opacities that nourish such regimes dissipate. Such integration will allow for the emergence of a more vibrant middle class and will strengthen the private sector and civil society. Because this tripartite force is the harbinger of democracy, ending the embargo will directly help the country's often economically strangled democratic movement. The growth of the private sector, now stifled under the heavy weight of the parasitic bonyads, the regime's rampant crony capitalism, and its occasional flirtation with forms of state socialism, is an essential step in strengthening the Iranian democratic movement. It is an adage as old as Aristotle, yet witnessed as recently as the empirical realities of countries such as Taiwan and South Korea, that a middle class and its civil society, as well as the painfully uneven growth of a free market, are a society's best guarantors and promoters of democracy.

Beyond the specific effects of the embargo, policymakers should recognize that the existing Western strategy toward Iran, such as it is, has failed. It is neither weakening the regime nor facilitating democracy; it has not curbed its nuclear weapons program nor undermined its support for terrorism. One reason for this failure is the fact that there has been no coherent and unified Western strategy. Even more importantly, under the existing conditions, there can arguably never be such a unified policy. U.S. policymakers should finally recognize, as the mullahs long have, that the United States and the EU, including the United Kingdom, do not share the same interests and goals when it comes to Iran. The status quo and the embargo have been an economic and diplomatic bonanza for the Europeans. They have kept the U.S. embassy and U.S. companies out of Iran, allowing the Europeans to play the role of an intermediary in the realm of diplomacy and affording them a lucrative monopolist position in Iran's economy.

Some have argued that France, Germany, and the United Kingdom are playing the role of a good cop, offering incentives to Iran, while the United States looms in the background as the bad cop, threatening Iran if it does not reach a deal with the Europeans. This strategy's supporters seem to overlook basic police interrogation techniques. For the game to work, the
two cops must both be working for the same goal in close cooperation with each other. The suspect must also be in the dark about the nature of the game being played. Otherwise, he or she will turn the game on its head and use it to his or her advantage. In the current international version of this game, the fact that Iran clearly knows that the EU and the United States do not share the same interests has allowed the regime to use tensions between the skeptical partners to its own interest. The regime often boasts to its supporters that it has succeeded in playing Europe against the United States, diplomatically isolating Washington.

Europe's profitable monopoly has not been without its price. One political consequence has been that the Iranian people have come to despise what they see as Europe's wanton greed and willingness to overlook startling breaches of human rights in favor of an oil deal or a rich licensing agreement. The United States, conversely, has gained the good will and respect of
the vast majority of the Iranian people, particularly the youth, as the only country in the world willing to stand up to the mullahs. The August 1953 syndrome-the condemnation of the United States for its role in overthrowing the popular Mossadeq government-seems to be gradually retreating from the nation's active memory. The only threat to this valuable political trend is a U.S. foreign policy that seems to betray the democratic movement and afford legitimacy to the current regime.

Supporting the Democratic Movement in Iran

Increasingly, the continuation of the status quo in U.S. policy on Iran is no longer a tenable option. A small example of the incidental cost of maintaining it can be seen in the field of education. British and Canadian universities have been reaping a harvest of cash and brilliant students as the result of the visa difficulties faced by Iranian students hoping to study in the United States. British universities from Oxford to Durham have been granting a surprisingly large number of doctorates to Iranian Revolutionary Guards and children of the clerical elite. Canada too has sustained some of its most troubled and isolated universities through the enrollment of thousands of highly qualified and motivated Iranian students. According to a recent survey by an Iranian government agency, a stunning 45 percent of Iranian youth indicate that, given a chance, they would leave Iran for a life of exile.(9) It is reasonable to assume that the United States is the destination of choice for nearly every Iranian student wishing to study abroad, and every student who studies in the United States and returns to Iran is a potential Trojan horse of democracy.

The Iranian clerics came to power relatively recently by masterminding a political heist and usurping absolutist power in the midst of a democratic revolution. They know from experience how easily a small error can gain revolutionary momentum overnight and are unlikely to open their citadel to gift-bearing Americans. Consequently, the new U.S. strategy must be built with small, innocuous jigsaw pieces that can and will coalesce into an organic and democratic whole at some unpredictable moment. Every Iranian youth who studies at a U.S. university and every Iranian scholar who attends a conference, every U.S. scholar or intellectual who visits Iran, and every genuine political activist who manages to visit the United States, as well as every successful member of the Iranian diaspora who travels home, is a piece of that Trojan horse puzzle. It is folly to try to predict the exact moment when the pieces will coalesce into a whole. Taking the chimera of the status quo's calm as an indication of the regime's strategic stability is similarly unwise. The new U.S. strategy toward Iran must therefore focus on fostering an atmosphere that will be most conducive to the success of the country's democratic movement by including at least seven important actions.

First, the United States should end the embargo and replace it with smart sanctions on the regime, its foundations, and its leaders. Many leading Iranian clerics and their families have a vast network of investments, usually from illicit gains in Iran or from oil, arms, and other "commissions" abroad. Nevertheless, these leaders, many of them responsible for killing and torturing Iranian citizens, travel and trade freely around the world. Europeans, obviously well informed about these illegal activities, cannot be expected to enforce sanctions or bring charges against the very officials with whom they do business. It is difficult to imagine that the U.S. intelligence agencies do not have detailed information about the financial shenanigans of these leaders. This information should be made public. It is even more difficult to comprehend how these leaders travel freely around the world while their opponents, Iran's genuine democrats, face all manner of difficulty in coming to the United States. This balance must be reversed. Just as in the days of the Soviet Union, when democratic activists and exiled opponents of the regime were afforded special treatment and access to the United States, Iranian democrats should be granted equally easy access.

Second, the United States must declare in words and show in deeds that, in spite of any changes in its economic or diplomatic ties with the Iranian regime, it is always on the side of the Iranian people and their democratic efforts. A no-less-important part of such a declaration should be a commitment to respect the independence and autonomy of the movement, reiterating the U.S. government's dedication to the idea that the future of Iran will and should be determined by the people of Iran themselves. A necessary corollary of these democratic principles must be to announce clearly that the United States will neither anoint any group or person as the future leader of Iran, nor cooperate with or use as surrogates any group that has been involved in terrorism in the past or was a ward of terrorist regimes such as that of Saddam Hussein.

Third, as a necessary consequence of the above principles, the United States should also declare that it will not provide cash assistance to any Iranian media outlet or opposition group inside or outside of Iran. At the same time, it should offer technological support to all democratic forces who want to broadcast to the Iranian people, insisting on transparency in all such aid and assistance. This will dissuade corrupt and opportunist elements from banking on dangled U.S. dollars and will also free genuine democratic forces from the taunts and taints of a regime that labels all of its opponents as U.S. lackeys. According to current estimates, there are now six million satellite dishes in Iran, giving somewhere between 15 million and 20 million people access to diaspora broadcasts. Yet, Iran has a population of 75 million. Furthermore, the majority of those who now have access to satellite dishes are members of the middle and upper classes, as well as small segments of the urban lower classes, and most are probably already staunch foes of the regime.(10) Talking to them is preaching to the converted. Satellite broadcasts need to reach the 50 million who are now electronically disenfranchised. Only broadcasts through short and medium wave can ensure democratic access to all strata of the Iranian people, and the U.S. government can volunteer to facilitate this access free of charge.

Fourth, a concomitant part of this plan can and indeed must be a commitment to a transparently funded, independent, and autonomous radio and television program broadcast to Iran, dedicated to the cause of democracy and human rights and universally accessible. As recent studies of the experience of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty in Eastern Europe have shown, such broadcasts played an important role in the evolution of the democratic movements in this region. Vaclev Havel called such broadcasts as "important as the sun itself."(11) The tactical, strategic, and organizational lessons of recent transitions to democracy need to be shared with the Iranian people, and an independent media outlet can be the conduit for their transmission.

Fifth, current U.S. laws have placed draconian limits on the ability of Iranian artists, intellectuals, and activists-for a time evenNobel laureate Shirin Ebadi-to gainfully publish their works in the United States. Not only must these laws be immediately rescinded, but the United States must then help enable democratic activists in Iran to publish their works in English as well as the translation of great works on democracy into Persian. Prior to the Islamic Revolution, the Franklin Publishing House in Iran worked toward making great works of
world literature and social theory available to Iranians. The need is even greater now for such attempts at cross- cultural democratic pollination. Sixth, the United States should make goodwill gestures to the Iranian people that will further disarm the regime's propaganda about the U.S. "crusade" against Islam in Iran and throughout the rest of the Muslim world. Public diplomacy can be better accomplished with deeds rather than mere words. Just as humanitarian aid in the aftermath of the tsunami seems to have improved the U.S. image in Indonesia, so too in Iran will simple, cost-efficient, humanitarian gestures go a long way toward neutralizing the venom of Islamist propaganda jihad.

For example, the cities of Tehran and Kerman, with populations of about 12 million and one million, respectively, sit on two of the world's most dangerous fault lines; seismologists have predicted that earthquakes will eventually shake both of these cities. It is estimated that there will be almost two million casualties in Tehran alone. The United States should immediately lift all limits on the export of technologies and equipment necessary to help predict earthquakes. It can also announce that it will donate to Iran a few earthquake prediction centers. The actual cost to the United States would be no more than $10 million for each of these centers, but the public relations impact would be enormous. Goodwill gestures, such as the decision of the U.S. government to send aid to Iran after the December 2003 Bam
earthquake, must be taken and, if legally possible, implemented unilaterally without expecting a response in kind. Even if the unilateral gesture is rejected by the regime, as the post-Bam earthquake assistance was, it will further enhance U.S. prestige and undermine the regime's anti-U.S. rhetoric.

Seventh, the United States must use its influence in international organizations to bring pressure on the regime when it clearly abuses the human and democratic rights of the Iranian people. Unfortunately, the EU's silence in the face of last February 's parliamentary coup by the conservatives is likely to embolden them in the upcoming elections. The regime understands
power well, and it must be made aware that the Iranian people are not alone in their fight, that international organizations are ready to come to their aid.

Individually, these seven pillars seem insignificant, but together they can go a long way in shaping a strategy that can serve both the national interests of the United States as well as the will of the Iranian people. For Iran, democracy is no longer just a political ideal, but a sheer economic necessity. Only a democratic Iran can attract the requisite investments needed to solve Iran's endemic unemployment problems. For the United States, particularly during the second Bush administration, it has become the avowed centerpiece of U.S. policy in the Middle East. Ultimately, a successful U.S. strategy must assist the democratic movement and have the patience for the Tehran regime to collapse under its own inconsistencies. Internationally,
part of the regime's raison d'etre and legitimacy in the eyes of its Hizballah flanks rests in its commitment to anti-Americanism. At the same time, in obvious contradiction to its self-ascribed anti-U.S. role, Tehran increasingly seeks a security guarantee or promise that the United States will not seek to overthrow the regime. It also wants and needs U.S. approval for the flow of capital desperately needed to solve Iran's economic woes.

In this sense, Iran and the United States are both in a dilemma. The U.S. government wants to engage without strengthening the regime. The Islamic Republic, on the other hand, wants to achieve its goals without forfeiting its claim to be the sole Muslim country standing up to the world's superpower. The delicacy of the current U.S. position lies precisely in the fact that
Washington must, with deft and calculated magnanimity, allow the regime to accomplish its inherently contradictory goals while wagering that the inconsistency in the Islamic Republic's position will open a gate for the Trojan horse of democracy to pass through.

Notes
1. For a discussion of nuclear "roll backs" in history and their political and social con-
text, see Ariel Levite, "Never Say Never Again," International Security 27, no. 3
(Winter 2002-03): 59-88.

2. Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Avon Books, 1993).

3. See Abbas Milani, Lost Wisdom: Rethinking Modernity in Iran (Washington, D.C.: Mage Publishers, 2004).

4. See Abbas Milani, The Persian Sphinx: Amir Abbas Hoveyda and the Riddle of the Islamic Revolution (Washington, D.C: Mage Publishers, 2001); Abbas Milani, "Hurley's Dream," Hoover Digest, no. 3 (Summer 2003): 144-152; Abbas Milani, Peacock Prince (Palgrave, forthcoming 2006).

5. National Youth Organization, "Sanade Sazmani-ye, Eshteghale Javanan" (Plan for Future Employment of the Youth), March 2005 [22 Esfand 1383].

6. The Ministry of Interior, which is in charge of issuing permits for these NGOs, has claimed that Iran has about 50,000 organizations, including 2,000 for youths and 800 for women. Others have put the figure much lower, at around 8,000. For the official report, see Ashraf Boroujerdi, Report to the Cabinet, March 2005.

7. See Shahram Chubin and Robert S. Litwak, "Debating Iran's Nuclear Aspirations," The Washington Quarterly 26, no. 4 (Autumn 2003): 99-114.

8. For an extensive review of the impact of the embargo, see Hossein Alikhani, Sanctioning Iran: Anatomy of a Failed Policy (London: I. B. Tauris, 2000). The Iranian Studies Group at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, organized by Muhammad Hafezi, has also been conducting an ongoing project on the economic costs of the embargo. Their initial findings were reported to a conference on the future of Iran, organized at Stanford University in November 2004.

9. National Youth Organization, "Sanade Sazmani-ye, Eshteghale Javanan," pp. 1-3.

10. Alireza Maybodi, interview with author, March 29, 2005 (television talk show host).

11. Havel made the statement in a message sent to the Conference on Cold War Broadcasting Impact, held at the Hoover Institution in October 2004. Several of the papers at the conference were detailed accounts of the degree of influence and audience share of the radio programs sponsored by the U.S. government. For example, see R. Eugene Parta, "A Preliminary Empirical Assessment of the Roles of Radio Liberty and Western Broadcasting to the USSR During the Cold War" (presentation, Conference on Cold War Broadcasting Impact, Palo Alto, Calif., October 13-15, 2004).

Russia may push forward with S-300 sales to Iran

2008-09-01T17:30:00.000-07:00

RIA Novosti, 01/09/08

MOSCOW - Russia may proceed with plans to sell advanced S-300 air defense systems to Iran under a secret contract believed to have been signed in 2005, a Russian analyst said on Monday.

Commenting on an article in the Sunday Telegraph newspaper saying Russia is using the plans as a bargaining chip in its standoff with America, Ruslan Pukhov, director of Moscow-based Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, said: "In the current situation, when the U.S. and the West in general are stubbornly gearing toward a confrontation with Russia after the events in South Ossetia, the implementation of a lucrative contract on the deliveries of S-300 [air defense systems] to Iran looks like a logical step."

The U.S. and Israel were alarmed by media reports, which started circulating as early as 2005, on the possible delivery of S-300 surface-to-air missiles to Iran, as these systems could greatly improve Iranian defenses against any air strike on its strategically important sites, including nuclear facilities.

The advanced version of the S-300 missile system, called S-300PMU1 (SA-20 Gargoyle), has a range of over 150 kilometers (over 100 miles) and can intercept ballistic missiles and aircraft at low and high altitudes, making the system an effective tool for warding off possible air strikes.

The issue was again raised in December last year when Iranian Defense Minister Mostafa Mohammad Najjar said Russia had agreed to deliver to Iran an unspecified number of advanced S-300 air defense complexes under a previously signed contract.

However, Russia's Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation said the issue of the delivery of S-300 air defense missile systems to Iran was not a subject of current or past negotiations.

Israeli defense sources, however, said in July that Iran was expected to take delivery of Russian S-300 air defense systems by the end of 2008.

Pukhov said: "This may be true. While Russia and the West were on good terms, the contract could have been 'frozen' for the time being. But now may be the perfect time to move forward with the fulfillment of the S-300 contract."

According to the Russian analyst, S-300 missiles and previously delivered Tor-M1 missiles would help Iran build a strong network of long- and medium-range 'defensive rings' to thwart any attempts to destroy key nuclear facilities in the country.

Moscow supplied Iran with 29 Tor-M1 air defense missile systems in late January under a $700-million contract signed in late 2005. Russia has also trained Iranian Tor-M1 specialists, including radar operators and crew commanders.

"Anyone attempting to threaten Iran with aerial bombardment would have to consider the possibility of strong and effective resistance," the expert said.

Meanwhile, Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Hassan Qashqavi denied on Monday reports that Tehran had bought S-300 air defense systems from Russia.

"Our missile and technical capability completely depends on the efforts of Iranian scientists," he said.

UAE complains to UN against Iranian occupation of Persian Gulf islands

2008-08-31T20:16:00.000-07:00

RTTNews, 31/08/08

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has filed a complaint to the United Nations against Iran for establishing facilities on disputed Persian Gulf islands, reports said.

The official Emirates news agency reported that the UAE government has sent a letter to UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon in protest against the Iranian move, blaming that it would negatively affect bilateral relations.

The islands of Abu Musa, Smaller Tunb, and Greater Tunb, located near key shipping lanes in the Gulf, are controlled by Iran but claimed by the UAE.

UAE claimed that Iran was continuing to 'violate' an agreement signed between the two sides in 1971 over the ownership of the islands.

Iran has been maintaining the position that its ownership of the islands is indisputable.

Quoting a recent Iranian TV report, UAE alleged that Tehran has established a maritime rescue office and an office for the registration of ships and sailors on the island of Abu Musa.

The letter of complaint, delivered by the UAE Charge d'affaires Anwar Othman Al-Barout Thursday, describes Iran's action as 'illegal' and a blatant violation of the 1971 Memorandum of Understanding.

UAE urged Iran to "nullify any measures already taken and remove any facilities established on the island."

Israel planning unilateral Iran attack

2008-08-31T18:30:00.000-07:00

Press TV, 31/08/08

An Israeli government committee is preparing a contingency plan to attack Iran, should diplomatic efforts fail to derail Iran's nuclear program, Israel's daily Ma'ariv reports.

Ephraim Sneh, an Israeli Labor Party lawmaker, has sent an eight-point document to both US presidential candidates, saying "There is no government in Jerusalem that would ever reconcile itself to a nuclear Iran."

"When it is clear Iran is on the verge of acquiring nuclear weapons, an Israeli military strike to prevent this will be seriously considered," the document says.

Sneh has suggested that the opportunity to find a non-military solution to halt Iran's nuclear program will cease within 18 to 24 months.

Israel which is the only possessor of a nuclear arsenal in the Middle East region and has not yet joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

MGH/HAR

Iranian conservative attacks president on economy

2008-08-31T17:49:00.000-07:00

Top Iranian conservative takes Ahmadinejad to task over economic policies

By Ali Akbar Dareini
AP, 31/08/08

A top conservative cleric close to Iran's supreme leader criticized the economic policies of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, saying they threaten to keep Iran from its goal of becoming a regional superpower by 2025.

The remarks by Ali Akbar Nateq Nouri, published Sunday, came just a week after supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei strongly backed Ahmadinejad, praising him for "standing up" to the West and urging him to plan for a second four-year term.

But Nateq Nouri, a confidant of Khamenei, said the strong support didn't mean the president was immune from criticism. And, according to his comments at a banking conference, Iran's economy is faltering.

Ahmadinejad was elected in 2005 on a populist agenda promising to bring oil revenues to every family, eradicate poverty and tackle unemployment. In recent months, he has faced increasingly fierce criticism for his failure to meet those promises.

He is being challenged not only by reformers but by the same conservatives who paved the way for his stunning victory in 2005 presidential elections. Even conservatives say Ahmadinejad has concentrated too much on fiery, anti-U.S. speeches and not enough on the economy-and they have become more aggressive in calling him to account.

Three years ago, Iran embarked on a 20-year plan to become a regional superpower and a leader in technological and economic know-how. In particular, the plan is focused on development in nuclear technology, industry and education.

"Goals of the 20-year plan won't materialize under the present policies unless executive officials really change (their) views," newspapers quoted Nateq Nouri as saying in a banking conference in Tehran.

Under the Iranian constitution, the government is required to move toward privatization but Nateq Nouri said institutions affiliated with the government, not the private sector, were being awarded shares in the "privatized" firms.

"We see that assets are transferred from an open to a shadow government," he said.

Earlier this month, the still-powerful former president, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, blamed Ahmadinejad for gas shortages in winter and power cuts during summer.

Dozens of people froze to death last winter in Iran because of natural gas cuts that left them without heat. Summertime electricity blackouts also spoiled food, hurt businesses and disrupted air conditioning at a time when temperatures reach an average of 113 degrees during the day.

Nateq Nouri also said the government plan of injecting liquidity into the society in the hope of creating jobs has backfired.

"Injecting liquidity won't create jobs," he said.

US fears Russia will sell Iran S-300s

2008-08-31T17:47:00.000-07:00

By Adam Gonn
Jerusalem Post, 31/08/08

US intelligence says escalating tensions between Washington and Moscow could prompt Russia to sell the sophisticated S-300 system to Iran.

"If Tehran obtained the S-300, it would be a game-changer in military thinking for tackling Iran. That could be a catalyst for Israeli air attacks before it is operational," said Dan Goure, a long-time Pentagon advisor.

"This is a system that scares every Western air force," he said.

Israeli officials have said that the system would complicate a potential attack on Iran's 'numerous, distant, and fortified' nuclear sites.

Tel Aviv has threatened to launch air strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities under the pretext that Tehran, a signatory to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), has plans to develop nuclear weapons.

This is while the UN nuclear watchdog has confirmed that Iran enriches uranium-235 to a level of 3.7 percent - a rate consistent with the construction of a nuclear power plant. Nuclear arms production requires an enrichment level of above 90 percent.

Iran announced last December that it had ordered an unspecified number of Russian-made anti-aircraft S-300 systems, which can simultaneously track 100 targets and fire on planes 75 miles (120 km) away.

The installation of the S-300 systems could further enhance Iran's defensive capabilities to counter any potential aerial attacks on its nuclear sites.

The Sunday Telegraph reported that senior US intelligence operatives believe the Kremlin could use the S-300 system to create a new foreign policy showdown with the White House in response to US interference in the Caucasus.

Tensions between Russia and the US have been mounting after Georgia's military offensive into South Ossetia in early August to reclaim the de-facto region prompted Russia to send its troops into the area.

Washington supported Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili's government and condemned the Russian initiative to defend South Ossetians.

"Back Georgia and Ukraine for NATO membership and you'll see the S-300 to Iran. It is a very powerful bargaining chip and a major deterrent to US actions in the region. Moscow is playing very strategically on America's obsession with Iran," said George Friedman, the director of Stratfor, a leading US private intelligence agency.

He added that once the S-300 is operational in Iran, it would effectively rule out Israeli air raids and seriously complicate any US aerial bombings.

CS/MD/HGH

Russia's nuclear chief cancels visit to Tehran

2008-08-31T17:46:00.000-07:00

Monsters and Critics.com, 31/08/08

Tehran-Russia's nuclear power chief cancelled a Sunday visit to Tehran that was planned to prepare the nuclear fuel operation of the joint Bushehr power plant in southern Iran, ISNA news agency reported.

An official source told ISNA that Sergei Kiriyenko will instead meet his Iranian counterpart Gholam-Reza Aqazadeh next month in Vienna.

No reason was given for the cancellation of the visit.

There have been reports that Russia might use the dispute over Iran's nuclear programmes-vetoing further sanctions against Tehran-as a pressure tool against the West in the current tensions over Georgia.

Instead of Kiriyenko, a delegation from the Russian nuclear power construction company Atomstroyexport will come to Tehran on Sunday to discuss the Bushehr nuclear power plant and also visit the site itself, ISNA said.

Russia finished delivery of 82 tons of low-enriched uranium for the plant's light-water reactor in January, and Kiriyenko said in June that nuclear fuel operations would start this year.

Aqazadeh said the Russian side was committed to launching the Bushehr plant as scheduled.

The 1-billion-dollar joint project was originally supposed to be completed at the beginning of the millennium but has been delayed at least five times for various reasons.

Iran warns any attack would start 'world war'

2008-08-30T17:36:00.000-07:00

AFP, 30/08/08

A senior Iranian military commander has warned that any US or Israeli attack on the Islamic republic would start a new world war, the state news agency IRNA reported on Saturday.

"Any aggression against Iran will start a world war," deputy chief of staff for defence publicity, Brigadier General Masoud Jazayeri, said in a statement carried by the agency.

Iran is under international pressure to halt uranium enrichment, a process which lies at the core of fears about Iran's nuclear programme as it can make nuclear fuel as well as the fissile core of an atom bomb.

"The unrestrained greed of the US leadership and global Zionism... is gradually leading the world to the edge of a precipice," Jazayeri said, citing the unrest in Afghanistan, Iraq, Sudan and Georgia.

"It is evident that if such a challenge occurs, the fake and artificial regimes will be eliminated before anything," he said, without naming any countries.

Iran does not recognise Israel, which is often described by officials in Tehran as a "fake regime."

The United States and its staunch ally Israel, the region's sole if undeclared nuclear armed nation, accuse Iran of seeking atomic weapons under the guise of a civilian nuclear programme.

Iran has vehemently denied the allegations, insisting its nuclear drive is aimed solely at providing electricity for a growing population when its reserves of fossil fuels run out.

The United States has never ruled out military action against Iran over its defiance of international demands for an enrichment freeze, but so far is pursuing the diplomatic route with calls for more sanctions.

Iran has repeatedly vowed a crushing response to any attacks and it has flexed military muscles in recent years by holding war games and showing off an array of home-grown weaponry and missiles.

Another top military commander said Iran was prepared to "take the enemies off-guard" and would unveil more weapons in case of an attack.

"Some of the equipment of our armed forces have been announced but there are important things hidden whose effect would be shown on the day (of any attack)," deputy army commander Abdolrahim Mousavi told Fars news agency.

During war games in July which provoked international concern, aides to the supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei warned that Iran would target US bases and US ships in the Gulf as well as Israel if it was attacked.

Iran also test-fired its Shahab-3 missile which it says puts Israel within range.

Iran is under three sets of UN Security Council sanctions over its refusal to freeze enrichment and risks further sanctions for failing to give a clear response to an incentives package offered by six world powers in return for a halt to the sensitive work.

Iranian officials have repeatedly said they have no intention of freezing enrichment and that the country is currently operating about 4,000 uranium enrichment centrifuges and installing several thousand more.

Dutch pull spies on Iran attack fears

2008-08-30T17:28:00.000-07:00

Press TV, 30/08/08

The Dutch AIVD secret service has had an ultra-secret operation underway in Iran in recent years that was halted in connection with plans for a US attack on Iran.

The respected newspaper De Telegraaf reported Friday the "ultra-secret operation" had as its aim infiltration and sabotage of the weapons industry in the Islamic Republic.

"The operation, described as extremely successful, was halted recently in connection with plans for an impending US air attack on Iran. Along with this, targets would also be bombed which were connected with the Dutch espionage action," writes the Netherlands' biggest newspaper.

"One of the agents involved, who was able to infiltrate the Iranian industry under the supervision of the AIVD, was recently recalled because the US was thought to be making a decision within weeks to attack Iran with unmanned aircraft.

Among the potential targets were said to be not only nuclear plants, but also military installations that have been brought to light partly by the agency of the AIVD," according to the newspaper.

"Information from the AIVD operation has in recent years been shared with the American CIA secret service," the paper continued. "Various supplies could also be sabotaged and stopped. These were parts for missiles and launching equipment."

The article was written by Joost de Haas, known for his good contacts in the intelligence world. Earlier, he got hold of an AIVD report which suggested that corrupt powers within Dutch police corps supplied weapons to criminals to liquidate other criminals.

(MGH/WY/HAR)

Medvedev, Ahmadinejad hold first personal meeting

2008-08-28T20:16:00.000-07:00

ITAR TASS, 28/08/08

DUSHANBE - Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and his Iranian counterpart Mahmoud Ahmadinejad at their first personal meeting have discussed the recent world developments and their consequences. The Iranian president stated at the talks that he wanted to meet the Russian colleague "more often and often."

"Certain events have recently taken place in the world," Medvedev said opening the meeting. "Lets talks about the consequences of these developments," the Russian president suggested.

The Russian leader also offered a conversation on the bilateral relations’ problems. "We will be able to talk on a wide range of issues," Medvedev is certain.

Ahmadinejad expressed satisfaction that he has an opportunity to discuss with Medvedev the bilateral relations, regional policy and the international security issues as well. "There are major problems in all the three spheres that should be discussed," he stated.

Noting that he had met Medvedev for the first time in person Ahmadinejad stated that he hoped for frequent contacts with the Russian head of state. "I’m sure that we need to meet more often and often in connection with the recent developments," said the Iranian president.

Iran and the United States: The Emerging Security Paradigm in the Middle East

2008-08-28T18:23:00.000-07:00

By Gawdat Bahgat
Parameters, Summer 2007, pp. 5-18.

When this decade began Iran was flanked by two sworn enemies: the Taliban regime in Afghanistan on the east and Saddam Hussein in Iraq on the west. The Taliban received substantial support from Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, and Iraq was believed to have weapons of mass destruction. The 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war resulted in more than a million casualties, ended with no peace treaty, and left major territorial disputes unresolved. On the other side, a war between Iran and the Taliban was averted in 1998 following the Taliban’s killing of eight Iranian diplomats and a journalist.

Since then, the regional security landscape and Tehran’s security outlook have dramatically changed. A few weeks after the 11 September terrorist attacks on the United States, an American-led international coalition invaded Afghanistan and overthrew the Taliban. Less than two years later, in March 2003, another US-led international coalition toppled Saddam Hussein’s regime. The removal of these two regimes and the deployment of American troops in both countries were perceived in Tehran as a "mixed blessing." Iranian officials became concerned that their country would be America’s next target for "regime change" in the Middle East. Feeling vulnerable, Iranian leaders signaled their willingness to conduct talks with the United States on a number of issues, including their nuclear program and support for the terrorist organizations, Hezbollah and Hamas.

However, the international coalitions’ failure to decisively defeat the insurgent threats and establish stable governments in Afghanistan and Iraq has altered regional security dynamics. As a result, the likelihood of another US-led international military confrontation with Iran has been substantially reduced. The continued fighting in Afghanistan and Iraq and the lack of any clear exit strategy have empowered Iran and given it much needed "breathing space." Indeed, Iran feels stronger now than it has in decades. As Martin Indyk, a former US Ambassador to Israel, argues, "After a decade of being on the defensive, the regime in Tehran now feels that its moment has arrived."1 Consequently, the Iranians have been more aggressive asserting their claim for regional leadership. This includes an ambitious nuclear program.

This "Iranian moment" has been further reinforced by developments in Israel and Lebanon. Hamas won a free election in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and formed a Palestinian government that has refused to recognize Israel and the framework for peace endorsed by the United States and other moderate Arab states. In Lebanon, Hezbollah, another ally of Iran, survived a 34-day war with Israel that expanded its popularity throughout the entire Arab world.

Despite this favorable strategic environment, Iran feels it is vulnerable to international pressure and looks for support from its Arab neighbors to consolidate its status as a rising regional and international power. However, as analyst Shahram Chubin asserts, "As a non-Arab Shiite state, Iran lacks a natural constituency."2 Furthermore, Iran and the majority of its Arab neighbors hold opposing views on matters related to regional security. While Tehran considers the United States a key factor influencing instability, its Arab neighbors see Washington as the foremost element in their defense posture. Iran has repeatedly called for a regional security system based on the active contribution of regional states and free from foreign influence. Concerned about Iran’s rising power, neighboring Arab states have shown little interest in such proposals.

The argument in this article is twofold. Iran is a crucial player not only in the Middle East, but more broadly in west Asia and the international arena. It can be a critical factor in shaping the future of Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, and the Arab-Israeli conflict. In order to solidify recent strategic gains, Iran needs to reach some accommodation with major Western powers. Likewise, the United States and Europe need to constructively engage Iran in an effort to foster greater political stability and contain the violence inherent in the Middle East and west Asia.

Iran’s National Security Strategy

Despite extreme ideological rhetoric, Iran’s regional-strategic goals are not all that different from those of other states in the Middle East. Iran seeks to expand its economic and cultural ties with neighboring states (except Israel), enlarge its sphere of influence, promote regional stability, and resist US military and political presence and policies. Iran’s regional policy has two important characteristics. The first being that since the end of the war with Iraq in 1988, Iranian foreign policy in general and regional relations in particular, have been driven more by pragmatic national interests and less by ideological concerns. Former President Mohammad Khatami worked very hard to re-establish close and friendly relations with many regional and global powers.

The second characteristic influencing regional policies is the fact that several centers of power have taken active roles in the design and execution of Iranian foreign and military policy. In many ways, the Iranian regime "reflects a constant jockeying for influence between different interest groups, personalities and institutions."3 Major foreign policy and military decisions are made by the Supreme National Security Council. Within this context, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s power is limited by the leverage of other members in the political and religious hierarchies. Shortly after Ahmadinejad’s election in 2005, the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, granted the Expediency Council, led by former President Ali Rafsanjani, supervisory power over the Iranian government.4 In June 2006 Khamenei created a new Strategic Council for Foreign Relations (SCFR). Kamal Kharazi, who served as foreign minister from 1997-2005, heads the council. Other members include Ali Akbar Velayati, who preceded Kharazi as foreign minister and Ali Shamkhani, who served as defense minister from 1997-2005. The SCFR is seen as an attempt to balance the brash and inexperienced foreign affairs apparatus of President Ahmadinejad with the more measured input of elder statesmen.5

This jockeying for influence between competing factions within the political and religious establishments is further complicated by a number of restraints placed on the nation’s military. With 545,000 people in military service, Iran has the largest army in the Middle East, larger than all other Persian Gulf countries (Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates) combined.6 However, Iran has not been allowed to buy Western weapon systems since the 1979 Islamic Revolution. In response to these sanctions, Iran has pursued four overlapping strategies:

• Create a clandestine network of suppliers for its remaining Western weapon systems.
• Switch to non-Western sources, particularly Russia and China.
• Develop an indigenous military industry.
• Rely on missiles to overcome any weakness in conventional capability.

Anoushiravan Ehteshami, a RAND author, argues that in net terms the Iranian military "has never recovered from the cost of the revolution to its prowess and resources. Nor indeed has the Iranian military fully recovered from the eight-year long war with Iraq and the twenty plus years of military sanctions imposed on the country by the West."7 With the exception of Iraq, most Arab states face little or no restraint on the purchase of the most advanced Western military technology.

In an effort to overcome its growing deficit in conventional military capability, Iran has invested heavily in an indigenous missile program. In the last few years, Iran has successfully completed several missile launches. These include an underwater missile named the Hoot (whale), a land-to-sea missile (Kowsar), and the most publicized Shehab-3 (shooting star), with a range of 1,300 miles.8 In November 2004, Iran’s Defense Minister, Ali Shamkhani, said that Iran was able to "mass produce the Shehab-3 missile."9 A few months later, he announced that Iran had successfully tested a new solid fuel motor for its arsenal of medium-range ballistic missiles.10 This particular technological breakthrough has the capability of making Iran’s missiles much more mobile and easier to deploy.

Despite this ambitious military build-up, Iranian officials emphasize that their country does not make any claim on the territory of its neighbors. They also remind possible opponents that Iran has not initiated a regional conflict for more than 200 years.11 Iran’s rivals are nevertheless suspicious of these claims and of the Islamic Republic’s intentions. This suspicion has focused on Tehran’s nuclear ambitions since the early 2000s.

The prospect of an Iran armed with nuclear weapons has been a major concern for both regional and international powers.12 The United States and several European nations have accused Iran of seeking a nuclear-weapons capability. Iran categorically denies these accusations and says its nuclear program is only for domestic purposes. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has been vigorously investigating Iran’s nuclear program for a number of years. The IAEA Board of Governors has issued several statements underscoring two critical points. First, Iran’s nuclear activities have not been completely in keeping with its commitments to the Non-proliferation Treaty. Second, despite these violations and some serious irregularities, the IAEA has not been able to find evidence that Iran seeks to develop nuclear weapons. No "smoking gun" has yet been found.

Four characteristics of Iran’s nuclear program deserve highlighting. First, Iran’s desire for some form of nuclear development is rooted in its tumultuous history. Most Iranians perceive their nation as a great civilization that has been deprived of its "rightful" status as a regional superpower by foreign intervention. Accordingly, developing an indigenous nuclear capability would go a long way in restoring a sense of pride, respect, and regional leadership. Second, Dr. Javad Zarif, the Iranian Ambassador to the United Nations, and other top officials point out that their country is "party to all international agreements on the control of weapons of mass destruction."13 These include the Non-proliferation Treaty, Chemical Weapons Convention, Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Third, a number of military analysts and policymakers are extremely doubtful that Iran fully complies with these treaties. John Chipman, director-general of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, concludes that "an Iranian nuclear capacity is both almost inevitable, and certainly bad."14 Finally, there is concern about Iran’s nuclear capability based on perceptions of the Iranian regime, what Dr. Peter Lavoy, Director for Counterproliferation Policy, Office of the Secretary of Defense, calls "political relativists."

Political relativists point to a country’s system of governance, its political ideology, and its strategic culture as the surest indicators of its likely conduct as a nuclear power.15 Specifically, there are concerns that a nuclear-Iran would intimidate its neighbors; challenge a US-based regional security system; and possibly lead to the transfer of nuclear weapons to terrorist organizations. These concerns will be discussed in some detail in the following sections.

Arab Reaction to Emerging Strategic Parameters

For decades US policy in the Persian Gulf sought to balance Iran and Iraq against one another. The two states had traditionally been stronger than the other six gulf monarchies that share this oil-rich region. The removal of Saddam Hussein and failure to restore political and military stability in Iraq has opened the door for Iran to aggressively pursue its claim of regional leadership. The United States anticipated that the rivalry between Iraqi and Iranian Shias would be more intense than that between Iraqi Shias and Sunnis. However, developments in Iraq since 2003 seem to prove these expectations wrong. The rise of sectarian strife has gradually eroded the hoped-for sense of nationalism and has, in fact, reinforced sectarian identity. Thus, the sectarian violence in Iraq is driving Iran and the Iraqi Shias closer, while Iraqi Sunnis and Arabs are allying.

Since the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime and the end of Arab-Sunni domination in Iraq, Iran has wasted little time in building a broad infrastructure of influence. Tehran maintains close relations with major Iraqi-Shia political parties and their leadership, particularly the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, the Dawa Party, Moqtada al-Sadr and his Mahdi army, and Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani.16 A recent report issued by Chatham House concluded, "It is Iran, not the United States, that is the most influential ‘external’ power in Iraq, with an unparalleled ability to affect stability and security across most of the country."17 These efforts are in keeping with what may be identified as Iranian strategy for a post-Hussein Iraq. This strategy seeks the following goals:

• Prevent the emergence of an Iraq dominated by Arab-Sunnis that might threaten Iran.
• Promote Iran’s economic and religious interests in Iraq (several Shia holy shrines are located in Iraq).
• Prevent the emergence of a separate independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq. Such a state might encourage the Kurds in Iran to follow suit.
• Prevent a decisive US victory. Such an outcome would improve the US image in the Middle East and could encourage Washington to repeat the experience of "regime change" in Iran. Keeping American troops fighting in Iraq reduces the chances of a US attack on Iran.
• Prevent a full-scale civil war in Iraq. Such a war would threaten the Shia influence inside Iraq, destabilize Iran, and antagonize surrounding Sunni-Arab states.

Time will dictate whether Iran will achieve some or all of these objectives. The future of Iraq is uncertain at present. Still, a few trends can be anticipated. First, a Shia-dominated Iraq is certain to have much closer relations with Iran. Meanwhile, given the heavy US investment in Iraq, any new Iraqi government is sure to maintain relations with America. Second, the close cultural and political ties between Iraqi Shias and Iran does not mean that Iraq would establish an Islamic state similar to that in Tehran. Historically, Iraq is one of the most secular of the Arab states. Furthermore, top Iraqi Shia leaders, including Sistani, have not endorsed the Iranian model of velayt e-faqih (guardianship of the jurist), direct clerical control of the government. Third, by toppling Saddam Hussein and permitting majority rule, the United States made Iraq one of the first Arab countries to be ruled by Shias in recent history. This liberation and empowerment of Shias in Iraq has already had an impact on the region, what the author Vali Nasr calls "The Shia Revival."18 This Shia empowerment is viewed with alarm by several Sunni-Arab governments. They are concerned about rising Iranian influence in the Middle East and its impact on their own Shia populations.

The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates) have maintained cultural, religious, commercial, and security ties with Iran for centuries. These relations have not always been amicable, however. Arab states bordering the Persian Gulf have always been suspicious of the intentions and capabilities of their larger neighbor. This suspicion is really more about Iran’s size and its potential and less about the nature of any regime in Tehran. During the first decade of the Islamic Revolution (1979-89) relations between Iran and the GCC reached one of the lowest points ever. Iran was enthusiastic about exporting its revolution and the GCC countries sought to contain such a threat by supporting Iraq. Relations gradually improved in the early 1990s, and the presidency of Muhammad Khatemi (1997-2005) marked a dramatic improvement in relations between the two. However, since 2005 Ahmadinejad’s foreign policy rhetoric, among other things, has caused a cooling of Iran’s relations with its Arab neighbors.

Since the fall of Saddam Hussein, the GCC has been anxiously watching Iran’s progress toward regional supremacy. In their eyes, Iran is emerging as the real beneficiary of the war in Iraq. Prince Saud al-Faisal, the Saudi Foreign Minister, summed up the Arabs’ dismay noting that during the Iran-Iraq War the United States and Saudi Arabia intervened to save Iraq from Iranian attacks. Since the 2003 war, however, the United States has been accused by Saudi Arabia of permitting Iran to bring in people, money, and weapons. It seems Iran is being handed Iraq on a golden platter.19 A major concern is how the rise of Iran’s influence, and the growing power of Iraq’s Shia majority might affect the delicate sectarian balance within the GCC. Another major concern is how the GCC might accommodate Iran while simultaneously maintaining close relations with the United States. The growing confrontation between Washington and Tehran over the nuclear issue has only served to heighten this dilemma.

There are a number of factors shaping the Arab states’ position on Iran’s nuclear ambitions. First, an Iran with nuclear weapons would have increased leverage to influence regional policy, a greater ability to intimidate its neighbors, and an enhanced position from which to challenge US involvement in the region. Second, there is a concern about potential environmental hazards. Some of Iran’s nuclear facilities are close to Arab states on the Persian Gulf. Furthermore, Iran depends heavily on Russian nuclear technology. Problematically, Russian technology has a questionable safety record as demonstrated by the 1986 Chernobyl disaster. Third, Arab states are placed in the unenviable position of not being able to demand action to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons without demanding that Israel forego its nuclear objectives, an option Israel is not willing to consider. Tehran’s nuclear ambition even presents the possibility of inviting an Israeli preemptive attack. A potential Iranian-Israeli military confrontation would destabilize the region even further. Fourth, if the United States decides to take military action against Iranian nuclear facilities, Arab governments would have difficulty justifying the bombing of another Muslim country to their domestic constituents. Additionally, such a confrontation between a Western coalition and Iran might provoke Tehran to retaliate against its Arab neighbors if there is any suspicion of cooperation.

Against this backdrop, it is clear that the GCC states have no easy option in the intensifying dilemma over Iran’s nuclear ambition. Thus, Arab states have decided to play a limited role, if any, in resolving the situation. Prince Saud al-Faisal summed up the Arabs’ feelings, "We’re hoping a diplomatic solution would work and would allow us to have a third option rather than the two bad options that are there—either atomic weapons in Iran or taking them out."20 In addition, the Gulf Research Center, a think-tank in the United Arab Emirates, has called for designating the Persian Gulf a weapon of mass destruction free zone (WMDFZ) as an initial step toward a wider WMDFZ covering the entire Middle East. Given their close relations with both Iran and the United States, it would be unrealistic to expect the GCC to play a major role in ongoing negotiations.21

Iran’s rising power, its nuclear ambition, and the potential confrontation with Western powers all are major concerns for the Arab states in the Persian Gulf. A relative détente between the Islamic Republic and the United States along with reduced tensions with Israel would go a long way in promoting greater regional stability.

Iran and Israel

Admittedly, Iran has never officially recognized Israel. Under the Pahlavi regime the two non-Arab states worked together to contain a common enemy, radical Arab nationalism. Consequently, they established close economic, technological, and military cooperation. The 1979 Islamic Revolution brought a dramatic end to this discreet cooperation. Iranian leaders sought to "Islamize" the Arab-Israeli conflict and reject what they consider an Israeli occupation of Muslim land. For a short time in the mid-1980s Israel sold Iran some US-made weapons and spare parts in what became known as the Iran-Contra Affair. This affair, however, did not change the animosity between the two states. They continue to perceive one another as a sworn enemy.

Under Ahmadinejad’s presidency, Iranian leadership has intensified its rhetoric against the Jewish state. The Iranian president expressed his desire to "wipe Israel off the map," and he even denied the Holocaust. Tehran has also strengthened its ties with Palestinian organizations such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Other factions within the Iranian leadership, however, have been more conciliatory about the Arab-Israeli conflict. Former President Muhammad Khatemi, for example, stated that Iran would accept a Palestinian state that is ready to live alongside Israel if the elected Hamas government freely adopted such an outcome.22 Rhetoric aside, Israel does not represent a threat to Iran’s national security. Statements against the Jewish state are made to reinforce the Iranian regime’s revolutionary credentials. Thus, Tehran has avoided direct conflict with Tel Aviv and has instead opted for a proxy-war strategy. The 2006 war in Lebanon between Israel and Hezbollah is a case in point.

After 34 days of fighting without a decisive victory by either side, a cease-fire was adopted. Naturally, the Israeli government along with the Iranian and Hezbollah leaders all claimed to have achieved their strategic goals. Addressing the Israeli Knesset shortly after the cease-fire, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert said, "War had changed the strategic balance against Hezbollah ... [The] Party of God is no longer a state within a state."23 Many Israelis, however, disagree with their government’s assessment. Benjamin Netanyahu, former Prime Minister and leader of the right-wing Likud, declared, "There were many failures, failures in identifying the threat, failures in preparing to meet the threat, failures in the management of the war, and failures in the management of the home front."24 Recognizing these failures, the Chief of Staff of the Israeli army, Lieutenant General Dan Halutz, resigned in January 2007.

On the other side, Sheikh Hassan Nasr-Allah declared that Hezbollah had achieved a "strategic historic victory" over Israel. He asserted that his fighters had succeeded where "big Arab armies had been defeated."25 Indeed, the mere survival of Hezbollah in battle with the Middle East’s most powerful army made it victorious in the eyes of many Arabs and Muslims. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s supreme leader, echoed this sentiment in a message to Sheikh Nasr-Allah, "You have ridiculed the myth that the Zionist army is invincible."26 However, the amount of destruction in Lebanon raises doubt on the validity of these declarations. Euphoria often does not last long. The enduring lessons of the conflict will only become clear over time. Still, some fundamental changes in the region’s strategic environment following the 2006 war can be identified.

First, the intensity and duration of the conflict raised doubts regarding Israeli deterrence. The concept of deterrence is largely about prevention, not retaliation. In other words, a successful deterrent works when enemies are convinced they would pay a high price if attacked. This price convinces a potential attacker to rule out any military option. In the 2006 conflict, Israel’s conventional and non-conventional capabilities failed to deter Hezbollah. As a result Israeli strategists are presently reviewing their nation’s military doctrine and strategy.

Second, as analysts in the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies argue, "air power has proved of very limited usefulness."27 In a few days, the Israeli air force ran out of targets and after thousands of air sorties, Israel failed to seriously impair Hezbollah’s capabilities. The destruction of Lebanon’s infrastructure also failed to provoke the Lebanese population to revolt against Hezbollah. Hopefully, these valuable lessons will not be lost on Israeli or American strategists if they pursue a military option against Iran’s nuclear facilities.

Third, Israel has defeated the Arab armies in each of the previous wars (1948, 1956, 1967, and 1973). In 2006, however, Hezbollah fighters sustained the fight against Israel for more than a month and achieved an Israeli withdrawal. As a result, the popularity of Hezbollah and its prime supporter Iran has risen markedly among the Arab and Muslim masses. After some hesitation, Sunni governments in the region felt compelled to join in support of Hezbollah. Even Ayman al-Zawahiri, deputy leader of al Qaeda, released a taped message endorsing Hezbollah’s fight against Israel.28 This rising popularity and the apparent unity between Hezbollah and Iran certainly was welcome news in Tehran. In the long run, however, Sunni governments’ suspicion of the Shias in general and Hezbollah and Iran in particular is not likely to wane. In late 2006, Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, leading Sunni governments, supported the Siniora regime in Lebanon against attempts by Hezbollah to bring it down.

Fourth, the 2006 war and its outcome are likely to further radicalize the Arab and Muslim masses and fuel anti-Israel and US sentiment. For more than a month, Arab and Muslim television viewers watched the Israeli army destroying Lebanon, not to mention the creation of hundreds of civilian casualties. Arab commentators claimed that Israel was over-reacting to the kidnapping of its soldiers and praised Hezbollah’s resistance as heroic. The Iranians supported Hezbollah by stating that armed resistance is the "only language the enemy understands."29 Meanwhile, the United States failed to endorse early calls for a cease-fire. In Iraq, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani condemned the "Israeli aggression" and warned that Islamic nations will not forgive the entities that hinder a cease-fire.30

Fifth, as a result of the conflict Hezbollah is destined to figure prominently in Iran’s strategic calculus. According to one Iranian analyst, "If Israel triumphs in this battle, not only the nuclear dossier, but also the territorial integrity of Iran will be jeopardized."31 Put another way, support for Hezbollah was seen as a national security priority in Tehran. Thus, the conflict has strengthened the strategic alliance between Hezbollah and Iran. Tehran’s extensive involvement in Lebanon’s Shia community is not likely to fade in the foreseeable future.

Finally, the conflict demonstrated the fragility of the overarching security system in the Middle East and the implications that portends for regional and global instability. It is a fact that hundreds of Lebanese and Israelis lost their lives; there was genuine concern that the hostilities might even expand to Syria and Iran; and the conflict added pressure to already high oil prices. The military confrontation between Hezbollah and Israel brought the entire Middle East close to the edge of regional conflict with grave strategic and economic implications.

The regional security system faces another challenge created by Iran’s nuclear ambitions and the associated uncertainty of Israel’s response. The Israeli government believes that a nuclear Iran is an existential threat to the Jewish state. Similarly, some analysts argue that Israel cannot co-exist with a nuclear Iran. Bernard Lewis, for example, suggests that there is a radical difference between Iran and other governments with nuclear weapons. "This difference is expressed in what can only be described as the apocalyptic worldview of Iran’s present rulers."32 The mutually assured destruction balance that prevented a nuclear confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War will not in all likelihood work between Israel and a nuclear Iran.

Some analysts make the distinction between being suicidal and extremist. They believe that Iran’s nuclear program is not driven by an obsession to destroy Israel, but by "its determination to preserve its regime and establish itself as a strategic regional power, vis-à-vis both Israel and the Sunni Arab states."33 Iranian leaders understand that a nuclear attack on Israel would invite a harsh Israeli, and probably American, retaliation. Thus, the argument goes, "It is possible to build a stable system of future nuclear deterrence between Israel and Iran."34 In order to establish such a deterrent, Israel will have to abandon its policy of nuclear ambiguity and declare itself a nuclear power, while continuing to build a second-strike capability.35 Of equal importance is a fully capable and supporting missile defense system.36

In summary, the toppling of the Taliban and Saddam Hussein along with the continuing instability in Iraq have all contributed to Iran’s rising power. The regime in Tehran feels less threatened by regional rivals and more certain in its quest for leadership in the Persian Gulf and the Middle East. For many years Israel has never had its military dominance challenged by a regional power. This emerging strategic configuration may well lead to a greater possibility of confrontation between Tehran and Tel Aviv. Anoushiravan Ehteshami suggests that the two countries see a historic opportunity "to stamp their hegemony on the considerably weakened Arab domain around them, and attempt to extend their reach into the other’s zones of influence."37 A confrontation between Tehran and Tel Aviv, however, is not inevitable. A strategic dialogue between the two states is not only possible but desirable. Such a dialogue would almost certainly enhance regional stability. Equally important is a well thought and executed US policy for the region. Such a policy can reduce the chances for confrontation and enhance the likelihood of a meaningful dialogue.

Policy Implications

A successful security paradigm has to acknowledge Iran’s growing power and design a framework for incorporating it in a multilateral system that encompasses all regional powers, along with the United States. If Iran is to be truly successful as a leader in the region it needs to solidify its recent gains to reach some understanding or détente with the United States.38

The intense resistance to the US-led coalitions in Iraq and Afghanistan, the controversy over inadequate intelligence, and questions related to the existence of weapons of mass destruction have all enhanced the possibility of an American confrontation with Iran. Equally undesirable is any strategy of policy focusing on economic sanctions. For the past several years, Iran has successfully cultivated commercial and energy ties with major Asian and European powers. This web of business relationships explains why not all global powers are enthusiastic about imposing sweeping economic sanctions on Iran. Iran is a promising market, flush with oil wealth and many of its 68 million people yearn for consumer goods, largely unavailable for decades.39

Disruption of the flow of energy from the Persian Gulf will be a major consideration in any potential confrontation with Iran. In June 2006 Ayatollah Ali Khamenei warned, "If Americans make a mistake about Iran, the flow of energy from this region will definitely be jeopardized."40 Similarly, Ali Larijani, Iran’s chief negotiator in nuclear talks, stated, "We are not interested in using oil as a weapon, but if the conditions change it could affect our decision."41 However, Iran’s overwhelming dependency on oil revenues raises serious doubt about the validity of such threats.

Zbigniew Brzezinski, former US national security adviser, urges the United States to engage in bilateral talks with Iran on mutually contentious security and economic issues.42 The bipartisan Iraq Study Group, co-chaired by James Baker and Lee Hamilton, advocates that, "Of all the neighbors, Iran has the most leverage in Iraq." The group recommends that the United States "engage directly with Iran and Syria in order to try to obtain their commitment to constructive policies toward Iraq and other regional issues."43

In late 2006 significant developments in Washington and Tehran altered the political landscape in both capitals significantly enough to facilitate the adoption of a new approach. The Democratic Party won the election in America taking charge of both houses of the Congress, and in Iran elections for municipal councils and the Assembly of Experts (Majles e-Khobregan) were held in mid-December. The clear victory in that election by Iranian reformist and pragmatic conservatives dealt a heavy blow to the populist, hard-line faction led by President Ahmadinejad.

A constructive engagement with Tehran has the potential of convincing Iran to use its influence and intelligence capabilities to reduce tensions in Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, and on the West Bank. Washington should also engage in a quiet diplomacy in an effort to reach a détente between Tehran and Tel Aviv. Such an initiative is likely to greatly enhance the prospects for political stability and regional security in the Middle East and west Asia. It is time that those responsible for crafting the policies and strategies for the region understand that US and Iranian interests are not by definition mutually exclusive.

NOTES

1. Martin Indyk, Responding to Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions: Next Steps, Testimony Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 19 September 2006, http://www.brookings.edu/views/testimony/indyk/20060919.pdf .

2. Shahram Chubin, Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006), p.15.

3. Robert Lowe and Claire Spence, eds., Iran, Its Neighbors and the Regional Crises (London: Chatham House, 2006), http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/pdf/research/mep/Iran0806.pdf.

4. Sammy Salama and Elizabeth Salch, "Iran’s Nuclear Impasse: Give Negotiations a Chance," Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 2 June 2006, http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/060602.htm.

5. Bill Samii, "Iran: New Foreign Policy Council Could Curtail Ahmadinejad’s Power," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 29 June 2006.

6. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance (London: Routledge, 2006), pp.165-216.

7. Anoushiravan Ehteshami, "The Future of Iran’s Defense and Nuclear Policy," in Iranian Challenges, ed. Walter Posch (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, 2006), p. 73.

8. Center for Nonproliferation Studies, "Iran: Missile Chronology," http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Iran/Missile/1788_4967.html.

9. Reuters, "Iran Says Can Mass Produce Medium-Range Missiles." 12 October 2004.

10. Ali Akbar Dareini, "Iran Achieves Solid Fuel Technology," Associated Press, 18 July 2005.

11. Hooshang Amirahmadi, "US-Iran Relations: Perils and Promises," Payvand, 22 September 2006, http://www.payvand.com/news/06/sep/1254.html.

12. Several recent studies have dealt with the history of Iran’s nuclear program and the country’s motives to acquire such capabilities. See Shahram Chubin, Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006); Mustafa Kibaroglu, "Good for the Shah, Banned for the Mullahs: The West and Iran’s Quest for Nuclear Power," Middle East Journal, 60 (Spring 2006), 207-33; Jahangir Amuzegar, "Nuclear Iran: Perils and Prospects," Middle East Policy, 13 (Summer 2006), 90-112; and Gawdat Bahgat, "Nuclear Proliferation: The Islamic Republic of Iran," International Studies Perspectives, 7 (May 2006), 124-36.

13. Javad Zarif, "We Do Not Have a Nuclear Weapons Program," New York Times, 6 April 2006, p. A25.

14. John Chipman, "The Military Balance 2006: Press Statement," 24 May 2006, http://www.iiss.org/publications/the-military-balance/military-balance-2006-launch.

15. Peter R. Lavoy, "The Strategic Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation—A Review Essay," Security Studies, 4 (Summer 1995), 713.

16. Ray Takeyh, Responding to Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions: Testimony Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 19 September 2006, http://cfr.org/publication/11484/responding_to_irans_nuclear_ambition.html.

17. Lowe and Spence, p. 20.

18. Vali Nasr, The Shia Revival: How Conflicts Within Islam Will Shape the Future (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2006).

19. Prince Saud al-Faisal, "Saudi Arabia and the International Oil Market: An Executive Summary of the Special Presentation," The James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, 21 September 2005, p. 2.

20. "Gulf States Send Envoy to Urge Iran to Forgo Nuclear Arms," Reuters, 17 May 2006.

21. Emile El-Hokayem and Matteo Legrenzi, "The Arab Gulf States in the Shadow of the Iranian Nuclear Challenge," The Henry L. Stimson Center, 26 May 2006, http://www.stimson.org/swa/pdf/StimsonIranGCC WorkingPaper.pdf.

22. Guy Dinmore and Najmeh Bozorgmehr, "Iran Accepts Two-State Answer in Mideast," Financial Times, 4 September 2006, p. 12.

23. Sheera Claire Frenkel, "Olmert—We Will Continue to Pursue Hezbollah Everywhere," Jerusalem Post, 14 August 2006, p. 3.

24. Donald Macintyre, "Israel’s Verdict: We Lost the War," Independent, 15 August 2006, p. 1.

25. Paul Reynolds, "New Phase in Mid-East Power Struggle," British Broadcasting Corporation, 16 August 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4798017.stm.

26. Hussein Dakroub, "Iran Leader Praises Hezbollah Resistance," Associated Press, 16 August 2006, http://www.iranfocus.com/modules/news/article.php?storyid=8265.

27. International Institute for Strategic Studies, "The War in Lebanon: Strategic Consequences," Strategic Comments, 12 (July 2006), 2.

28. Neil MacFarquhar, "Tide of Arab Opinion Turning to Hezbollah," International Herald Tribune, 29 July 2006, p. 1.

29. Bill Samii, "Iran: Is Tehran Protecting Its Investment in Hezbollah?" Payvand, 14 August 2006, http://www.payvand.com/news/06/aug/1151.html.

30. New York Times, "News Analysis: Iraq Supporting Lebanon," 31 July 2006.

31. Cited in Kaveh L. Afrasiabi, "Tehran Teeters on the Path to War," Asia Times, 2 August 2006, www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/HH02Ak03.html.

32. Bernard Lewis, "August 22," Wall Street Journal, 8 August 2006, p. A10.

33. Shlomo Ben-Armi, "The Basis for Iran’s Belligerence," Haaretz, 8 September 2006.

34. Reuven Pedatzur, "Let Them Have Nukes," Haaretz, 8 September 2006.

35. In the last several years Israel acquired a number of German submarines with nuclear-strike capabilities.

36. Israel has several missile defense systems. The most sophisticated one is Arrow, developed in cooperation with the United States.

37. Ehteshami, p. 85.

38. Mohsen M. Milani, "Iran’s Policy Towards Afghanistan," Middle East Journal, 60 (Spring 2006), 255.

39. Neil King Jr. and Marc Champion, "Embargo Politics: Nations’ Rich Trade with Iran Is Hurdle for Sanctions Plan," Wall Street Journal, 20 September 2006, p. A1.

40. Roula Khalaf, "Iran Threatens Oil Disruption in Event of U.S. Mistake," Financial Times, 5 June 2006, p. 7.

41. Steven Mufson, "The Weapon Iran May Not Want to Use," The Washington Post, 19 May 2006, p. D1.

42. Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Do Not Attack Iran," International Herald Tribune, 26 April 2006, p. 7.

43. James A. Baker, III, and Lee H. Hamilton, The Iran Study Group Report (New York: Vintage Books, 2006), p. 51.

Gawdat Bahgat is Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for Middle Eastern Studies at Indiana University of Pennsylvania. His most recent books include American Oil Diplomacy in the Persian Gulf and the Caspian Sea, Israel and the Persian Gulf: Retrospect and Prospect, and Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in the Middle East. In addition, he has published numerous articles on the Persian Gulf and the Caspian Sea in scholarly journals.

Russia: We'll react militarily to US

2008-08-26T20:16:00.000-07:00

AP, 26/08/08

Russia may offer a military response to a US missile shield in Europe, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev warned Tuesday.

He said that the deployment of an anti-missile system close to Russian borders "will of course create additional tensions."

"We will have to react somehow, to react, of course, in a military way," Medvedev was quoted as saying Tuesday by the RIA-Novosti news agency.

Meanwhile, US President George W. Bush urged Russia to reconsider its "irresponsible decision" to shower independent status on two breakaway Georgian provinces.

Already rebuffed by Medvedev, Bush warned Russia to change course and respect the borders of its Georgian neighbor.

"Russia's action only exacerbates tensions and complicates diplomatic negotiations," the president said by written statement from Texas, where he is vacationing.

Medvedev said Tuesday that his country would grant diplomatic recognition to the separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. He said Georgia forced Russia's hand by trying to gain control by force in the smaller of the two areas, South Ossetia, on Aug. 7.

Bush shot back that Russia's move violates both United Nations resolutions and the six-point cease-fire deal that Russia, under Medvedev's watch, signed with Georgia to end war.

"We expect Russia to live up to its international commitments, reconsider this irresponsible decision, and follow the approach set out in the six-point agreement," Bush said.

The White House says the US will use its veto power to on the UN Security Council to ensure that the two separatist provinces remain part of Georgia in the eyes of the world.

US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said that any push by Russia to do otherwise will be "dead on arrival" at the United Nations.

The rhetoric underscored the stakes of a once obscure territorial dispute that has mushroomed into a Cold War-style conflict between the United States and Russia.

The White House, though, sought to emphasize that Russia's real conflict was with the broader international community. Several world leaders criticized Russia's action on the two provinces.

"Russia is making, I would say, a number of irrational decisions," commented Bush's Deputy Assistant Tony Fratto.

"We hope that they hear the loud voices from the international community and understand that it's not in their long-term interests to take these kinds of actions," he said.

Vice President Dick Cheney leaves next week on a trip that includes a stop in Georgia; Fratto said that no US officials plan to go Russia to appeal directly to leaders there.

"The Russians know their obligations and I don't know that it requires anyone going to Russia to inform them of it," he said.

Meanwhile, the United States dispatched a military ship bearing aid to a Georgian port city still patrolled by Russian troops.

All options are on the table regarding Iran

2008-08-26T19:48:00.001-07:00

By Haaretz service and Reuters

Israel Defense Forces Chief of Staff Gabi Ashkenazi, on his first official visit to Washington, warned Thursday that Israel would not rule out any course of action regarding Iran's nuclear ambitions, Israel Radio reported.

"We are all united in the view that Iran needs to be prevented from obtaining a nuclear weapon. There is no doubt that diplomatic activity and sanctions are preferable, but we all understand -we and the Americans-that we need to prepare all options," the radio report quoted Ashkenazi stating after meeting with senior United States officials.

Western nations accuse Iran of seeking to develop nuclear weapons under the cover of its civil nuclear program. Iran denies that, saying its atomic program is to generate power so it can export more of its valuable oil and gas.

On the first day of his trip Wednesday, the IDF chief warned that it was crucial to block what he called "Iranian aggression" in the Middle East.

"We are are witnessing, I believe, a paradigmatic change in the Middle East in which radical countries and elements are trying to [install] a new order to replace the traditional national, secular one that exists today," Ashkenazi said in a brief speech at the Israeli Embassy.

Israel and Washington accuse Iran of fomenting violence in Iraq and of supplying arms to Palestinian militants and to Lebanon's Hezbollah, which the United States regards as a terrorist organization.

"At the center of this radical axis is Iran, who seeks to achieve its regional aspiration of hegemony by upsetting the existing balance of power," Ashkenazi told the embassy, accusing Iran of backing "terror organizations and radical groups" and of pursuing nuclear arms "to project power within the region and beyond."

"I believe it is therefore crucial that we block Iranian aggression, which [may] in turn weaken the radicalization process in the region presently being manifested in such places as Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon and in the Palestinian territories," he added.

Ashkenazi made no reference to speculation about the possibility of an Israeli strike on Iranian nuclear facilities. Israel carried out an air strike last year on a suspected Syrian nuclear reactor.

The IDF chief met with U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney on Wednesday, as well as senior congressmen and John Negroponte, the deputy secretary of state. On Thursday he was set to meet with his counterpart at the Pentagon, Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael Mullen.

Meanwhile, Democratic presidential hopeful Barack Obama pledged to Prime Minister Ehud Olmert Wednesday that if elected, he will coordinate his policy on Iran with Israel.

Senior U.S. officials, while saying they never take any option off the table - code for the possibility of a military strike - have played down speculation about a U.S. military strike against Iran over its nuclear program.

But speculation that Israel could bomb Iranian nuclear installations has grown since it reportedly carried out a large-scale air force drill over the Mediterranean last month that was widely seen as a "dress rehearsal" for a possible raid on Iran.

The United States is pursuing a diplomatic path to try to persuade Iran to suspend its uranium enrichment program, a process that can produce fuel for power plants or, if greatly refined, for nuclear weapons.

So far, neither Western offers of economic incentives nor three UN Security Council sanctions resolutions have convinced Iran to suspend uranium enrichment.

U.S. officials have said repeatedly they are focused on the diplomatic track and, along with other permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany, have given Iran two weeks to respond to a fresh offer of incentives from the so-called P5+1 group if it suspends uranium enrichment.

Ashkenazi's schedule on Wednesday included meetings with U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney, White House national security adviser Stephen Hadley, Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte and key members of Congress. On Thursday, he is to meet Admiral Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The big powers are going down

2008-08-26T19:44:00.000-07:00

TEHRAN - Iran's president on Tuesday blamed the U.S. and other "big powers" for nuclear proliferation, AIDS and other global ills, and accused them of exploiting the U.N. and other organizations for their own gain and the developing world's loss.

Iran's President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad likes nothing more than criticizing the U.S. But, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said, time was on the poor countries' side.

"The big powers are going down," Ahmadinejad told foreign ministers of the Nonaligned Movement meeting in Tehran. "They have come to the end of their power, and the world is on the verge of entering a new, promising era."

The more than 100-member NAM is made up of such diverse members as communist Cuba, Jamaica and India and depicts itself as bloc-free. But most members share a critical view of the U.S and the developed world in general.

And with Iran assuming the chairmanship of the conference Tuesday, Ahmadinejad's keynote speech was tailored to reflect the struggle that some NAM members see themselves in against the world's rich and powerful countries. Video Watch more on Iran's nuclear ambitions »

A draft of the final document that ministers will be asked to approve, made available to The Associated Press as the conference opened Tuesday, reflected that struggle.

"The rich and powerful countries continue to exercise an inordinate influence in determining the nature and direction of international relations, including economic and trade relations, as well as rules governing these relations, many of which are at the expense of developing countries," it said.

NAM countries oppose "unilaterally imposed measures by certain states...the use and threat of use of force, and pressure and coercive measures as a means to achieving their national policy objectives," said the draft.

That appeared to be an indirect slap at the United States, which has refused to rule out force as a possible means of last resort against Iran unless it heeds U.N. Security Council demands to curb its nuclear activities.

The draft also condemns "the categorization of countries as good or evil based on unilateral and unjustified criteria"-oblique criticism of President Bush's labeling of Iran as part of an "axis of evil" along with Saddam Hussein's Iraq and North Korea.

Iran has in the past counted on NAM countries to blunt pressure from the U.S. and its allies for harsh U.N. sanctions and other penalties because of its refusal to freeze uranium enrichment, which can produce both nuclear fuel or the fissile payload of warheads. Tehran has been slapped with three sets of U.N. sanctions because of its nuclear defiance and new penalties loom unless Tehran shows compromise.

Another draft statement also obtained by the AP before the meeting began seeks continued support. Submitted by Iran on behalf of the NAM, it asks the conference to agree that "sanctions imposed on Iran for its nuclear program are of a political nature and should be promptly removed."

The ministers "further affirm...that there is no legal basis that [the] U.N. Security Council proceeds" in continuing to deal with the Iran nuclear file, said that draft.

While only infrequently mentioning the U.S. by name Tuesday, Ahmadinejad made clear that he blamed Washington and its allies for trying to "impose their political will on nations and governments."

He accused the great powers of "fomenting discord...to intensify the military and arms race" so they can feed their arms industries. AIDS, he said, also was the result of world conditions "imposed by big powers."

Accusing the U.N. Security Council of being a tool of the world's haves-which use them against the have-nots-he said it was useless to expect that body to be the solution to the world's ills.

"If the United Nations and the Security Council...were supposed to deal with the problems of the world...we would not have a problem called Palestine," he declared, in indirect criticism of the creation of the Jewish state 60 years ago.